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Foreword	  	   The	   Workshop	   on	   ‘Linked	   Democracy:	   Artificial	   Intelligence	   for	   Democratic	  Innovation’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  official	  workshops	  of	  the	  International	  Joint	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (IJCAI	  2017)	  held	  in	  Melbourne	  (19-­‐26	  August	  2017).	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  workshop	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  multidisciplinary	  forum	  to	  address	  questions	  such	  as:	  How	  to	  model	  the	  interactions	  between	  people,	  data,	  and	  digital	  tools	  that	  create	  new	   spaces	   and	   forms	   of	   civic	   action	   in	   the	   digital	   era?	  How	   to	   analyse	   emerging	  properties	  and	  types	  of	  knowledge	  in	  these	  contexts?	  How	  to	  design	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	   that	   effectively	   leverage	   data	   and	   knowledge	   for	   deliberation	   (or	   other	  types	  of	  participation)	  and	  collective	  decision	  making?	  Can	  we	  design	  the	  meta-­‐rules	  of	  the	  emergent	  ecosystems?	  The	  Workshop	  brings	   together	  participants	   from	  universities	  and	  research	  centers	  in	   Australia,	   New	   Zealand,	   Spain,	   Brazil,	   Israel,	   UK,	   and	   the	   USA.	   The	   workshop	  received	  10	  submissions,	  covering	  a	  number	  of	  different	  areas	  in	  AI	  (e.g.	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  and	  machine	  learning),	  economics,	  political	  sciences,	  and	  law.	  All	  submitted	  versions	  were	  reviewed	  by	  at	  least	  two	  members	  of	  the	  Program	  Committee.	  	  These	  proceedings	   finally	   include	  nine	  of	   these	  papers	  and	  an	   invited	  keynote	   speech	  by	  Patrick	  Keyzer.1	  	  We	   sincerely	   thank	   the	   Program	  Committee	  members	   for	   reviewing	   all	   submitted	  papers	   and	   providing	   feedback	   to	   improve	   their	   revised	   versions.	   We	   are	   also	  grateful	   to	   the	   IJCAI	   2017	   chairs	   (Program	   Chair	   Carles	   Sierra,	   Workshops	   Chair	  Daniele	  Magazzeni	  and	  Local	  Arrangements	  co-­‐Chair	  Andy	  Song)	  for	  their	  support	  in	  preparing	  this	  workshop.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  participants	  who	  submitted	  their	  papers	  and	  afterwards	  produced	  the	  revised	  versions	  that	  are	  now	  composing	  these	  proceedings.	  	  	   Marta	  Poblet,	  Pompeu	  Casanovas,	  and	  Enric	  Plaza	  Workshop	  Chairs	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  The	  submission	  not	  published	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  this	  volume	  can	  be	  found	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  Cohensius,	  G.,	  Mannor,	  S.,	  Meir,	  R.,	  Meirom,	   E.,	   &	   Orda,	   A.	   (2017).	   Proxy	   Voting	   for	   Better	   Outcomes.	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   Proceedings	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1 The Cautionary Tale of “Robo-Debt”  
Centrelink, Australia’s welfare agency, recently contacted the Commonwealth Scien-
tific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia’s leading public scientific agen-
cy, and asked its “Data61” team to review its electronic data-matching system with 
the Australian Taxation Office, the “Online Compliance Intervention”.  The purpose 
of the Online Compliance Intervention was to data-match tax records and welfare 
payment records, work out whether there were any discrepancies, and then correct 
them (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2017).  It makes sense for governments to ensure 
that welfare benefits are paid to people who are genuinely in need, and to ensure that 
benefits are not paid to people who have paid employment.  Properly set up and oper-
ated, such a system could help ensure that resources are most effectively deployed to 
prevent poverty and minimise welfare fraud. 
However this is not how things worked in practice, in a great many cases.  Instead, 
from about midway through last year and well into this year, Centrelink’s data-
matching system was conflating annual earnings figures from the Tax Office with 
fortnightly income profiles used by Centrelink to assess welfare payment needs.  It 
transpires that the “Matching Techniques” Protocol deployed an algorithm to calcu-
late totals for a number of financial years, but since Centrelink doesn’t return detailed 
fortnightly data about a given year’s earnings, the algorithm simply averaged the 
amounts over the relevant periods.  This approach was prone to errors, particularly in 
circumstances where a beneficiary might have made transitions in and out of work 
(increasingly common in a casualised labour market). 
Regrettably, the errors produced by this defective approach were compounded by 
the administrative approach taken to the recoupment of the debts.   Letters were sent 
out automatically, without any internal, human review of the relevant calculations.  
These identified debts of hundreds or even thousands of dollars and then required the 
recipients to contact Centrelink within 21 days to explain the discrepancy, or pay the 
debt under penalty of enforcement. The letters did not include contact telephone num-
bers for the compliance team, so people seeking assistance contacted Centrelink 
through a general call line that resulted in long waiting times.  It transpires that the 
 call line was staffed by people who had little knowledge of the Online Compliance 
Intervention because they had not been trained. 
The characterisation of these letters has been a bone of contention.  They were de-
scribed by the departmental secretary in a subsequent Senate Inquiry as “clarification 
letters” – as providing opportunities for welfare beneficiaries to “clarify” the discrep-
ancy between the identified debt and the beneficiary’s personal records.   However to 
ensure that this “clarification” was provided within a particular time period, the Gov-
ernment authorised private debt collectors to follow-up the letters with telephone calls 
in return for a 10% bonus payment.  The “clarification” was thus outsourced by the 
government department to the “customer”, and to be conducted under the shadow of a 
penalty. 
After many complaints, the Commonwealth Ombudsman initiated an investigation.  
The Ombudsman’s report concluded that the enforcement regime imposed unreasona-
ble burdens on welfare beneficiaries and Centrelink staff.  The Ombudsman said that 
while it was reasonable for Centrelink to ask beneficiaries for assistance in explaining 
discrepancies in its records, that the 21-day timeframe was unreasonable, and that the 
success of the Initiative depended on its usability. Usability in turn depended on the 
accuracy and completeness of departmental information, which was questionable in 
many cases.  (Peter Hanks QC has questioned this, noting that the Ombudsman did 
not address the question whether the Social Security Act can create a debt presump-
tively, and whether the Department of Human Services could shift the fact-finding 
task to the individual: Hanks, 2017).  The Ombudsman also found that the require-
ment that people keep records over six or seven years was unreasonable, in part be-
cause beneficiaries had not been forewarned of this requirement. The Report also 
outlined problems related to planning and implementation, lack of consultation, and a 
failure to plan for or properly mitigate risks. In addition, the Ombudsman found that 
Centrelink’s assistance and customer support was defective (it has been reported that 
there were 42 million unanswered phone calls in a month) and that staff had not been 
adequately trained to support customers and to deal with complaints. 
The Robo-Debt Controversy could be dismissed as a classic case of “garbage in, 
garbage out” – the “algorithm” was flawed, and if it was fixed, then, according to the 
Ombudsman, it was otherwise fair for Centrelink to request “clarification”.  Perhaps 
the reference to Data 61 means that the Government will take expert advice to ensure 
that the design of such systems will be improved in the future.  But the Robo-Debt 
Controversy is a cautionary tale.  With the increasing use of artificial intelligence 
systems in public administration, where is the place for human oversight and proce-
dural justice?  What steps should we take to protect the most vulnerable people in our 
society from the public service machines?  This paper raises some questions.  An-
swering them will take more work. 
 
*** 
 
The deployment of artificial intelligence systems makes a lot of sense in large-
scale, routine work that requires no or only minimal and manageable discretion (Perry 
and Smith, 2014).  For example, a program developed by the United States Depart-
 ment of Veterans Affairs manages disability claims and has completely replaced hu-
man public servants by requiring applicants to fill in a detailed questionnaire that is 
then processed by software. Properly designed and implemented, these systems can 
speed up the operation of administrative justice and enhance transparency.  Questions 
arise, of course, when artificial intelligence initiatives disrupt—legally-sanctioned 
bureaucratic authority.  Notwithstanding the risks, it is likely that governments will 
continue to seek out new ways to automate such systems, in order to save revenue, 
particularly in environments of austerity (Perry and Smith, 2014) (let alone artificial-
ly-produced scarcity).  
In a recent lecture series at Penn State, Justice Cuellar of the California Supreme 
Court, a former Professor of Law and Information Technology at Stanford Law 
School, has identified a number of potential side effects from automated public deci-
sion-making.  Cybersecurity risks are an obvious example. However the impact of 
automation on dialogue is by far the most important: 
 
Implicit in democratic governance is an aspiration for dialogue and exchange of reasons that 
are capable of being understood, accepted, or rejected by policymakers, representatives of 
organized interests, and members of the public. 
 
Except when computerized decisions can rely on relatively straightforward, rule-like struc-
tures, difficulties will arise in supplying explanations of how decisions were made that could 
be sufficiently understood by policymakers and the public.  
 
Cuellar (2016) also remarked: 
 
This is not to say that the status quo is any deliberative panacea. On the contrary, it is easy 
to criticize the current administrative state for its lack of opportunities to allow the public to 
participate in decisions. Yet the growing reliance on automated computer programs to make 
sensitive decisions in the administrative state will only complicate what little deliberation 
does occur.  
 
Do the principles of Australian law provide adequate normative resources for deal-
ing with the challenges ahead?  This is a question that could inspire many academic 
papers.  In this paper I will focus on just one, but an important one: What happens 
when we don’t know why the machine has made the decision it has made?   
2 Risk Assessment on Secret Grounds 
In ‘The Minority Report’ (1956), the science fiction writer Philip K Dick famously 
invented ‘Precrime’, a government agency (later popularized by Tom Cruise in a very 
ordinary movie) which enabled the surveillance and apprehension of people who 
would commit murders in the future.  Today, suspected terrorists can be detained 
without charge on suspicion of future harm and sex offenders can be sent to prison on 
the basis of a risk assessment in circumstances where they have committed no new 
 crime (McSherry and Keyzer, 2009).  The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has said in several decisions that imprisoning a person on the basis of a risk assess-
ment in the absence of a fresh crime and criminal trial is arbitrary detention and in-
compatible with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Keyzer, 
2011) but this continues to be done, as Australia does not honour its international 
human rights obligations (O’Donovan and Keyzer, 2014).  In the absence of human 
rights norms, Australia is left with weak constitutional protections and the common 
law.  Can these principles ensure procedural justice in pre-crime scenarios? 
The use of secret algorithms in risk assessments is a new, worrying development in 
the criminal justice system.  Recently, a Wisconsin trial court sentenced a man named 
Eric Loomis to six years’ imprisonment for participating in a drive-by shooting (Lip-
tak, 2017).  In sentencing, the trial court considered a report derived from a software 
product called Compas, produced by a company called Northpointe Inc.  Compas uses 
an algorithm to weigh a number of risk factors and produce an actuarial risk assess-
ment of a person accused of a crime.  At trial, the prosecutor submitted a Compas 
report about Loomis that found him to be a high risk of violence, a high risk of recidi-
vism, and a high pretrial risk.  Loomis sought details about the software algorithm so 
that he could challenge its conclusions.  Northpointe declined to release any details 
about how its Compas algorithm calculates risk on the basis that it is proprietary, and 
commercial-in-confidence.  Loomis appealed the ruling of the trial judge. 
The process of actuarial risk assessment is well explained by Brad Johnson in his 
paper “Prophecy With Numbers” (2006), in terms worth setting out at some length: 
     
Psychiatrists and psychologists have employed a number of methods for determining risk 
with respect to human behaviour, which include … clinical assessment, actuarial risk as-
sessment and actuarially informed clinical assessment which combines elements from each. 
The difference between clinical and actuarial assessment is reflected in the type of data re-
lied on in order to determine the level of risk—clinical assessment relying primarily on data 
about the person being assessed and actuarial assessment relying on data from a population 
of individuals who share a number of attributes in common with the person being assessed, 
thus allowing statistical comparative judgements. … 
 
Actuarial risk assessment departs from clinical assessment methods by examining popula-
tions of released offenders in order to identify attributes that are associated with an increased 
risk of recidivism. The data with respect to recidivism rates collected from multiple sample 
populations of released offenders can be used to make some simple inferences. The relative 
frequency of recidivism for a particular sample may be used to make a probability statement 
about the chance of an individual, who shares the attributes that define the population, 
committing a future offence. Alternatively the relative frequencies for various populations 
may be compared to determine which samples display a higher level recidivism, which in 
turn is believed to indicate a greater risk of recidivism. The process of establishing relative 
frequencies with respect to recidivism begins by examining an initial population of released 
offenders for a specific period of time which yields relative frequencies for those who re-
offend and those who do not. The sample population being investigated also allows re-
searchers to look for attributes that are associated with recidivism. The initial population can 
 then be analysed by specifying further attributes that break the population down into more 
clearly defined demographic groups in the hope of identifying greater recidivism rates for 
specific populations. 
 
Elsewhere, Bernadette McSherry and I have written that the use of risk assessment 
scales may be justifiable for the purpose of treatment in clinical environments (2009), 
but problems with these scales are amplified by their use in legal forums, where they 
can be ‘prone to manipulation and misinterpretation’ (Sullivan, Mullen and Pathé, 
2005, p 319), leading to unnecessary detention due to false positive findings that the 
individual concerned is at risk of harming others.  Importantly, all of these scales are 
based on variables that are derived from analyzing groups, giving rise to the ‘statisti-
cal truism that the mean of a distribution tells us about everyone, yet no one’ (Cooke 
and Michie, 2010).  Ian Coyle and Robert Halon (2013) have further observed that: 
 
The law guarantees that a decision will be made but it does not guarantee outcomes. Yet that 
is precisely what the law seeks to require of those engaging in the task of risk-analysis of 
dangerousness.  It is time, once and for all, to acknowledge that estimates derived from ac-
tuarial tests cannot predict the future behavior of individuals with anything approaching that 
implicit in the legal minimum standards of proof. 
 
Returning to the Loomis case, the trial court used a COMPAS report to justify in-
carceration.  The court said that “You’re identified, through the COMPAS assess-
ment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community.  In terms of weighing the 
various factors, I’m ruling out probation because of the seriousness of the crime and 
because your history, your history on supervision, and the risk assessment tools that 
have been utilized, suggest that your [sic] extremely high risk to re-offend.”  Loomis’ 
counsel led evidence from an expert witness, Dr Thompson, who outlined the pitfalls 
of relying on actuarial risk assessment in a sentencing context.  The State of Wiscon-
sin did not offer any witnesses to counteract this evidence, instead arguing that the 
court’s conclusion did not rely on the COMPAS report and, if it did, any reliance was 
a “harmless error”.  
One of the appeal points was whether the trial court’s use of COMPAS at sentenc-
ing violated Loomis’ constitutional right to due process because Loomis could not 
challenge the scientific validity of the assessment due to Northpointe’s proprietary 
claim over the software algorithm.  Loomis argued that it was unknown which crimi-
nogenic factors COMPAS utilizes, and how it weighs them.  He relied on Gardner v 
Florida (430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977)).  In Gardner, the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to death. The defendant appealed 
because the trial court deemed certain portions of the pre-sentence investigation report 
to be confidential and refused to disclose the information to counsel.  The US Su-
preme Court held that the defendant was denied due process because the trial court 
had imposed a sentence “at least in part, on the basis of information which (Gardner) 
had no opportunity to deny or explain”.  The Court of Appeals accepted Loomis’ 
submission that the same principle applied here, and concluded that the “apparent 
 limited ability of (the) defendants to investigate the tool” unfairly prevented them 
from assessing its scientific validity.   
 
Wisconsin appealed to the US Supreme Court.  In his appellate submissions, 
Loomis argued that: 
 
the only basis for COMPAS are the ipse dixit statements from Northpointe that it does what 
it says; that although we do not know how it weighs the criminogenic factors, we should just 
take the risk assessment as true. To do so, however, violates Mr. Loomis’ (and other defend-
ant’s) right to due process because information upon which the trial court is relying for sen-
tencing is secret and confidential. As the Court of Appeals noted, there is a lack of transpar-
ency. 
 
Wisconsin, for its part, defended COMPAS (citing Brennan, 2009).  Remarkably, 
Wisconsin argued that “Loomis claims the COMPAS report may have been inaccu-
rate, but he cannot prove it because he does not know how COMPAS calculates risk”.  
Quite.  Instead, Wisconsin argued that Loomis knew what questions the COMPAS 
evaluation asked and he knew the answers to the questions – and on that basis he 
could contest the answer to specific questions on the COMPAS evaluation if he 
thought that the correct answer was different than the answer entered, and that proce-
dure satisfied the constitutional due process requirement.  Specifically, according to 
the State of Wisconsin, “Due process does not require disclosure of the formulas used 
to determine risk”. 
Remarkably, the US Supreme Court rejected the appeal.  The Court was likely in-
fluenced by an amicus curiae brief filed, on the Court’s request, by the US Solicitor-
General.  The Solicitor-General opined that given “the highly limited purpose for 
which petitioner’s ability to counter the factual information on which the assessment 
relied, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly declined to find a due process viola-
tion. But that is not to say that the use of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing will 
always be constitutionally sound.”  While the issues the petition raised were conceded 
to be important, the Solicitor-General said that any “constitutional error in consider-
ing (the) petitioner’s COMPAS score was likely (to have been) harmless”. 
What a remarkable occasion to apply the maxim de minimis non curat lex. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has since published a guideline judgment relating to 
COMPAS which has rather confusingly said that while COMPAS Reports cannot be 
determinative, they nevertheless may be regarded as relevant in sentencing.  How 
relevant will, it seems, remain a mystery.  Perhaps tacitly acknowledging the weak-
ness of this reasoning, the Wisconsin court has imposed several prophylactic guide-
lines: first, any “presentence investigation report (“PSI”) containing a COMPAS risk 
assessment filed with the court must contain a written advisement listing” its limita-
tions, and second, if used in sentencing, the following cautions need to be applied: 
 “The proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent disclosure of 
information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk scores are determined. 
  Because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on group data, they are able to 
identify group of high-risk offenders-not a particular high-risk individual. 
 Some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised questions about 
whether they disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a higher risk 
of recidivism. 
 A COMPAS risk assessment compares defendants to a national sample, but no 
cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet been completed. Risk as-
sessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-normed for accuracy due to 
changing populations and subpopulations.” 
On this basis, “if used properly with awareness of the limitations and cautions, a 
circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not 
violate a defendant’s right to due process” (emphasis added). 
Not long after the Supreme Court delivered its judgment rejecting the Loomis ap-
peal, Professor Shirley Ann Jackson, President of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
in New York, asked the Chief Justice of the United States, the Hon John Roberts Jr., 
“[c]an you foresee a day when smart machines, driven with artificial intelligences, 
will assist with courtroom fact-finding or, more controversially even, judicial deci-
sion-making?” Roberts CJ replied, “It’s a day that’s here, and it’s putting a significant 
strain on how the judiciary goes about doing things.” 
It seems remarkable that the constitutional right to due process would not protect 
the defendant in a criminal trial, and ensure that person’s access to information used 
against them.  Would Australian common law principles of procedural fairness oper-
ate to protect a person placed in a similar position in Australia?  
3 “Preventive Exile” after Failing the Character Test 
I’m not aware of any Australian case where a court had to consider the procedural 
justice implications of the use of secret algorithms.  However the Australian Govern-
ment is, apparently,  actively considering the development of risk assessment tools, 
and it is conceivable that similar issues might arise.  A Cabinet briefing note leaked in 
the first half of 2016 proposed the introduction of “a visa risk assessment tool that 
establishes an intelligence-led threat identification and risk profiling capability incor-
porating immigration as well as national security and criminality risk for visa appli-
cants”.1 
Ian Coyle and I have written elsewhere (2016) about the use of character testing in 
the immigration system (and the next few paragraphs rely heavily on that paper).  
Specifically, in late 2014 the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection issued 
Direction 65 to supplement section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which ena-
bles the Minister or a delegate to cancel a visa held by a noncitizen convicted of an 
offence on the basis that they have failed a ‘character test’.  A person is presumed to 
                                                          
1 David Lipson, ‘Leaked Government document outlines tougher migration program, increased 
monitoring of refugees’, ABC News, 4 February 2016. 
 fail the character test if they have a ‘substantial criminal record’, defined as a criminal 
conviction attracting a sentence (or cumulative convictions and sentences, adding up 
to) of 12 months or more.  
The removal of people pursuant to this regime takes place without prior notice be-
ing given (presumably to prevent absconding) and is often effected in the early hours 
of the morning by armed personnel.
2
  Once arrested and removed from their homes 
and families, these people are typically taken to an immigration detention centre such 
as Christmas Island.  Christmas Island is a lovely name for an island but it is very 
remote – some thousands of kilometres from Australia in the middle of the Indian 
Ocean.  It is a long way from family, friends and supports.  Here, detainees may wait 
many months or even years for their case to be heard, assuming they are able to se-
cure legal assistance to do so.  This plainly raises significant concerns about their 
ability to access the justice system to challenge their removal. 
With Ian Coyle, I have explored the use of a ‘risk assessment’ as a basis for deci-
sion-making about removals – and considered whether it is compliant with proper 
forensic standards.  We have argued that if risk assessments are to be undertaken, they 
need to be undertaken properly, and with a nuanced appreciation of the limitations of 
forensic tools.  Serious questions can be raised about the utility of actuarial risk as-
sessment tools.  However the risk remains that governments will devise regulations 
that remove the power of litigants and courts to question these tools.  Applying 
knowledge of group tendencies to individual offenders within actuarial risk assess-
ment approaches can have dire consequences when transferred to court settings in 
high stakes cases where liberty or citizenship is at stake (McSherry and Keyzer, 
2009).  Problems identified with the use of actuarial-based scales in relation to indi-
vidual offenders were acknowledged in the guideline judgment delivered after Loomis 
v Wisconsin.  But it is the gloss on Gardner v Florida that is significant in an age of 
algorithmic governance.  It is difficult to prevent an involuntary shaking of the head 
when a company’s proprietary interests are elevated above the right to liberty. 
In China, a social credit system has been devised to rate people on their social and 
financial behavior.  It is said that this new system will “allow the trustworthy to roam 
everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single 
step.” (Hawkins, 2017).  While horrifying, and so horrifying to be scarcely believable, 
surveillance is not new, and has been carried out for eons.  The Chinese Communist 
dang’an, or secret personal file, tracks a citizen’s information from their high school 
grades, to their behavior at university, to their perceived political sympathies in adult 
life. The file can affect a person’s career prospects and pension entitlements. The 
Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser has described the dang’an as “an invisible monster 
stalking you” (Jacobs, 2015). 
There has been an appreciable rise in the development and deployment of risk as-
sessment tools to judge us all.  We want to remove risk from our lives and we expect 
our governments to do this.  In the commercial sphere, we are all affected by the ad-
ministrative justice meted out by electronic platforms and services that we use for 
                                                          
2 Eden v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 780. 
 transport, to do shopping, and to employ assistants.  We buy into these regimes by 
rating people ourselves.  
Actuaries say that we should work with all available information, and that it would 
be wrong not to.  But where is the place for the presumption of innocence, let alone 
the possibility of rehabilitation, in the coming dystopia?  Do we have the legal tools to 
challenge the risk assessments? 
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Abstract. Law enforcement agencies are facing an ever-increasing flood of data 
to be acquired, stored, assessed and used. Automation and advanced data analy-
sis capabilities are required to supersede traditional manual work processes and 
legacy information silos by automatically acquiring information from a range of 
sources, analyzing it in the context of on-going investigations, and linking it to 
other pieces of knowledge pertaining to the investigation. This paper outlines a 
modular architecture for management of linked data in the law enforcement 
domain and discusses legal and policy issues related to workflows and infor-
mation sharing in this context. 
Keywords: law enforcement, investigation management, linked data. 
1 Introduction 
Investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are increasingly reliant 
on effective collection and analysis of information that may be obtained from a varie-
ty of sources, internal and external to the organization [1]. Investigations generally 
follow an iterative process of information collection, assessment, investigation plan-
ning, execution, and brief of evidence preparation where each step either produces 
new information or relies on information collected earlier in the process. 
Information collected within the organization include information about individu-
als, organizations, objects and entities of interest, witness statements, evidence ob-
tained from crime scenes, communications intercepts and the results of forensic anal-
ysis. This information may be complemented and integrated with data such as finan-
cial transactions, travel and immigration records, and criminal history that are ob-
tained from external sources. In addition, documentation about the investigation pro-
cess and data provenance must be maintained in order to establish that evidence sub-
mitted to court had been obtained within the law and policies relevant to the investi-
gation.  
Accessing data as well as linking and integrating them in a correct and consistent 
way is a pressing challenge in particular when underlying data structures and access 
methods change over time. Lack of interoperability between information systems 
 within and across organizations remains one of the prevalent concerns of investigators 
[2]. Investigations are delayed by poor information management practices that result 
in information being unavailable or not being available in a timely manner, poor in-
formation quality, and cumbersome manual approval and information retrieval proce-
dures. 
The project Integrated Law Enforcement (ILE), conducted by the Data to Deci-
sions Cooperative Research Centre (D2D CRC)
1
, aims to develop a platform where 
investigators can manage the information collection, analysis, and processes pertain-
ing to a case through a consistent single user-facing platform. The project has been 
developing technological solutions for information management, linking, and analysis 
that are tailored to the needs of investigators. An extensible software architecture for 
searching, linking, and integration of data sources forms one of the corner stones of 
the project. The platform will eventually include analytic services that can be invoked 
by investigators. The data management architecture is complemented with a state of 
the art user-facing portal and an analysis of legal aspects pertaining to workflows and 
information sharing.  
Effective linking, integration, and analysis of data requires breaking down data “si-
los” and opening up legacy systems within organizations to make information acces-
sible, establishing procedures and technical infrastructure to effectively and timely 
share information across organizational boundaries, creating data standards to facili-
tate interpretation and analysis of the body of collected data, and automating, where 
possible, analysis and semantic enrichment of data [3]. 
Data integration in this context raises serious legal compliance and good govern-
ance challenges. Compliance with existing laws and principles is a pre-condition of 
the whole process [4]. Transparency and privacy should be preserved to foster trust 
between citizens and national security and law enforcement agencies. A 2015 litera-
ture review on online data mining technology intended for law enforcement  broadly 
singled out eight main problems (crimes, investigative requirements) in 2015 [1]. 
Separately, some criminologists warned against the profound effect of automated data 
collection on the traditional criminal justice system, as it could undercut the due pro-
cess safeguards built into the traditional criminal justice model [5]. It is our conten-
tion that this technological modelling should be performed under the protections of 
the rule of law. 
In this paper, we present the overall system architecture for information sharing 
and outline the related legal issues pertaining to workflows and information exchange 
in the context of policing investigations. Our work has resulted in a data access 
framework for law enforcement which provides a comprehensive data and meta-data 
model including provenance, security, confidence, links and timeline information 
related to entities and links. This meta-data layer spans a Knowledge Graph-like view 
[7] of information pertaining to entities relevant to investigations. The resulting data 
and meta-data model serves as the foundation for information use, governance, data 
quality protocols, analytic pipelines and exploration of search results. 
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 2 Information Sharing in Law Enforcement  
Timely information sharing domain is crucial for the success of many investigations 
in the law enforcement domain. Unfortunately, many investigations are stalled by one 
or more of a number of impediments related to effectively sharing information among 
investigators and organizations [2]. In the following we highlight a selection of issues 
relevant in context of linked information access. 
Among the technical impediments, internal information silos and cumbersome in-
formation access procedures are common. Investigators routinely enter the same que-
ries across a multitude of legacy information systems and manually collate and inte-
grate the results. Lack of information access mechanisms for investigators in the field 
hamper the timely acquisition of information in electronic form and information may 
not be updated in timely manner. In absence of automated alerts, investigators may be 
unaware that new information relevant to a case has become available unless they 
manually issue queries periodically or rely on informal personal connections to re-
ceive notifications. As a result, relevant information may be missed even though it 
had been available in an information system. Data quality varies greatly as data quali-
ty standards are often not enforced and instead left to the individual user. 
Workflows and policies may impact upon investigations. Where approvals for ac-
tions are required, for example expenditure approval for call records requests, anti-
quated policies and work processes may still rely on paper forms and manual approval 
which result in excessive delays, in particular if approvals are sought outside of nor-
mal office hours. Here, automation and electronic means of requesting and obtaining 
warrants and approvals would streamline the investigation process. 
Legal issues relate to restrictions on information use and sharing. For example, in-
formation obtained under a warrant for a specific investigation may not generally be 
used in the context of other investigations. Similarly, agencies are generally subject to 
restrictions on what information they can share with other agencies [2]. Even where 
information sharing may be legally permitted, many organizations, concerned about 
the implications of breaching the law, are prone to adopt prudential attitudes and poli-
cies that perhaps may unnecessarily restrict what can be shared. Information security 
and access control are challenging issues when multiple systems and organizations are 
involved. It is challenging to guarantee comprehensive and secure access to a large 
number of users accessing a multitude of information systems across organizational 
boundaries. Moreover, there is interaction between analytics and security attributes as 
new information derived from automated analytic processes must be classified using 
appropriate security policies to avoid inadvertently disclosing otherwise inaccessible 
information. Determining appropriate classification and access restrictions can be 
challenging in organizations.  
3 System Architecture 
An open architecture for data/meta-data management and analytic processes has been 
defined. It translates the best practices from Enterprise Application Integration to the 
 “Big Data” analytic pipelines [6]. Our work addresses aspects related to data and 
meta-data modelling and storage, modelling and execution of analytic processes, and 
efficient execution of analytic processes across multiple analytic tools and data 
sources. Central to this architecture is a method for effective semi-interactive entity 
linking and querying of linked data (akin to automatically generated linked ontologies 
such as YAGO [13]). The project intends to realize a comprehensive data manage-
ment framework that relies on a well-defined share data and meta-data model sup-
ported by vendor-agnostic interfaces for data access and execution of processes com-
prising analytic services offered by different tools. 
The overall architecture of the ILE platform is shown in Figure 1. A federated ar-
chitectural model has been adopted, where one or more instances of the ILE platform 
can be deployed and access a number of external data sources. Each instance may 
provide query and analytic services to the front-end applications and can obtain data 
from other instances and external sources on demand. This approach is necessary as 
data in external sources is usually controlled by external organizations and may 
change at any time. Moreover, organizational policies in this context rarely support 
traditional Extract-Transform-Load ingestion processes across organizational bounda-
ries. 
The ILE platform provides programmatic interfaces (APIs) to front-end applica-
tions to access data and invoke analytic services. The interfaces expose the platform’s 
services using a uniform data format and communication protocol. The APIs can be 
accessed from a desktop front-end where investigators can search and enter infor-
mation as well as invoke services. Mobile applications for investigators may be de-
veloped in future versions of the platform. 
Each instance maintains a Curated Linked Data Store, that is, a set of databases 
that collectively implement a knowledge-graph like structure comprising entities and 
their links and meta-data. This curated data store holds facts and meta-data about 
entities and their links whose veracity has been confirmed. This data store is used to 
infer the results for queries and to synthesize requests to external sources and other 
instances if further information is required. As such, the linked data store implements 
a directory of entities and links enriched with appropriate meta-data and source in-
formation such that detailed information can be obtained from authoritative sources 
that may be external to the system. This approach is needed as data in the law en-
forcement domain is dispersed among a number of systems owned and operated by 
different agencies. As such no centrally controlled database can feasibly be put in 
place in the foreseeable future.  
The information contained in the linked data store is governed by an Ontology that 
defines the entity types, link types, and associated meta-data that is available among 
the collective platform. The ontology acts as a reference for knowledge manage-
ment/organization and aids in the integration of information stemming from external 
sources, where it acts as a reference for linking and translating information into a 
form suitable for the knowledge hub. The ontology has been designed specifically for 
the law enforcement domain and includes detailed provenance information and meta-
data related to information access restrictions. It is explicitly represented and can be 
 queried. All information within the ILE platform is represented in the ontology in 
order to facilitate entity linking and analysis. 
The ILE ontology is too large to reproduce it in full in this paper; it comprises 19 
high-level domain concepts which are further refined into a total of ~140 concepts 
and a taxonomy of ~400 specialized relationship types. It has been documented in [8]. 
The ontology conceptualizes the domain on three levels: meta-level where concept 
types are captured, the type level, where domain concepts are represented in terms of 
types, and the instance level, where instance-level data is represented and linked. For 
example, the meta-level defines EntityType, RelationshipType, and MetaAttribute-
Type. Their instances on the level below represent persons, organizations, (and more 
broadly a hierarchy of object types), concrete domain relationships that may be estab-
lished between objects (for example that a Person works for an Organization), and 
meta-data attributes related to access control, provenance, and temporal validity. 
These domain concepts are closely aligned with the draft National Police Infor-
mation Model (NPIM), complemented with relevant aspects drawn from the NIEM 
standard
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 and concepts related to case management. The provenance model is an ex-
tension of PROV-O [9]. The instances of the domain concepts form the objects com-
prising the Knowledge Graph on the lowest layer in the ontology. The aforementioned 
concepts are complemented with classes and objects representing data sources linked 
to the domain information stored therein as well as schema mapping information re-
quired to translate between the external source and the ontology model adopted within 
the federated architecture.  
This multi-level modelling method has been adopted to provide a modular and ex-
tensible knowledge representation architecture. The semantic technologies that under-
pin our platform facilitate incremental addition of elements to the ontology, and phas-
ing out of obsolete concepts can be implemented via meta-data annotations interpret-
ed by the underlying information systems. Changes in information representation 
received from external parties can be addressed by ontology matching techniques and 
machine learning methods for information extraction and linking. Profound changes 
in the information acquisition pipelines however would require changes to the under-
lying information system. Our modular architecture has been designed to accommo-
date such changes. 
Information from external sources is sought based on a catalog of data sources that 
are available to the system, each with a corresponding adapter that communicates 
with the external systems and rewrites the information and meta-data into the ontolo-
gy used within the ILE platform [11]. Our platform spans several sources, including 
an entity database (Person, Objects, Location, Event, and Relations), a case manage-
ment system, and a repository of unstructured documents.  
Information received from external systems is passed through an ingestion and en-
richment pipeline where entities are extracted [14], enriched with meta-data (prove-
nance and access restrictions) and linked to the knowledge graph in the linked data 
store.  
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 Analytic services include entity extraction from unstructured text [14], entity link-
ing, similarity calculation and ranking. Services provided by commercial tools, such 
as network analysis and entity liking/resolution solutions, can be integrated in the 
modular architecture. 
Automation services will provide workflow orchestration and alert notices if new 
information relevant to a case becomes available. Workflow services will facilitate 
the enactment of work processes such as acquiring authorization and warrants. The 
automation services component is pending implementation. 
Cross-cutting technical concerns, including access control and user management, 
logging, monitoring and other deployment facilities, have been omitted in this archi-
tecture view. Our implementation builds on open source big data technologies (Ha-
doop/Spark, polyglot persistence, message queues, and RESTful interfaces). The 
technical building blocks are outlined in [8]. 
Fig. 1 draws the overall architecture and plot the direction of legal workflow pro-
cessing.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Architecture overview and legal workflow processing 
 4 Legal and governance issues 
A key concern is the incorporation of legal risk management and compliance con-
straints into the workflow execution to ensure observance of and compliance with the 
applicable legal rules, for example agency and privacy rules as well as internal agency 
policies and procedures. Natural Language parsing can be used to elicit event specifi-
cations that could then be translated to business rules in an executable formal lan-
guage and issued to an event processor in the knowledge hub [16]. These rules would 
be used to check and guarantee conformance of analytic processes/workflows and 
data usage. [16] provides support for extracting data from a variety of sources (rela-
tional databases, CSV files, JSON, and XML), for modeling it according to a vocabu-
lary of the user’s choice and for integrating multiple data sources. This process de-
serves a closer attention, because (i) it implies LEAs cooperation, and (ii) must be 
compliant with Australian law.
3
 
The D2D CRC’s law and policy team outlined for discussion a set of high level 
principles that may guide the development of an appropriate framework: (i) engender 
public confidence in government use of data and analytic tools, (ii) develop principles 
for data governance in National Security Law Enforcement (NSLE) agencies; (iii) 
employ clear and consistent principles in developing legal frameworks, (iv) improve 
processes to enhance effective use of data within NSLE agencies, (v) ensure the con-
tinued effectiveness of the oversight regime as technologies and NSLE agency prac-
tices evolve, (v) disentangle elements of technological change associated with ‘Big 
Data’, (vi) maintain data integrity and security in a high volume environment, (vii) 
ensure fair and appropriate use of data analytics, (viii) use appropriate systems for 
data matching, data integration or federated access that takes account of benefits and 
risks; (ix) ensure efficient, appropriate, and regulated sharing of specific data for 
NSLE purposes [17]. 
In a recent survey we carried out on the state of the art of Compliance by Design 
(CbD) [12], we found that the passage from Business to Legal CbD mainly follows a 
semantic path, in which Natural Language Processing (NLP), non-monotonic defeasi-
ble logic and inferential reasoning are combined with enriched annotated legal 
sources (e.g. described according linked data standards). This is aligned with recent 
developments in e-business
4
 [26] and e-government [27].  Architectures are deemed 
                                                          
3  We consider primarily investigations conducted by Australian law enforcement agencies, 
where compliance with Australian laws governing these investigations and subsequent legal 
proceedings is paramount. 
4 ISO/IEC 42010:2007 defines "architecture" as: "The fundamental organization of a system, 
embodied in its components, their relationships to each other and the environment, and the 
principles governing its design and evolution".  It has been fleshed out by [26], and [27] [28] 
for the e-government architecture. See esp. ADM Architecture Requirements Management, 
and the Architecture Compliance steps defined at TOGAF 9.1, Part VII: Architecture Capa-
bility Framework Architecture Compliance.  http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/togaf9-
doc/arch/  
 
 
 to be understandable, robust, complete, consistent and stable. [28] has proposed a 
comprehensive approach to develop interoperable European e-government services 
adapting and extending the existing enterprise architecture requirements. The investi-
gation shows that at least half —i.e. not all— of the 30 requirements identified are 
adequately addressed by enterprise architectures (EA).
5
 It concludes with ten interop-
erability challenges that should be taken into account and addressed when providing 
pan-European e-government services (PEGS) across Member State borders. Quoting 
at length:  (i)  critical success factors should be identified, (ii) an EA framework for 
PEGS should be built upon widely accepted principles and strategies, (iii) it should 
comprise architecture design principles and guidelines to reason about alternative 
design strategies, (iv) in order to facilitate stakeholder management, it should refer to 
abstract stakeholder classes and roles in interoperability projects and determine driv-
ers for their engagement, (v) the creation of contents can be improved through a 
methodology that supports the capturing of requirements from business-driven needs, 
policy implementation processes and other strategic aspects in order to establish 
common path and to increase the acceptance of architecture outputs among stakehold-
ers (vi) another methodology should describe how to define interoperability specifica-
tions on semantic and organizational level, which can be used as a basis for collabora-
tion agreements, (vii) a detailed design of each architecture should identify relevant 
model fragments and should be based on a commonly agreed architecture description 
language, (viii) there are missing guidelines and methods that describe how to transi-
tion and to govern architectures in multi-stakeholder environments, (ix) several inde-
pendent implementations of PEGS have to be coordinated, extended and sustained 
over time (e.g. it  should integrate appropriate assessment methodologies to measure 
specifications and the compliance of solutions with the underlying collaboration 
agreements, (x) other assessment methodologies can help to determine the level of 
business standardizations in a domain and to appraise the maturity of market solutions 
in order to detect appropriate ways forward.  
This is a valuable programme. Likewise, we have also devised one close to it with 
the Australian framework in mind. However, as [28] underline as well, business lan-
guages do not completely match all governance and security requirements. Interoper-
ability frameworks do not enable an anticipatory management [29]. 
Legal compliance is complex, even in relation to national laws where the jurisdic-
tion concerned is a unified, non-federal national state. There are several methodolo-
gies and languages to represent norms using formal rules —e.g. Regorous and Legal-
RuleML [31]—, but there are not fully automated ways to carry out such a task. Legal 
norms must be interpreted in particular fields according to the specific domains to 
which they apply, anticipating the possible risks and unintended side effects. In addi-
tion, ethical principles can nuance or mould this interpretation according to different 
jurisdictions — e.g. Fair Information Practices in USA, or Data Protection Principles 
                                                          
 
5 The 30 requirements obtained in the survey of the literature have been structured  into six 
categories [28]: project management (PM), stakeholder management (ST), service develop-
ment (SD), interoperability layers and architecture viewpoints (LV), building blocks (BB), 
and collaboration agreements (CA). 
 similar to the brand new General Data Protection Regulation in Europe. Similarly, 
information governance rules and policies differ between private corporations and 
state agencies. 
At a more general level, legal scholars have noticed that the protection of relative 
civil rights such as privacy does not necessarily entail tradeoffs [21]
6
. Nevertheless, as 
we have already suggested, there are many ways to comply with rule of law require-
ments, depending on the plurality of legal constraints and constitutional specifica-
tions. Apparently, protections for civil rights are not as clear —and  arguably as 
strong—  in Australia as in the EU, where the police and their criminal intelligence 
functions operate subject to well-developed data protection and privacy norms. In 
contrast to a more comprehensive, integrated EU approach, it could be argued that 
public transparency and operational secrecy are, for example, not as finely balanced 
under current Australian law [19]. Contrary to European provisions, the 2017 Austral-
ian Productivity Commission Inquiry Report on Data Availability and Use, excludes 
national security data [20]. As asserted by the Report, governments use data to moni-
tor and investigate compliance and implement enforcement actions. They retrieve, 
extract and analyse information from publicly available sources (Open Source Intelli-
gence, OSINT) in a way that can also be regulated [22].   
Having a closer look, problems about fragmentation and interoperability are analo-
gous in both Australia and Europe. Different as they might be, the post-facto investi-
gations about the Abdelsam brothers in the Bataclan crisis in Paris [30] and the in-
quest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege in Sydney
7
 have come to simi-
lar conclusions. Cooperation among state departments and agencies; and between 
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), can and should be improved.  
These conclusions are not limited solely to security issues but can be also extended 
to the coordination of public administration and the legal system in policy domains. 
For instance, in many situations, problems might arise “because of gaps of infor-
mation flow between the family law system, the family violence system, and the child 
protection system: in many circumstances, important information is not being shared 
among courts and agencies and this is having a negative impact on victims, impeding 
the ‘seamlessness’ of the legal and service responses to the family violence”.8 
Disparity is produced as well across all Australian jurisdictions. At a federal level 
the Privacy Act 1988, for example, regulates the handling of personal information by 
the federal government and the private sector. The Act does not extend to state gov-
ernments. Some states have their own comprehensive frameworks. In Victoria, for 
example, the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) contains the following In-
formation Privacy Principles (IPPs) which apply to all information held by the Victo-
rian public sector (including the police and a contracted service provider): (i) Open 
and transparent management of personal information, (ii) Sensitive information, (iii) 
                                                          
6    International human rights law distinguishes between absolute and relative rights. Absolute 
rights —such as freedom from slavery, torture and servitude— cannot be suspended, restricted, 
or limited for any reason.  Non-absolute or relative rights are those which stand in the various 
private and legal relations, and can be discussed, re-defined or qualified.   
7 http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/ 
8  Australian Law Reform Commission (2010), as quoted in [20]. 
 Right to anonymity/pseudonymity, (iv) Notification of collection, (v) Purpose test for 
use / disclosure, (vi) Direct marketing restrictions, (vii) Cross border disclosure, (viii) 
Government-related or unique identifiers, (ix) Data quality, (x) Data security, (xi) 
Access and correction. South Australia, on the other hand, only has an administrative 
instruction requiring government agencies to comply with a set of Information Priva-
cy Principles while Western Australia does not currently have a comprehensive legis-
lative privacy regime.  
Australia has a comprehensive oversight regime in relation to national security and 
law enforcement agencies. Different bodies have however oversight over different 
agencies or have oversight over closely-defined aspects of a range of agencies. The 
fragmented nature of the oversight framework in Australia “will be challenged by an 
environment where NSLE agencies collaborate more closely in a Big Data frame-
work” [19]. But to reach this milestone, it is our contention that the information inte-
gration process that takes place on the platform through reusable ontologies and vo-
cabularies requires a broader regulatory framework. To overcome the patchwork of 
disparate and sometimes contradictory legal constraints, we will work within an in-
termediate implementation level, setting what can be called an “anchoring institution” 
between the semantic tools of the platform and LEAs (end-users). 
This set of intermediate conceptual rules constitute a semantic web regulatory 
model (SWRM), i.e. a specific cluster of guidelines to regulate the information flow, 
establishing a system of check and balances between LEA’s investigative powers and 
their use of semantic technology [22]. This is an indirect strategy for Compliance by 
Design (CbD) purposes, in which police officers might set forth internal and external 
controls, and adopt a conceptual scheme to implement privacy and security principles 
including ethics as a main component, i.e. at the intermediate level of linked democ-
racy [23]. To encompass both behavioural and informational trends, we use the ex-
pression ‘Compliance through Design’ [CtD] [12] . This means that the increasing of 
pressure on human compliance management resources in the security area can be 
taken into account [25]. The crucial point is the coexistence of both artificial and hu-
man decision-making and information processes. 
Likewise, ‘linked democracy’ can be defined as “a meso-level approach to both 
online and offline innovations that elucidates the interactions between people, tech-
nology, and data in particular settings, providing a framework of analysis to under-
stand the emerging properties (and tensions) of these interactions” [24]. Therefore, 
public principles such as transparency, accountability and security could be graduated 
and connected within particular investigations according to their weight at their spe-
cific implementation level. This entails the emergence of different notions, degrees 
and values of legal compliance, enhancing their semantic side, and outstripping the 
traditional obstacles of operating from separate information silos.    
It is worth noticing that from this pragmatic approach, interoperability does not on-
ly mean ‘semantic interoperability’ —the creation of a common meaning for infor-
mation ex- change across computational systems— but systemic interoperability. That 
is, the ability of complex systems to interact, share, and exchange information. It fo-
cuses onto the coordination of practices, including human behavior, organizational 
structures, tools, languages, and techniques [23]. Establishing such a model, translat-
 ing legal and systemic conditions to institutional and computational constraints and 
requirements, is the next step. 
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Abstract. In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be
detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the prob-
lem of monitor placement within a normative multi-agent system under budgetary
constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of pos-
sible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs
associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which com-
pliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to
identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system’s utility. We for-
malize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics,
empirically demonstrating their efficiency.
1 Introduction
Since agents within open multi-agent systems cannot be assumed to share goals, ob-
taining desirable outcomes requires a coordination mechanism, and norms [5] are often
used to perform this coordination. While regimented norms – which prevent an agent by
design from undertaking undesirable behavior – are widely often assumed, a substantial
body of work has shown the advantages of using approaches based on enforcement [8,
10]. These latter approaches, which allow norms to be violated, require a mechanism
that monitors for norm compliance or violation and applies sanctions when appropri-
ate [11]. In turn, norm enforcement can be performed either by some organization or by
other autonomous agents in the system [14].
Norm enforcement assumes that violation and compliance can always be detected
[6, 7, 11]. Such an assumption is, however, clearly unrealistic. First, in a large system,
the cost of monitoring is very high [15]. Second, there are often portions of the environ-
ment that are not fully observable, and which monitors cannot access. There is therefore
a need to investigate how norms should be monitored.
Previous work on the monitoring of norms has considered how norms should be
modified so as to be monitorable [2], and whether related states can be observed which
may indicate upcoming norm violations [1]. In this paper, we consider instead how
monitors should be deployed within a system, assuming that such deployments have a
cost, so as to monitor the most important norms. Our approach builds on ideas from
the planning literature, and in Section 2, we introduce the necessary concepts from this
domain and formalize the notion of a norm. Section 3 introduces monitors and formally
describes the problem we are addressing. We describe several approaches to addressing
the problem in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 evaluates our solutions, and we conclude
by considering related work (Section 6) and directions for future research (Section 7).
2 Background
In this section we introduce concepts from the planning literature, used to formalise the
system and our solution. Following this, we describe norms within our system.
2.1 Planning
We build on classical planning, which assumes finite, fully observable and determin-
istic systems, and adapt the definitions from Ghallab et al. [9, Ch. 2]. Systems that
follow classical planning semantics assume that actions in the domain cause transitions
between states, and are specified in terms of sets of predicates.
Definition 1 (Predicate and State). A predicate in a first-order language L is com-
posed of a symbol and zero or more terms. Each term can be either a constant or a
variable; a predicate is ground if it does not contain variables. We denote as |L| the
number of ground predicates in this language. A state is a set of ground literals (i.e.,
positive or negative predicates) in L.
We use the operator |= to specify that a state (a set of predicates) satisfies a logical
formula, i.e., that a formula is a model of the state.
Classical planning makes a closed-world assumption — that if a state does not spec-
ify a predicate, then this predicate does not hold in that state. We write s |= P where P
is a set of ground predicates, if the conjunction of these ground predicates is satisfied
by s. We formalize action execution, and its effects on the environment as follows.
Definition 2 (Planning Operator and Actions). A planning operator is represented by
a triple o = 〈name(o), pre(o), eff(o)〉, where name(o) is the description of o. pre(o)
and eff (o) are set of predicates representing the planning operator’s preconditions and
effects. An action a is a ground instance of a planning operator, and is applicable in
state s only if s |= pre(a). The result of applying action a to state s is a new state s′,
such that s′ = (s/eff −(a)) ∪ eff +(a), where eff = eff + ∪ eff − (such that eff + ∩
eff − = ∅) and eff − is the set of negated predicates and eff + is the set of positive
predicates.
We specify the dynamics of our multiagent system in terms of a transition func-
tion following classical planning semantics in Definition 3, and the initial states of the
system in terms of planning problem instances, as per the following definitions.
Definition 3 (Planning Domain). IfL is a first-order language with finite sets of predi-
cates and constants, a planning domain in L is a state-transition systemΣ = 〈S,A, γ〉,
where S ⊆ 2|L| is a subset of all possible states; A is the set of all ground instances of
planning operators; γ(s, a) is a state-transition function defined as follows: if a ∈ A
and a is applicable to s ∈ S, it returns the next state s′ ∈ S, which is the result of
applying action a to state s.
Note that S is closed under γ, i.e., given a state s ∈ S, all states reachable from
applying action a in s are also in S.
Definition 4 (Planning Problem). A planning problem is defined as a triple P =
〈Σ, s0, g〉, where Σ is the state-transition system, s0 ∈ S is the initial state of the
problem and g, the goal, is a set of ground predicates.
2.2 Norms
In open and dynamic societies, self-interested agents cannot be assumed to share the
same set of goals. In this context, norms can be used to regulate and coordinate behavior
[13, Ch. 14]. For our work, we adapt the definition of a norm from [12]. We consider
two norm types: obligations and prohibitions; the former specifies behavior that must
be followed by agents, while the latter specifies behavior that must be avoided.
Definition 5 (Norm). A norm is a tuple n = 〈µ, χ, ρ, C〉, where:
– µ ∈ {obligation, prohibition} represents the norm’s modality;
– χ is a set of ground predicates that represents the context to which a norm applies,
i.e., a norm is applicable in state s if s |= χ;
– ρ ∈ A represents the object of the norm’s modality;
– C is the cost or penalty to the society which occurs if the norm is violated.
Example 1. The following norm requires an agent to drive on the left side of the road
if they are in England; a violation causes harm to the society worth 20 units of utility.
n0 = 〈obligation, at(England), driveLeft(a, b), 20〉
We now describe when a norm is considered to be violated by an agent.
Definition 6 (Norm Violation). A norm n = 〈µ, χ, ρ, C〉 is violated in state s by an
agent a iff:
– s |= χ; and
– agent a either: executes action ρ in state s and µ = prohibition; or does not
execute action ρ in state s and µ = obligation.
A violated norm has an undesirable impact on the society, as encoded by its cost C.
To dissuade agents from violating norms, when such a violation is detected, an enforcer
applies a penalty to the agent. In this work, we do not consider the nature of this penalty,
assuming instead that it is sufficiently large to prevent the agent from violating a norm
if such a violation can be detected. We must therefore consider how to place monitors
so that violations are detected, while minimizing monitor costs. We refer to this as the
bounded-monitor placement problem, and describe it in more detail in the next section.
3 Bounded-Monitor Placement Problem
We consider a set of monitors able to determine whether some combination of predi-
cates is, or is not satisfied. Formally, we define a monitor as follows.
Definition 7 (Monitor). A monitor m = 〈P,D〉 consists of a set of predicates P , and
a deployment cost D ∈ R. We refer to the predicates of a monitor m as Pm, and to its
cost as Dm.
A set of monitors can be used to monitor more complex combinations of predi-
cates. Some monitors can conceivably detect the status of a predicate related to multiple
norms, or when combined, can be used to determine the status of a norm that individ-
ual monitors cannot. We formalize the combination of monitors aiming to cover sets of
norms as a Monitor Placement.
Definition 8 (Monitor Placement). A monitor placement MP is a tuple 〈M1,M2〉,
where M1 and M2 are sets of monitors, representing the capability of observing predi-
cates in the current and in the next state, assuming an action was performed.
A monitor placement detects a norm violation 〈µ, χ, ρ, C〉 iff given a state s and s′
such that s′ is the result of applying an action ρ at s; and s |= χ, one of the following
holds:
1. µ = prohibition and s |= ∧{Pm1 |m1 ∈M1} and s′ |= ∧{Pm2 |m2 ∈M2}.
2. µ = obligation and s |= ∧{Pm1 |m1 ∈M1} and s′ 6|= ∧{Pm2 |m2 ∈M2}.
The cost C of a monitor placement is
∑
m∈M1∨m∈M2 Dm, while the utility U is∑
n∈N C, where N is the set of norms detected by this placement.
By introducing the concept of an available budget, we define our problem of placing
monitors in a system as follows.
Definition 9 (Bounded-Monitor Placement Problem). A bounded-monitor placement
problem is encoded as a triple 〈M,N,B〉 where M is a set of monitors, N is a set of
norms, and B ∈ R+ is a budget.
A solution to the problem is a monitor placement MP such that its cost is smaller
than, or equal to, the budget.
The set of possible solutions for a monitor placement problem is exponential in the
worst case, and in the next section, we suggest several approaches to finding solutions.
4 Solution
4.1 Brute-force
A brute-force approach is a trivial solution to this problem. It considers all possible
combinations of available monitors and returns the best one. We can clearly see that
this is impractical for large problems, as its complexity increases exponentially given
the size of the possible monitors set input: specifically, it has a time complexity of
O(22|M |). We use this approach as a baseline against which we compare the remaining
heuristics.
4.2 Mapping from norms to monitors
The main drawback of the brute-force approach is that it includes a large number of
irrelevant solutions while enumerating all possible solutions. We can reduce this over-
head by computing a mapping from norms to monitor placements, i.e., by finding the
set of all monitor placements capable of monitoring each norm.
With this mapping, we can compute possible solutions by choosing one monitor
placement for each norm. Generalizing, we have
∏|N |
i=1(|MPni |+1) possible solutions,
where MPni is the set of monitor placements able to monitor norm ni; since we also
need to consider whether it is practical to monitor a given norm (e.g., when there is
no available budget to do so), we need to add the empty monitor placement set. In the
best case we have only one possible monitor placement for each norm, and in the worst
case we have all possible combinations of available monitors for MPM1 and MPM2 ,
for each norm. Therefore, the number of solutions ranges from 2|N | to 4|M ||N |.
Given this exponential complexity, it is clear that both the brute force and monitor
mapping approaches cannot scale up to larger problem sets. We must therefore consider
heuristics for addressing the problem, which we describe next.
4.3 Naive Approximate Solution
To improve performance compared to the brute-force approach we introduce a simple
approximate solution whose purpose is to serve as a a baseline for comparing the accu-
racy of the other solutions. This solution iterates over monitors ranked by their expected
probability of detecting norm violations. To rank monitors, we consider the number of
norms that a single monitor can partially detect — a monitor can partially detect a norm
if it has at least one predicate of the norm’s context or of the preconditions of the norm’s
action ρ. The intuition here is that choosing monitors that can partially observe several
norms leads to a final monitor placement that can detect many existing norms.
This approach, however, does not capture essential parts of the problem. First, it
does not consider the norm’s penalty and monitor’s cost. Second, it has an overly strong
assumption that joining monitors that can partially detect norms will lead to a monitor
placement that can actually detect norms. We can therefore enhance this approach by
using the mapping describe in Section 4.2 together with a greedy search.
4.4 Greedy Solution
We propose two approaches with different heuristics using the mapping structure in-
troduced in Section 4.2. By using a heuristic to rank the best monitor placements, we
can avoid searching through an exponential solution search space. More specifically,
we select the best monitor placement candidate for each norm. The resulting heuristic
sacrifices optimality for efficiency, running in linear time.
Our base algorithm (used for both of our heuristics) is described in Algorithm 1.
It starts by creating a mapping between norms and monitor placements, as described
in Section 4.2. After this, it adds monitors to an initially empty monitor placement
currentMP , while budget is available. Within each iteration, it selects one norm, gets
a monitor placement able to monitor this norm, and adds the already selected monitors
Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm
1: procedure FINDAPPROXIMATESOLUTION(N:Norms)
2: build mapping from norms to monitor placements
3: currentMP ← {}
4: while hasBudget do
5: n← extractMaxNorm(N )
6: mp← getMinMP(n)
7: currentMP ← currentMP ∪mp
return currentMP
(currentMP ) to the monitor placement. We now describe two heuristics to speed up
this algorithm.
4.4.1 Norm Independence Heuristic Our first heuristic considers norms to be mon-
itored completely independently of each other when choosing monitors in order to sub-
stantially prune the search space of the problem. We first need to define which norm
extractMaxNorm(N) in line 5 of Algorithm 1 chooses. Here, we select the norm with
the highest penalty, in order to increase the value of U (the sum of each individual norm
penalty), i.e., extractMaxNorm(N) = argmaxn∈N Cn.
The other decision required is which monitor placement is selected by the get-
MinMP(n) method (line 6). For this, we select the placement with the lowest cost,
as it is a good monitor placement able to monitor norm n. Thus, getMinMP(n) =
argminMP∈MPn CMP .
This approach does not consider the intersection of monitors that are able to mon-
itor multiple norms; it selects monitor placements independently of the others. Conse-
quently, we improve this solution in what follows by introducing the concept of current
cost to try to find a better approximate solution for our problem.
4.4.2 Add and Update Heuristic The structure of this heuristic is similar to the
previous approach. However, instead of using the cost of each monitor placement as the
metric to select the one with lowest budget, we use its current cost. The current cost
of a given monitor placement MP is computed as per Formula 1 below, and considers
only the cost of monitors that were not already selected in a previous iteration (and thus
not in the set of monitors of currentMP).
CCMP =
∑
m∈MMP∧m6∈McurrentMP
Dm (1)
getMinMP(n) = argmin
MP∈MPn
CCMP (2)
extractMaxNorm(N ) = argmax
n∈N
Cn
CCgetMinMP(n)
(3)
The getMinMP(n) method is implemented as per Formula 2, which we use to compute
the next norm to be monitored using the extractMaxNorm(N) method, implemented in
Formula 3. This heuristic chooses the norm with the highest value based on the ratio
between its penalty and the lowest current cost of the set of monitor placements. By
using the current cost, we disregard the costs of monitors that have already been chosen
in past iterations, yielding better estimates. In the next section we empirically evaluate
the different approaches proposed in this section.
5 Experiments and Results
To empirically evaluate our approaches, we automatically generate sets of norms and
sets of monitors with increasing complexity. In our experiments, we assumed the set
of monitors M2 of a monitor placement can in effect see all actions that were executed
from the states visible byM1; i.e., we assume that our monitor placement is always able
to check the next state after applying a given action. While this is a strong assumption
and makes our problem easier to solve, it still captures the exponential nature of the
bounded-monitor placement problem. Our experiments are based on standard planning
problems [], and our main domain is the drink-driving domain, where agents are able
to drive between cities, and there is a norm stating that it is forbidden to drive while
drunk; we also tested with blocksworld, depots, dwr, easy ipc grid, gripper, logistics
and robby domains.
There are two metrics to consider when analyzing results: time performance and
accuracy. When comparing time performance we use the brute-force approach as a
baseline for the approximate approaches. In Figure 1 we can see that the brute-force ap-
proach becomes intractable for a relative small number of norms, while the approximate
approaches remain linear as the number of norms increases.
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Figure 2 shows the time performance of both greedy solutions. The Add and Update
Solution is worse in this metric than the Norm Independence Solution because it needs
to recompute the current cost at each iteration. It is still fast compared to the brute-force
approach, being able to find a solution for a problem with almost 300 norms in under
one second.
We perform two experiments to compare the accuracy of the results of the approx-
imate approaches. First, in Figure 4, we show the relative accuracy compared with an
optimal solution to the problem using the brute-force approach. Note that, as we are
comparing with the brute-force approach, these results are limited to small problems
that this approach can solve1. In this experiment, both greedy approaches outperform
the naive solution; between the two greedy approaches, the second one (Add and Update
Heuristic) has, in almost all domains, greater accuracy, and — in all cases — a smaller
standard deviation. For the depots, gripper and logistics domain, the second solution
achieves optimal accuracy; this can be explained as these domains become intractable
even for small number of norms, and thus the number of problems in this experiment,
for these domains, is also small. The increase in performance from the first to the sec-
ond greedy approach is relatively small for these domains; while it is relatively large
for the drinkdriving and robby domains.
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To investigate if the relationships found for the first experiment hold for large prob-
lems, we perform additional experiments, shown in Figure 3. As these problems cannot
be solved in a timely manner using a brute-force approach, in order to calculate their
accuracy we compare them with a perfect solution that could monitor all norms, but
that does not necessarily need to respect the available budget. This perfect solution has
the maximum value of U, which can be unattainable for actual solutions to these prob-
lems; therefore, in this experiment we are interested in the relative accuracy between
the approximate approaches, and not in how close they are to the perfect solution.
We can see the same pattern in this experiment; the greedy approaches perform
better than the naive solution, with a slight advantage for the Add and Update Heuristic.
The increase in performance from the first to the second greedy approach remains large
for the drinkdriving domain, while for other domains it is relatively small.
From the experiments we conclude that brute-force solution is intractable for all but
small problems, while approximate approaches can solve large problems. The accuracy
of the greedy approaches is better than the naive solution, with a slight advantage to
the second greedy approach. This advantage is more noticeable for small problems; for
large problems — as we do not have the value for the optimal solution — this difference
is smaller.
1 We set a timeout of 30 seconds for this experiment.
6 Related Work
Other authors also dropped the assumption that a monitor has full observability in the
system. Criado’s [4] approach is similar to our work; their norms are more expressive,
and for their solution they use the CEF algorithm which uses a greedy approach. How-
ever, they do not perform an empirical evaluation, or consider whether their approach is
able to actually monitor any norm, as there are no guarantees proven for their proposed
algorithm. Alechina et al. [2] models a set of queries that a monitor can ask in a state,
i.e., a monitor may not be able to distinguish between two states. They then modify
the set of norms to a new set of approximate norms that can be optimally monitored
given a set of monitors and queries, therefore approaching the problem from another
perspective.
Alechina et al. [1] define norms using LTL (linear temporal logic) formulas. They
introduce the concept of a guard, which uses lookahead mechanisms to detect future
norm violations. The size of the lookahead window is bounded to reduce the amount
of computation in the future (they have complete knowledge of the past), and have
similarities with the concept of monitor cost in our work. The main difference is that,
while we use a combination of monitors to be able to detect a norm violation, they
increase their lookahead window size to increase their monitoring capabilities, also
increasing its computational cost.
Finally, our work is also similar to that of Bulling et al. [3]; both include the con-
cept of monitors and combination of monitors. While we use a relatively simple norm
formalism and optimize the cost to monitor these norms, their specification uses LTL-
formulas, focusing on its properties and relations. Their current framework does not
include norms or monitors costs.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we extend the state of the art in norm monitoring by dropping the as-
sumption that a monitor system has full observability, i.e., that monitors can observe all
actions performed. Adding the notion of a set of available monitors and an associated
cost results in the problem of finding a monitor placement in order to maximize the
number of detectable violations. While brute-force solutions are impractical because
the possible solution search space is exponential in the size of input, we propose heuris-
tics that use a mapping between norms and monitors to find approximate solutions. Our
empirical of runtime performance and accuracy shows that these heuristics are both
practical in computational terms and approach optimal performance for many realistic
domains from the planning literature.
We aim to extend the work in at least three ways. The first is to allow monitors to
dynamically modify their placement during execution. In this setting, monitors would
be able to observe agent actions and move to locations where more norm violations
occur. The second extension would be to consider different agents being able to perform
concurrent actions, and how to build monitors able to correctly identify which agent
violated a given norm. The third is to allow more complex expressions representing
both what monitors can observe and how monitors can be combined, as currently we
only consider conjunctions of monitors. This can increase the richness of our approach,
and we intend to investigate heuristics for the use of such more expressive monitors.
Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by grants from CNPq/Brazil numbers 132339/2016-1
and 305969/2016-1.
References
1. Alechina, N., Bulling, N., Dastani, M., Logan, B.: Practical run-time norm enforcement with
bounded lookahead. In: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 443–451 (2015)
2. Alechina, N., Dastani, M., Logan, B.: Norm approximation for imperfect monitors. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems. pp. 117–124 (2014)
3. Bulling, N., Dastani, M., Knobbout, M.: Monitoring norm violations in multi-agent systems.
In: Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems. pp. 491–498 (2013)
4. Criado, N.: A practical resource-constrained norm monitor. In: Proceedings of the 2017 Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 1508–1510 (2017)
5. Dignum, F.: Autonomous agents with norms. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7(1), 69–79
(1999)
6. Esteva, M., Rosell, B., Rodriguez-Aguilar, J.A., Arcos, J.L.: Ameli: An agent-based middle-
ware for electronic institutions. In: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 236–243 (2004)
7. Garcı´a-Camino, A., Noriega, P., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.A.: Implementing norms in electronic
institutions. In: Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 667–673 (2005)
8. Garcı´a-Camino, A., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.A., Sierra, C., Vasconcelos, W.: Constraint rule-
based programming of norms for electronic institutions. In: Proceedings of the 2009 Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 186–217 (2009)
9. Ghallab, M., Nau, D., Traverso, P.: Automated planning: theory & practice. Elsevier (2004)
10. Luck, M., d’Inverno, M.: Constraining autonomy through norms. In: Proceedings of the First
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 674–681
(2002)
11. Modgil, S., Faci, N., Meneguzzi, F., Oren, N., Miles, S., Luck, M.: A framework for moni-
toring agent-based normative systems. In: Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 153–160 (2009)
12. Oren, N., Panagiotidi, S., Va´zquez-Salceda, J., Modgil, S., Luck, M., Miles, S.: Towards a
formalisation of electronic contracting environments. In: Coordination, Organizations, Insti-
tutions and Norms in Agent Systems IV, pp. 156–171 (2009)
13. Ossowski, S.: Agreement technologies, vol. 8. Springer Science & Business Media (2012)
14. Savarimuthu, B.T.R., Cranefield, S.: Norm creation, spreading and emergence: A survey of
simulation models of norms in multi-agent systems. Multiagent and Grid Systems 7(1), 21–
54 (2011)
15. Sutinen, J.G., Andersen, P.: The economics of fisheries law enforcement. Land economics
61(4), 387–397 (1985)
The Perils of Classifying Political Orientation From Text
Hao Yan, Allen Lavoie?, and Sanmay Das
Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
{haoyan,allenlavoie,sanmay}@wustl.edu
Abstract. Political communication often takes complex linguistic forms. Un-
derstanding political ideology from text is an important methodological task in
studying political interactions between people in both new and traditional media.
Therefore, there has been a spate of recent research that either relies on, or pro-
poses new methodology for, the classification of political ideology from text data.
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of these techniques for classifying ideol-
ogy in the context of US politics. We construct three different datasets of conser-
vative and liberal English texts from (1) the congressional record, (2) prominent
conservative and liberal media websites, and (3) conservative and liberal wikis,
and apply text classification algorithms with a domain adaptation technique. Our
results are surprisingly negative. We find that the cross-domain learning perfor-
mance, benchmarking the ability to generalize from one of these datasets to an-
other, is poor, even though the algorithms perform very well in within-dataset
cross-validation tests. We provide evidence that the poor performance is due to
differences in the concepts that generate the true labels across datasets, rather
than to a failure of domain adaptation methods. Our results suggest the need for
extreme caution in interpreting the results of machine learning methodologies for
classification of political text across domains. The one exception to our strongly
negative results is that the classification methods show some ability to generalize
from the congressional record to media websites. We show that this is likely be-
cause of the temporal movement of the use of specific phrases from politicians to
the media.
1 Introduction
Political discourse is a fundamental aspect of government across the world, especially
so in democratic institutions. In the US alone, billions of dollars are spent annually on
political lobbying and advertising, and language is carefully crafted to influence the
public or lawmakers [10, 11]. Matthew Gentzkow won the John Bates Clark Medal in
economics in 2014 in part for his contributions to understanding the drivers of me-
dia “slant.” With the increasing prevalence of social media, where activity patterns are
correlated with political ideologies [2], companies are also striving to identify users’
ideologies based on their comments on political issues, so that they can recommend
specific news and advertisements to them.
The manner in which political speech is crafted and words are used creates diffi-
culties applying standard methods. Political ideology classification is a difficult task
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even for people – only those who have substantial experience in politics can correctly
classify the ideology behind given articles or sentences. In many political ideology la-
beling tasks, it is even more essential than in tasks that could be thought of as similar
(e.g. labeling images, or identifying positive or negative sentiment in text) to ensure that
labelers are qualified before using the labels they generate [5, 21].
One of the reasons why classification of political texts for inexperienced people is
hard is because different sides of the political spectrum use slightly different terminol-
ogy for concepts that are semantically the same. For example, in the US debate over
privatizing social security, liberals typically used the phrase “private accounts” whereas
conservatives preferred “personal accounts” [13]. Nevertheless, it is well-recognized
that “dictionary based” methods for classifying political text have trouble generalizing
across different domains of text [17].
Many methods based on machine learning techniques have also been proposed for
the problem of classifying political ideology from text [1,21,23]. The training and test-
ing process typically follows the standard validation rules: first split the dataset into
a training set and a test set, then propose an algorithm and train a classification model
based on the training set and finally test on the test set. These methods have been achiev-
ing increasingly impressive results, and so it is natural to assume that classifiers trained
to recognize political ideology on labeled data from one type of text can be applied
to different types of text, as has been common in the social science literature (e.g.
Gentzkow and Shapiro using phrases from the Congressional Record to measure the
slant of news media [13], or Groseclose and Milyo using citations of different think
tanks by politicians to also measure media bias [18]). However, these papers are clas-
sifying the bias of entire outlets (for example, The New York Times or The Wall Street
Journal) rather than individual pieces of writing, like articles. Such generalization abil-
ity is not obvious in the context of machine learning methods working with smaller
portions of text, and must be put to the test.
The main question we ask in this paper is whether the increasingly excellent per-
formance of machine learning models in cross-validation settings will generalize to the
task of classifying political ideology in text generated from a different source. For ex-
ample, can a political ideology classifier trained on text from the congressional record
successfully distinguish between liberal and conservative news articles? One immediate
problem we face in engaging this question is the absence of large datasets with political
ideology labels attached to individual pieces of writing. Therefore, we assemble three
datasets with very different types of political text and an easy way of attributing labels
to texts. The first is the congressional record, where texts can be labeled by the party
of the speaker. The second is a dataset of articles from two popular web-based publi-
cations, Townhall.com, which features conservative columnists, and salon.com,
which features liberal writers. The third is a dataset of political articles taken from Con-
servapedia (a conservative response to Wikipedia) and RationalWiki (a liberal response
to Conservapedia). In each of these cases there is a natural label associated with each
article, and it is relatively uncontroversial that the labels align with common notions of
liberal and conservative. We show that standard classification techniques can achieve
high performance in distinguishing liberal and conservative pieces of writing in cross-
validation experiments on these datasets.
It is tempting to assume that there is enough shared language across datasets that
one can generalize from one to the other for new tasks, for example, for detecting bias
in Wikipedia editors, or the political orientation of op-ed columnists. However, is it
really reasonable to extrapolate from any of these datasets to others? As a motivating
example, we show that the results of training bag-of-bigram linear classifiers using the
three different datasets above and then using them to identify the political biases of
Wikipedia administrators leads to wildly inconsistent results, with virtually no corre-
lation between the partisanship rankings of the administrators based on the three dif-
ferent training sets. More generally, we show that, with one exception, the unaltered
cross-domain performance of different classifiers on these datasets is abysmal, and there
is only marginal benefit from applying a state-of-the-art domain adaptation technique
(marginalized stacked denoising autoencoders [6]). The exception is in using data from
the congressional record to predict whether articles are from Salon or Townhall, consis-
tent with Gentzkow and Shapiro’s results on media bias. A temporal analysis suggests
that this is because phrases move in a rapid and predictable way from the congressional
record to the news media. However, even in this domain, we provide evidence that the
underlying concepts (Salon vs. Townhall compared with Democrat vs. Republican) are
significantly different: adding additional labeled data from one domain actively hurts
performance on the other. Our results are robust to using regressions on measures of
political ideology (DW-Nominate scores [26]) rather than simple classifications of par-
tisanship. Our overall results suggest that we should proceed with extreme caution in
using machine learning (or phrase-counting) approaches for classifying political text,
especially in situations where we are generalizing from one type of political speech to
another.
1.1 Related Work.
While our methods and results are general, we focus in this paper on political ideol-
ogy in the US context, since there is already a rich literature on the topic, as well as
abundant data. Political ideology in U.S. media has been well studied in economics and
other social sciences. Groseclose et al., [18] calculate and compare the number of times
that think tanks and policy groups were cited by mainstream media and congresspeople.
Gentzkow et al., [13] generate a partisan phrase list based on the Congressional Record
and compute an index of partisanship for U.S. newspapers based on the frequency of
these partisan phrases. Budak et al., [5] use Amazon Mechanical Turk to manually rate
articles from major media outlets. They use machine learning methods (logistic regres-
sion and SVMs) to identify whether articles are political news, but then use human
workers to identify political ideology in order to determine media bias. Ho et al., [20]
examine editorials from major newspapers regarding U.S. Supreme Court cases and ap-
ply the statistical model proposed by Clinton et al., [7]. All of the above research gives
us quantitative political slant measurements of U.S. mainstream media outlets. How-
ever, these political ideology classification results are corpus-level rather than article
level or sentence level.
The machine learning community has focused more on the learning techniques
themselves. Gerrish et al., [14] propose several learning models to predict voting pat-
terns. They evaluate their model via cross-validation on legislative data. Iyyer et al., [21]
apply recursive neural networks in political ideology classification. They use Con-
vote [30] and the Ideological Books Corpus [19]. They present cross-validation results
and do not analyze performance on different types of data. Ahmed et al., [1] propose
an LDA-based topic model to estimate political ideology. They treat the generation of
words as an interaction between topic and ideology. They describe an experiment where
they train their model based on four blogs and test on two new blogs. However, political
blogs are considerably less diverse than our datasets; since the articles in our datasets
are generated in completely different ways (speeches, crowdsourcing and editorials).
The results in this paper constitute a more general test of cross-domain political ideol-
ogy learning.
Cross-domain text classification methods are an active area of research. Glorot et
al., [15] propose an algorithm based on stacked denoising autoencoders (SDA) to learn
domain-invariant feature representations. Chen et al., [6] come up with a marginalized
closed-form solution, mSDA. Recently, Ganin et al., [12] have proposed a promising
“Y” structure end-to-end domain adversarial learning network, which can be applied in
multiple cross-domain learning tasks.
Cohen et al., [8] investigate the classification of political leaning across three dif-
ferent groups (based on activity level) of Twitter users. Without any domain adaptation
methodology, they show that cross-domain classification accuracy declines significantly
compared with in-domain accuracy. Our work provides a view across much more di-
verse data sources than just social media, and engages the question of domain adaptation
more substantively.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
Mainstream newspapers and websites have been widely used in political ideology re-
search [3, 5, 13]. However, these datasets contain many non-political articles, and the
political articles in news datasets are typically non-partisan [5]. Therefore, we carefully
construct three datasets that we expect to be partisan: (1) The Congressional Record,
containing statements by members of the Republican and Democratic parties in the US
congress; (2) News media articles from Salon (a left-leaning website) & Townhall (a
right-leaning one); and (3) Articles related to American politics from two collectively
constructed “new media” websites, Conservapedia (conservative) & RationalWiki (lib-
eral). Details of the construction process and the resulting corpora are in the appendix.
2.2 Methods
Text Preprocessing We perform some preprocessing on all the datasets to extract con-
tent rather than references and metadata, and also standardize the text by lowercasing,
stemming, removing stopwords and other extremely common and venue-specific words.
Logistic Regression Models Logistic regression is a standard and useful technique
for text classification. We extract bigrams from the text and Term Frequency-Inverse
Document Frequency weighting to construct the feature representation for logistic re-
gression to use (and denote the overall method TF-IDFLR in what follows). We use the
implementation provided in the scikit-learn machine learning package [25].
Marginalized Stacked Denoising Autoencoders for domain adaptation Marginal-
ized Stacked Denoising Autoencoders (mSDA) [6] are a state-of-the-art cross-domain
text classification method [12]. Given bag-of-words input of text from two different
domains, mSDA provides a closed-form representation of the input, and is faster than
the original Stacked Denoising Autoencoder (SDA) [15] without loss of classification
accuracy. We use TF-IDF bag-of-bigrams vectors as the input to mSDA, the original
mSDA Python package1 for the implementation of mSDA in combination with the lo-
gistic regressions described above in our domain adaptation experiments.
Semi-Supervised Recursive Autoencoders Recently, there have been rapid advances
in text sentiment and ideology classification based on recursive neural networks. Most
of this work is based on sentence or phrase level classification. Some of these methods
use fully labeled [29] or partially labeled [21] parsed sentence trees, and some need
large numbers of parameters [27, 29]. Since we have large datasets available to use,
we use semi-supervised recursive autoencoders (RAE) [28], which do not need parse
trees, labels for all nodes in the parse trees, or a large number of parameters. We use the
MATLAB package distributed by Socher et al., [28]2. We do not transform the words
down to their linguistic roots when we apply the RAE method since we need to use a
word dictionary.
3 Results
3.1 Cross-domain consistency
The first question is whether training on different domains yields consistent results in
classifying political ideology. We evaluate this on a motivating task that is exactly the
type of task that one may wish to use these types of tools for, determining ideological
bias among Wikipedia administrators.
For each of the 500 most active Wikipedia administrators, we concatenate all the
strings they have added to pages on Wikipedia related to U.S. politics and classify the
resulting “body of work” of that administrator using the three different training sets (the
Congressional Record is #1, Salon/Townhall is #2, and RationalWiki/Conservapedia is
#3). Each classifier produces a ranking of these 500 administrators. Shockingly we find
that these rankings have virtually no correlation with each other (see Table 1).
Somewhat more anecdotally, we can also look at the ranks of some users from each
method. We select the three most liberal users according to each of the three classifiers
and find their positions in the other two lists. The results are in Table 2 and again
demonstrate how diverse the rankings can be based on the training sets.
3.2 Consistency across time
1 http://www.cse.wustl.edu/˜kilian/code/files/mSDA.zip
2 http://nlp.stanford.edu/˜socherr/codeDataMoviesEMNLP.zip
User Sorted
Lists
Spearman’s ρ Kendall’s τ
U1, U2 -0.004588 -0.003469
U2, U3 0.005201 0.002133
U3, U1 -0.073204 -0.048652
Table 1: Correlation between the user ide-
ology ranks as determined by the three dif-
ferent training sets. U1 is the rank vec-
tor based on the classifier trained on Con-
gressional Record, U2 is based on Salon /
Townhall and U3 is based on RationalWiki
/ Conservapedia. Both ρ and τ are close to
0, demonstrating almost no correlation (the
statistics range from -1 for perfectly anti-
correlated to +1 for perfectly correlated).
User Name U1 U2 U3
Barek 1 282 487
ERcheck 2 387 35
Widr 3 345 496
James086 262 1 356
Penwhale 455 2 300
Dave souza 97 3 240
Gyrofrog 425 141 1
Smartse 416 358 2
Rigadoun 418 38 3
Table 2: Rankings of the three most lib-
eral users according to classifiers trained on
each of the training sets.
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Fig. 1: Salon & Townhall year-
based timeline test. The training
set is 2006 Salon & Townhall data.
The test sets are individual year
data from 2007 to 2014, also from
Salon & Townhall.
The words used to describe politics change across
time, as do the topics of importance. Therefore,
political articles that are distant in time from each
other will be less similar than those written dur-
ing the same period. We now study whether this
is a significant issue for the logistic regression
methods by focusing on the Salon and Townhall
dataset. We use 2006 Salon and Townhall articles
as a training set and future years (from 2007 to
2014) as separate test sets.
Figure 1 shows the AUC across time. The
AUC for 2007 is 0.872, which means that the Sa-
lon & Townhall articles in 2006 and 2007 are sim-
ilar enough for successful generalization of the
ideology classifier from one to the other. How-
ever, the prediction accuracy goes down signifi-
cantly as the dates of the test set become further
out in the future, as the nature of the discourse
changes. It is now clear that our classification methods have generalization problems
both across domains and across time.
3.3 Domain adaptation
Now we turn to a more comprehensive analysis. We examine the performance of sev-
eral different methods across the three labeled datasets. We study linear classifiers and
recursive autoencoders as described above, as well as the mSDA method for domain
adaptation. In order to account for the effects of time-varying language use demon-
strated above, we restrict our methods to train and test only on data from the same year,
and then aggregate results across years.
Training Set
Test Set Congressional
Record
Salon &
Townhall
Conservapedia &
RationalWiki
Congressional
Record
0.8299 (TF-IDFLR)
0.8136 (RAE)
0.6935(mSDA)
0.6731 (TF-IDFLR)
0.5937(RAE)
0.4729(mSDA)
0.4940 (TF-IDFLR)
0.4655 (RAE)
Salon &
Townhall
0.6038(mSDA)
0.5861 (TF-IDFLR)
0.5363 (RAE)
0.9193(TF-IDFLR)
0.9041(RAE)
0.5234(mSDA)
0.5080 (TF-IDFLR)
0.5527(RAE)
Conservapedia &
RationalWiki
0.5260(mSDA)
0.5012 (TF-IDFLR)
0.4674 (RAE)
0.5835(mSDA)
0.5282 (TF-IDFLR)
0.5711 (RAE)
0.8493 (TF-IDFLR)
0.8180 (RAE)
Table 3: Domain adaptation test based on three data sets
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Fig. 2: AUC on Salon/Townhall as
a function of the proportion of the
labeled (Salon/Townhall) dataset
used in training. The results show
that including labeled data from
the Congressional Record never
helps and actively hurts classifi-
cation accuracy in almost all set-
tings, and that restricting features
to ngrams with sufficient support
in both datasets does not help ei-
ther.
Table 3 shows the average AUC for each
group of experiments. The within-domain cross-
validation results (on the diagonal) are excellent
for both the linear classifier and the RAE. How-
ever, the naive cross-domain generalization re-
sults are uniformly terrible, often barely above
chance. While we could hope that using a sophis-
ticated domain-adaptation technique like mSDA
would help, the results are disappointing: in only
one cross-domain task (generalizing from the
Congressional Record to Salon and Townhall)
does it help to achieve a reasonable level of
accuracy. The AUC score gaps between cross-
validation and domain adaptation results indicate
that, even with a state-of-the-art domain adapta-
tion algorithm, cross-text domain political ideol-
ogy identification is not, at this point, able to give
reliable results. It is of note that the best perfor-
mance is in generalizing from the congressional
record to a media dataset (Salon/Townhall) be-
cause it adds weight to the existing line of re-
search starting from Gentzkow and Shapiro on
how language flows from politicians to the media.
(Implementation details and parameter choices
for Sections 3.1-3.3 can be found in the appendix)
3.4 Failure of domain adaptation, or distinct concepts?
There are two plausible hypotheses that could explain these negative results. H1: The
domain adaptation algorithm algorithm is failing (probably because it is easy to overfit
labeled data from any of the specific domains), or H2: The specific concepts we are
trying to learn are actually different or inconsistent across the different datasets. We
perform several experiments to try and provide evidence to distinguish between these
hypotheses. First, we may be able to reduce overfitting by restricting the features to
ngrams that have sufficient support (operationally, at least 5 appearances) in both sets
of data (this reduces the dimensionality of the space and would lead to a greater likeli-
hood of the “true” liberal/conservative concept being found if there were many accurate
hypotheses that could work in any individual dataset). Second, we can examine perfor-
mance as we include more and more labeled data from the target domain in the training
set. In the limit, if the concepts are consistent, we would not expect to see any degra-
dation in (cross-validation) performance on the source domain from including labeled
data from the target domain in training.
We focus on the Salon/Townhall and Congressional Record data sets here since
they are the most promising for the possibility of domain adaptation. We combine part
of the Salon/Townhall data with Congressional Record as training set. Then we use
the rest of the Salon/Townhall data set as the test set, increasing the percentage of the
Salon/Townhall dataset used in training from 0% to 80%, and compare with cross-
validation performance on just the Salon/Townhall dataset.
Figure 2 shows that including labeled data from the Congressional Record never
helps and, once we have at least 10% of labels, actively hurts classification accuracy
on the Salon/Townhall dataset. Restricting to bigrams that appear in both datasets at
least 5 times further degrades the performance. This demonstrates quite clearly that
the problem is not overfitting a specific dataset when there are many correct concepts
available, it is that the concept of being from Salon or Townhall is significantly different
than the concept of being from a Democratic or Republican speech. Therefore, the hope
of successful domain-agnostic classification of political orientation based on text data
is significantly diminished.
3.5 Temporal movement of topics
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Fig. 3: Distribution of median
value of time lag results in each
experiment
The silver lining so far is that there is at least some
ability to predict the political orientation of web-
based news media based on the congressional
record. We can further investigate this insight
and demonstrate the utility of the data we have
collected by examining the question temporally.
Leskovec et al., [22] investigated the time lag re-
garding news events between the mainstream me-
dia and blogs. We ask a similar question – who
discusses “new” political topics in the first place
– congress or the media?
In order to answer this question, we exam-
ine mutual trigrams in the Congressional Record
and Salon&Townhall datasets. We find all new tri-
grams in any given year (those which did not ap-
pear in the previous year and appeared at least
twice in the media data and five times in the con-
gressional record in the given year and the next
one), and then construct the time lags between first appearance in each of the two
datasets, excluding congressional recess days. Since the congressional record is much
larger, we subsample and repeat the experiment many times to get a distribution of time
lags.
In each of these bootstrapped samples, there is a median time lag between the first
appearance of a phrase in the congressional record and its first appearance in the media
dataset. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these medians. The median is never negative,
and is on average 2 days, showing a definite tendency for phrases to travel from the
congressional record to the media rather than the other way round. The entire distribu-
tion also shows a slight bias towards the media picking up on congressional topics of
discussion after the fact. These results help to explain the relative success of domain
adaptation from the congressional record to the media dataset.
4 Conclusion
Text analytics is becoming a central methodological tool in analyzing political commu-
nication in many different contexts. It is obviously very valuable to have a good way of
measuring political ideology based on text. Our work sounds a cautionary note in this
regard by demonstrating the difficulty of classifying political text across different con-
texts. We provide strong evidence that, in spite of the fact that writers or speech makers
in different domains often self-identify or can be relatively easily identified by humans
as being conservative or liberal, the concepts are distinct enough across datasets (even
in just the US political context!) that generalization is extremely difficult. We note that,
while we have presented our results in the context of classification, we get identical re-
sults when using measures of political ideology on a real-valued spectrum (the standard
DW-Nominate score [26]) as the target of a regression task (this is only feasible for the
congressional record, since the scores of congresspeople can be obtained as a function
of their voting record). Our results demonstrate the need for extreme caution in the ap-
plication of machine learning techniques to classifying political ideologies, especially
when such efforts are made across domains.
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Appendix
A Datasets
A.1 Congressional Record.
The U.S. Congressional Record preserves the activities of the House and Senate, includ-
ing every debate, bill, and announcement. We use the party affiliation of the speaker
(Democrat or Republican) as an indication of ideology (liberal or conservative). We
retrieve the floor proceedings of both the Senate and House from 2005 to 2014. We sep-
arate the proceedings into segments with a single speaker. For each of these segments,
we extract the speaker and their party affiliation (Democrat, Republican or indepen-
dent)In order to focus on partisan language, we excluded speech from independents,
and from clerks and presiding officers.
A.2 Salon and Townhall.
We collect articles tagged with “politics” from Salon, a website with a progressive/liberal
ideology, and all articles from Townhall, which mainly publishes reports about U.S. po-
litical events and political commentary from a conservative viewpoint.
A.3 Conservapedia and RationalWiki.
Conservapedia (http://www.conservapedia.com/) is a wiki encyclopedia project
website. Conservapedia strives for a conservative point of view, created as a reaction
to what was seen as a liberal point of view from Wikipedia. RationalWiki (http:
//rationalwiki.org/) is also a wiki encyclopedia project website, which was,
in turn, created as a liberal response to Conservapedia. RationalWiki and Conservape-
dia are based on the MediaWiki system. Once a page is set up, other users can revise
it. For RationalWiki, we download pages ranking in the top 10000 in number of revi-
sions. We further select pages whose categories contain the following word stems: liber,
conserv, govern, tea party, politic, left-wing, right-wing, president, u.s. cabinet, united
states senat, united states house. Because the Conservapedia community has more arti-
cles than RationalWiki, we download the top 40000 pages. We apply the same political
keywords list we use for RationalWiki. We always use the last revision of any page for
a given time period.
Table 4 shows the counts of articles in the liberal and conservative parts of each of
the three datasets by year. Our datasets have the following properties that make them
useful for political ideology learning and evaluation in the context of U.S. politics:
– The content is selected to be relevant to U.S. politics.
– The content can predictably be labeled as conservative or liberal by a somewhat
knowledgeable human. While it is true that not all speeches by Democrats are lib-
eral, and not all articles on Townhall conservative, since these are subjectively de-
fined, this is nevertheless as clean a delineation as we can hope for.
– The creation times of items in the three datasets have substantial overlap;
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Democrat (CR) 14504 11134 17990 11053 14580 11080 11161 8540 9673 7956 0 0
Republican (CR) 11478 9289 12897 8362 13351 7878 9141 6841 8212 6585 0 0
Salon 1613 1561 2161 2598 2615 1650 1860 1630 865 123 0 0
Townhall 27 143 290 341 174 176 258 380 441 674 0 0
RationalWiki 0 0 302 514 666 854 1086 1208 1342 1402 1480 1480
Conservapedia 0 93 1752 2381 2933 3214 3467 3698 3792 3863 3937 3938
Table 4: Article distributions by year in the three datasets. Democrat (CR), Salon, and
RationalWiki are assumed to be liberal, while Republican (CR), Townhall, and Conser-
vapedia are assumed to be conservative.
A.4 Wikipedia
We also motivate our task by attempting to classify bias on Wikipedia, an important
task [9]. Wikipedia is the largest encyclopedia project in the world and is widely used
in both natural language processing and political science studies [4, 24]. Wikipedia is
considered to have become nonpartisan as many users have contributed to political en-
tries [16]. We focus on edits made by admins on political topics in Wikipedia. We
download the English Wikipedia dump from March 4, 2015. To focus on US politics,
we extract all articles (with full edit history) that belong to WikiProject United States3
and satisfy the same political keywords requirement that we use for RationalWiki, yield-
ing 4659 articles in total. We then collect all edits added or subtracted by each active
Wikipedia admin.
B Details of Experimental Methodology
B.1 Cross-domain consistency
For the Congressional Record and Salon/Townhall datasets, we use data from 2005
to 2014. For the RationalWiki/Conservapedia datasets, we use the data from 2014 as
capturing a recent snapshot. For this dataset only we use feature hashing to project
the bigram features into a lower dimensional non-sparse feature space. We set the di-
mension of the hashed vector n features = 20000, ngram range = (2, 2), and
decode error = ignore. We use a so-called “balanced” logistic regression classifier to
deal with the problem of class imbalance. All other parameters are the defaults in the
scikit-learn package for both feature hashing vectorizer and logistic regression classi-
fier.
B.2 Consistency across time
We use the TF-IDFLR method for this experiment. For the vectorizer, we set min df =
5, ngram range = (2, 2) and decode error = ignore. For logistic regression classi-
fier, we set class weight = balanced to re-weight training samples. Other parameters
are set to the default values in the scikit-learn package.
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_United_
States
B.3 Domain adaptation
The linear classifier is the TF-IDFLR method described above. The RAE algorithm
trains embeddings using sentences subsampled from the data in order to balance con-
servative and liberal training sentences, and then a logistic regression classifier is used
on top of the embeddings thus trained. The marginalized stacked denoising autoencoder,
which is expected to find features that convey domain-invariant political ideology in-
formation, is run on TF-IDF bigram features before a logistic regression is applied on
top of that feature representation. We use five-fold cross validation when the training
and testing sets are the same.
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1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, digital technologies have opened up new paths for civic 
engagement and political participation. Hundreds of websites, portals, platforms and 
mobile apps enable citizens across the globe to organise campaigns, vote initiatives 
and sign petitions, monitor their representatives and track parliamentary activity, pro-
pose ideas and draft legislation or constitutions. Governments at different levels adopt 
digital technologies to develop ‘open government’ and ‘open data’ strategies to pro-
mote citizens’ participation and increase transparency. Crowdsourcing is now a per-
vasive method to collect data, information, ideas, and legislative proposals. A grow-
ing literature based on case studies and empirical testing provides the basis for further 
refinement of methods: e.g. smart crowdsourcing [17], expert crowdsourcing [5,6] 
microtasking [10].  
The exploration of new technologies and methods to harness the potential of 
crowdsourcing for civic action and politics, nevertheless, contrasts with the scarce 
attention given to the underlying assumptions about democracy, participation, equali-
ty, representation, and citizenship. Surprisingly enough, there has been little dialogue 
between theorists of democracy and citizenship, on the one hand, and digital technol-
ogists, information systems and AI experts, on the other, on how civic technologies 
 may redefine our current notions of democracy, participation, equality, representation, 
and citizenship.  
Our goal in this paper is threefold. First, we aim to induce a discussion on how to 
reinterpret some of these notions by reviewing some tensions and ‘trilemmas’ raised 
by political philosophers and democratic theorists. Second, we consider both the role 
and the limitations of civic technologies in mitigating these tensions and trilemmas. 
Third, we propose to adopt a meso-level approach, in between the macro-level of 
democratic theories and the micro-level of tools, to situate the interplay between peo-
ple, digital technologies, and data. As different groups in different social contexts use 
digital tools and data differently, it is at this meso level that we can elucidate the 
trade-offs with the notions of the trilemmas. We conceptualise the meso-level as the 
institutional level, for the notion of institution will give us a framework to analyse the 
use of technology in a given social context. 
2 Some Tensions and ‘Trilemmas’ in Democratic Theory 
2.1 A Condorcetian reading of representation 
The tensions between key concepts in democratic theory, notably sovereignty, repre-
sentation, participation, equality, and citizenship have long been debated. In her work 
on representative democracy, Nadia Urbinati has noted that both Montesquieu and 
Rousseau were ‘the first theorists to argue (for divergent reasons) that an unsolvable 
tension exists between democracy, sovereignty, and representation’ [23, p. 54]. More 
specifically:  
 
Montesquieu separated representation from democracy, and Rousseau representation from 
sovereignty. Montesquieu argued that a state where the people delegated their ‘right of sov-
ereignty’ could not be democratic and must be classified as a species of mixed government 
and in fact an aristocracy. Rousseau saw such a state as non-political from the start and ille-
gitimate because the people lost their political liberty along with the power to vote on legis-
lation directly: unless all citizens were lawmakers, there were no citizens at all. In both cas-
es, democracy and sovereignty excluded representation (p. 54). 
 
Urbinati argues that this exclusion remains implicit within contemporary theories 
of representative government for which “from a theoretical point of view, a ‘repre-
sented democracy’, although technically feasible, is an oxymoron, while direct de-
mocracy, although the norm, is impractical” [22, p.55]. Yet, Urbinati denies this in-
compatibility to be the only legacy of 18th century’s political philosophy when it 
comes to the idea of representation.
1
 In supporting her claim for a ‘democratic under-
                                                          
1 ‘Rather than a monolithic entity, the theory of representative government formed, since its 
birth, a complex and pluralistic family whose democratic wing was not the exclusive property 
of those who advocated for participation against representation.’ [22, p. 55]. 
 
 
 standing of representation’ she draws on Condorcet’s Plan de Constitution submitted 
to the French National Assembly in 1793. Condorcet’s proposal, eventually rejected 
by both his fellow Girondins and the Jacobins, contains what Urbinati describes as ‘an 
institutional order that is one of the most democratically advanced and imaginative 
Europe has produced in the last two centuries’ [22, p. 56]: 
 
Condorcet’s constitution designed a political order that was horizontal and acephalous (par-
liamentary, not presidential) and rigorously based on the centrality of the legislative power, 
a power held by a multiplicity of actors and performed in multiple times and within a plural-
ity of spaces. The function of legislation was performed within assemblies – elected assem-
bly and assemblies of the citizens (assemblées primaires) – and was held by the representa-
tives along with (not instead of) the citizens who ‘enjoyed’ both the electoral right and the 
right to revoke or censure the laws (constitutional and ordinary). [22, p. 59-60].   
 
Condorcet, Urbinati notes, reconciles sovereignty, representation, and participation 
by making ‘citizens’ participation essential to both the functioning of representative 
government and the preservation of political liberty’ [22, p. 60]. With a comment that 
echoes Josiah Ober’s vision of the role of citizens in ancient Athens [14, 15], Urbinati 
sees citizen participation in Condorcet’s institutional order as a ‘source of stability 
and of innovation’, while representation becomes the political device collecting and 
filtering knowledge for the public interest [22, p. 60].  
In our contemporary democracies, representation has become an even more intri-
cate subject, even at the local level [16]. Urbinati and Warren argue that the com-
plexity of issues and the multiple, overlapping constituencies involved call for the 
extension of the meaning of representation to include non-electoral forms ‘that are 
capable of representing latent interests, transnational issues, broad values, and discur-
sive positions’ [23, p. 407]. Moreover, the Internet has also enabled the emergence of 
online communities of interest beyond geographical boundaries that have no mecha-
nisms of representation in our political systems [9]. 
It is our contention that digital technologies and AI can facilitate the channelling of 
these multifaceted forms of representation in unique ways. But a second ‘trilemma’ 
needs to be addressed before considering these options. 
2.2 The ‘trilemma’ of democratic reform 
James Fishkin, a leading theorist of deliberative democracy, addresses in one of his 
papers the key question of how to incorporate public deliberation into constitutional 
processes [4]. In raising this question he introduces what he refers to as the ‘trilemma 
of democratic reform’. To Fishkin, there are three basic principles internal to the de-
sign of democratic institutions: political equality (people’s views are counted equal-
ly), mass participation (we are all given the opportunity to provide informed consent), 
and deliberation (we are all given the opportunity to provide opinions and weigh 
competing arguments).  
Fishkin suggests that, under normal conditions, any serious effort to attain any of 
the two principles inevitably hinders the third, so that we cannot satisfy the three prin-
 ciples simultaneously. For example, if we pursue a process driven by political equali-
ty and mass participation we are unlikely to get deliberation into the picture because 
the incentives for people to become seriously informed and engaged are very low 
(‘audience democracy’). Likewise, we can satisfy the principles of political equality 
and deliberation if we choose (by lot or by random sampling) a microcosm of deliber-
ators (e.g. Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls). This microcosm may be representative of the 
broader population from which it has been extracted, but then this population will 
have no voice in the process and therefore the principle of mass participation will not 
be fulfilled. Finally, we can have a process with mass participation (to some extent) 
and deliberation. This is what most of the current online crowd-civic platforms pro-
vide, but what we gather in this case is a ‘self-selected microcosm of deliberators’, 
highly engaged and yet, far from being representative of the broader population (so 
we would be violating the principle of political equality). Tanja Aitamurto et al. [1] 
have also highlighted the tension between the norm of equal representation in democ-
racy and the self-selection bias of crowdsourcing, suggesting that ‘crowdsourcing 
shouldn’t strive for statistical representativeness of the public, otherwise the virtues of 
crowdsourcing would be compromised and its benefits in crowd work would not be 
achieved.’ [1, p. 1]. Statistical representativeness as a requirement may be a debatable 
issue, but what is at stake here is the legitimacy of crowdsourcing in political practice. 
We also find a self-selection bias in offline political activity, e.g. in parliamentary 
elections, where the turnout is usually significantly below 100 per cent of the demos. 
How self-selection affects legitimacy in a political process is a general issue that po-
litical theory needs to address in broader terms. Specifically, if we conceptualize po-
litical equality in the classical sense [isegoria (equal voice) + isonomia (equality of 
political rights)] self-selection does not necessarily diminish the principle of equality 
(non-participation is an individual decision). 
What should we do if the simultaneous achievement of the three principles is not 
attainable? Fishkin suggests adopting a pragmatic approach to solve his trilemma. 
Rather than trying to approximate the ideal, he proposes the design of a second best 
approach or a proxy (and hence his research program on Deliberative Polling, aiming 
at both the internal and external validity of the process). Nevertheless, Fishkin 
acknowledges that this solution may incur a democratic deficit, since the resulting 
views may not be the actual views of the public [4, p. 253]. To tackle this issue, he 
proposes a process with sequential strategies (for example, a convention followed by 
a deliberative microcosm and, finally, a referendum) that, combined, cover the three 
principles at different stages.  
The remaining issue, nevertheless, is that deliberation does not travel well across 
those stages. Fishkin illustrates what he terms ‘the weak link of deliberation’ with the 
example of the Australian 1999 referendum, where two different deliberative bodies 
(a convention and a deliberative poll) had previously reached the opposite conclusion 
(pro-republic) with regard to the proposal of an Australian republic [4: p.253-254]. 
The elaboration of Iceland’s Constitution is another recent example of the weak con-
nection between deliberative bodies (in this case, the Constitutional Convention and 
the Parliament). Fishkin proposes to strengthen this link by organizing a Deliberation 
Day, where the entire population is convened for one day to engage in deliberation 
 followed by a referendum. To motivate participants, Fishkin estimated that an incen-
tive of $300 per participant would act as an adequate incentive [4, p. 258]. No matter 
how well designed, though, the costs of such events could be extremely prohibitive 
for many countries, especially considering how short-lived they would be. The ques-
tion that remains open is whether there is a role for technology in mitigating the tri-
lemma.  
3 Mitigating Democratic Trilemmas 
Political philosophy addresses both the tensions and trilemmas in democratic theory 
and practice with a sophisticated conceptual apparatus. Yet, research on the implica-
tions of civic technologies for democracy and democratisation processes is still large-
ly overlooked in both deliberative and epistemic accounts of democracy. This com-
partmentalisation of knowledge is disadvantageous from both a theoretical and empir-
ical perspective. For example, enabling effective non-electoral forms of representation 
would require a survey of technology options and ‘knowledge of what works and 
when’ [17]. Likewise, a better understanding of the underlying principles, models, 
and concepts of democratic theory would help to inform the design of civic tools and 
modulate the frequently inflated expectations placed on them.  
Digital platforms facilitate the depth and breadth of participation, lowering the bar-
riers to different forms of participation (without precluding offline participation) and 
improving the ‘open access pattern’ of a given social order [13]. They also open up 
the door to new, meaningful forms of mass deliberation and epistemic outcomes [e.g. 
10, 19]. To illustrate this point, in Figures 1 and 2 below we compare two models of 
democracy: 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Plebiscitarian model with deliberative body 
 
  
Fig. 2. Participatory model with deliberative body 
Fig. 1 represents a well-known plebiscitarian model of democracy: a small group (for 
example, a constitutional convention, a parliamentary commission, etc.) produces a 
legal text. When the text is ready, a referendum is called and citizens can cast a yes/no 
vote. This model accounts for the principles of political equality, mass participation, 
and representation. Yet, deliberation is restricted to the small group, as citizens are 
left with just an ex post, binary option (yes/no). Many constitution making processes 
in Western democracies have followed this path to date.  
Fig. 2 visualises a more complex participatory model to mitigate the trilemma. As 
in the previous case, a small group of people (either drafted by sortition or appointed 
by some other entity) is given the task of producing a legal text, but in sequential 
steps. The group deliberates on a first draft, which is open to the general public for 
comments and suggestions (typically from a self-selected subset of the electorate). 
The feedback from this very large group is incorporated in the draft and subsequently 
adapted to produce, after a number of iterations, the text to be agreed and ratified by 
the electorate. This participatory model was famously deployed in Iceland in 2011, 
when the meetings and debates of a Constitutional Council of 25 individuals (drafted 
from a larger pool of citizens) were made publicly available in the Council website 
for comment via social media and e-mail. The proposal was approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the voting population in a referendum in late 2012 but it eventually stalled 
in parliament [8].  
Similarly, this model was adopted in Mexico City. On January 2016, the Mayor of 
the city obtained approval from the federal parliament to initiate a constitution-
making process by appointing a group of 30 experts to discuss and draft a proposal.
2
 
In order to open up the drafting process to the citizenry, the City Council made pub-
licly available a collaborative editing tool for citizens to provide feedback on the spe-
cific topics posted by the drafting group. Moreover, as crowdsourced legal drafting 
does not typically attract a large number of citizens, this approach was complemented 
                                                          
2 https://www.constitucion.cdmx.gob.mx/constitucion-cdmx/#grupo-trabajo 
 
 with other participatory strategies, namely a survey and a Change.org campaign to 
collect petitions relevant to the constitutional text (at the closing date of the process, 
280,678 people had supported 129 petitions). The Constitution of Mexico City was 
finally published on 5 February 2017, although at the time of writing the Supreme 
Court of Mexico is hearing a number of appeals to the constitutional text from the 
federal government, two political parties, and other organisations.
3
 Strikingly, both 
the Icelandic and Mexican constitutional drafts came to a standstill as other institu-
tional bodies were involved. We will review this in Section 3.2 below. 
3.1 The technology caveat 
Digital platforms have come a long way when it comes to facilitating legal drafting, 
crowdsourcing of ideas, or structuring large-scale deliberation, but the tasks of aggre-
gating legal and political knowledge for deliberation and decision making remain 
onerous. In recent years, a number of advances in AI areas such as text mining, argu-
ment detection, extraction, and mapping can be applied to support the activity of very 
large groups, both to improve self awareness (of what they are co-producing) and 
facilitate knowledge aggregation. Likewise, both small and large groups can benefit 
from text mining, semantic languages (e.g. RDF, XML), ontologies, linked data, and 
machine learning when searching, analysing and reusing legal texts to elaborate new 
ones. For example, using ConstituteProject,
4
 constitution makers can now browse 
nearly 200 constitutions across the world (tagged with more than 300 topical labels) 
when drafting their own. Global laws are also accessible to law proponents or drafters 
with services offered, among others, by the World Legal Information Institute
5
 or 
Global Regulation.
6
  
To date, online platforms have focused on improving and facilitating mass partici-
pation (or at least to include larger numbers of citizens in a political process). Those 
efforts have proved useful when supporting the participation of dozens, hundreds or, 
in some cases, thousands of people contributing to an initiative with arguments or 
comments. Yet, the issue of effectively enabling large-scale, massive participation 
(that is, hundreds of thousands or even millions of people) is still unresolved.  
It is also important to note here the implicit assumption that correlates higher par-
ticipation with higher legitimacy. Mexico City, to use our previous example, has al-
most 9 million inhabitants, but what is the threshold for establishing that a constitu-
tion crowdsourced from a negligible percentage of its inhabitants is more legitimate 
than appointing a group of 30 experts? Can future civic technologies really scale up to 
mass participation in elaborating policies and laws, or can legitimacy only be claimed 
when the crowds are requested to ratify them? Would it be better to design systems 
that cater for smaller, decentralised, and distributed (offline and online) citizen as-
                                                          
3http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2017/03/10/corte-admite-
impugnaciones-contra-constitucion-cdmx 
4 http://constituteproject.org 
5 http://wordlii.org 
6 http://www.global-regulation.com 
 semblies (thus supporting a renewed version of democratic representation)?
7
 While 
these questions remain open, the answers also depend on political and institutional 
choices. 
3.2 The institutional caveat 
 A second caveat when trying to mitigate democratic trilemmas is that deploying civic 
tools for large-scale participation will not guarantee any real influence on either rule 
making or policy making. As the examples in Iceland and Mexico show, there is no 
way to ensure that embedding participatory components into the process—regardless 
of whether this participation is deliberative or not—will eventually have an impact on 
decision making and, ultimately, will lead to more bottom-up, inclusive decisions.  
Over the last two decades, deliberative democrats have set the conditions, proce-
dures, and standards of deliberative processes. More recently, some of them have 
adopted a ‘systemic’ approach where some institutions will achieve some principles 
while others will achieve others, making the institutional system ‘deliberative’ as a 
whole [11]. The focus on procedures and standards has also expanded to include the 
discussion on whether mini-publics (citizen juries, citizen assemblies, deliberative 
polls, etc.) and other institutional innovations should have a binding force—aligning 
the outcomes of deliberation with rule or policy making—or have a mere advisory 
role [e.g. 7]. The debate highlights the underlying tensions between participation and 
deliberation, but it does so from an abstract perspective. Ironically enough, the discus-
sion on the optimal institutional design to coordinate and translate deliberative outputs 
at the micro level into aligned policy making is not institutionally anchored. Yet, 
without such anchoring, it is hard to predict in which particular institutional contexts 
the new designs will either thrive or languish, and which trade-offs will be required. 
Empirical studies focusing on the institutional level, such as the Utrecht experiment 
below, may help to shed some light: 
 
The key feature of this process of political innovation is that citizens were randomly selected 
to participate, they received remuneration for their participation and they could be regarded 
as an alternative form of citizen representation. In contrast with many other forms of partici-
pation such as citizen panels, the advice was not ‘free’: local government had committed be-
forehand to follow this advice and to translate it to an energy policy plan. Our empirical 
analysis of this case shows that an interplay between idealist and realist logics explains why 
they are ‘accepted’ by the institutionalized democratic system.” [12, p. 21]. 
 
                                                          
7 We also find examples of this option in Buenos Aires, British Columbia, or Ireland. The 
Swiss ‘semi-direct democracy’ model [3] is paradigmatic when combining representation and 
popular sovereignty at the three levels of governance (federal, cantonal and municipal). Ap-
proximately four times a year, voting occurs over various issues: federal popular initiatives 
(constitutional reforms), policies, and election of representatives. Federal, cantonal and munici-
pal issues are polled simultaneously, and the majority of votes are cast by mail.  
 
 An intermediate, meso-level approach to both online and offline innovations would 
help to elucidate the interactions between people, technology, and data in particular 
settings. It would also provide a framework of analysis to better understand both the 
emerging properties (and tensions) of these interactions. We have suggested a model 
of ‘linked democracy’ to synthetise this framework [2, 18]. Linked democracy, there-
fore, is a model dynamically linking the distributed interactions between people, data, 
institutions within both organizational and local contexts.  
4 A Proposal for a Meso-level Approach: Some Features 
Our proposal consists of analysing political ecosystems where clusters of institutions 
are distributed throughout with different roles and specialisations, but all connected 
together in a distributed way. Both the Mexican and Icelandic cases can be analysed 
through these lenses, as well as, for example, the connected interactions between peo-
ple, technology and data in a public health ecosystem [2].   
 
 
Fig. 3. An ecosystem of linked institutions8 
It is out of the scope of this paper to present a case study embedded in this meso-level 
approach. Nevertheless, our proposal here includes outlining the features that may 
guide such an analysis from the perspective of a linked democracy model. Thus, our 
analysis of political ecosystems will consider them as:  
 Contextual. Interactions between people, technologies, and data occur at specific 
settings. People are identifiable individuals or groups, geographically bounded or 
connected online (or both); technologies include specific devices and tools (plat-
                                                          
8 In Figure 3 we use icons from the Noun Project (https://thenounproject.com/): group icon by 
Gregor Cresnar; data icon by IcoDots; mobile device icon by Vildana. 
 
 
 forms, apps, sensors, etc.); data comprises particular datasets with different formats 
(open data, linked open data, etc.) and licenses of use. 
 Blended. Interactions between people take place seamlessly, both offline and 
online. Global initiatives, or local initiatives that become transnational, may set lo-
cal chapters where people can meet offline, organise, and discuss. 
 Distributed. Political ecosystems are distributed networks with multiple nodes (as 
opposed to centralised or decentralised systems). Most likely, different political 
ecosystems will exhibit different connectivity maps—or political ‘connectomes’, to 
borrow an emerging concept from the neurosciences [21]. Likewise, we will need 
to develop and refine an appropriate ‘connectomics’ [20] to analyse their structural 
connections.    
 Open ended. Political ecosystems will evolve and adapt as the context changes. 
Stakeholders and their interests are not stable, technologies change rapidly and data 
has been characterised with the 4 Vs (volume, velocity, variety, and veracity). In 
this regard, a political ecosystem can be viewed as an adaptive complex systems. 
 Technologically agnostic. Political ecosystems rely on civic technologies that can 
be replaced. Whereas specific technologies can fail, be prohibited, or its supply be 
interrupted, there is a possibility for alternative implementations. 
 Modular. Participation and civic engagement are fluid concepts that can adopt 
multiple forms. Civic technology tools now support a vast range of options for citi-
zens and groups: data collection, fact checking, monitoring, signing petitions, 
crowdfunding, ideating, deliberating, drafting, voting, etc. In a modular political 
ecosystem, these options are available to cater for different levels of interest and 
engagement. Some forms of engagement will likely attract large numbers, while 
some others, requiring more time and cognitive effort, will appeal smaller crowds. 
 Scalable.  Political ecosystems should be able to accommodate increasing numbers 
of nodes (participants, technologies, data) and interactions between them without 
compromising connectivity and effectiveness. 
 Reusable knowledge. Political ecosystems tap on collective intelligence to produce 
new forms of collective, commons-based knowledge. This knowledge may adopt 
multiple formats: unstructured conversation threads in forums, websites, social 
media, portals; annotated documents and wiki-documents, crowdsourced legisla-
tive and policy drafts, proposals, manifestos, etc.; infographics, reports, case-study 
repositories, podcasts, videos, etc. Both deliberation and epistemic approaches to 
democracy assume the need to find and reuse knowledge in deliberation and deci-
sion-making processes. Josiah Ober adds to this necessity the dimension of prob-
lem solving, in the sense that untapped knowledge can only be ‘discovered’ in rela-
tion to a particular political issue by making a connection of relevance between 
that knowledge and the issue at hand [14,15]. From a linked democracy approach, 
we are interested in discovering how those connections are made and how they can 
be reused. 
 Knowledge-archiving. To reuse politically relevant knowledge, political ecosys-
tems need to find ways to trace and reproduce such knowledge. Traceability, re-
producibility, and accountability are essential components of collective, commons-
based knowledge. 
  Aligned. Political ecosystems may emerge bottom-up, as civic engagement initia-
tives, or top-down, from legislative or open government initiatives. In any case, on-
ly if institutional arrangements are in place there will be the consequential decision 
making and feedback loops that characterise aligned processes. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have briefly sketched some tensions and trilemmas in democratic 
theory that are relevant to the topic of designing civic technologies for democracy. 
Our contention is that technology can provide solutions to these tensions and trilem-
mas if we embed the issues at stake in a particular institutional meso-level. 
Most online platforms focus on facilitating engagement and specially participation. 
As we have seen, it is not possible to scale up participation by mere technological 
prowess. Developing technological platforms in the near future will require an inte-
grated approach where trade-offs between political values are explicitly acknowl-
edged and the institutional design of the different components and processes is coher-
ent with contextual constraints and changing environments. Civic values are also 
critical, and we agree with the perspective of Shannon Vallor [24] when she states 
that ‘the designs of such platforms have assumed civic virtues as inputs, rather than 
helping to cultivate them—virtues like integrity, courage, empathy, perspective, be-
nevolence, and respect for truth necessary to fuel any democratic technology, analog 
or digital’. A model of linked democracy is proposed to pay attention to these differ-
ent dimensions. 
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Abstract. Democracy is an economic problem of choice constrained by transac-
tion costs and information costs. Society must choose between competing insti-
tutional frameworks for the conduct of voting and elections. These decisions are 
constrained by the technologies and institutions available. Blockchains are a 
governance technology that reduces the costs of consensus, coordinating infor-
mation, and monitoring and enforcing contracts. Blockchain could be applied to 
the voting and electoral process to form a crypto-democracy. Analysed through 
the Institutional Possibility Frontier framework, we propose that blockchain 
lowers disorder and dictatorship costs of the voting and electoral process. In ad-
dition to efficiency gains, this technological progress has implications for de-
centralised institutions of voting. One application of crypto-democracy, quad-
ratic voting, is discussed.  
Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptoeconomics, Democracy, New comparative eco-
nomics, New institutional economics, Transaction cost economics, Voting  
1 Democracy as an economic problem  
Democracy is an economic problem insofar as it consists of a choice subject to con-
straints made by acting agents with diverse preferences about their own ends (Bu-
chanan and Tullock 1962). As in market exchange, in democratic choice these con-
straints are transaction costs and information costs, and are determined by the prevail-
ing institutions and technologies available to individual voters, candidates, political 
parties, and electoral agencies. Democratic institutions include laws governing elec-
tions and participation, rules controlling the provision of political information (such 
as free speech or limits to free speech, speech or donation disclosure, truth in advertis-
ing laws, or electronic advertising bans), and norms about democratic participation. 
Democratic technologies include those which enable the distribution of information 
and knowledge about democratic choice (such as the printing press or social media) 
and facilitate the making of democratic choice (such as printed ballot papers). Consti-
tutionally, societies have to determine who gets to choose (the franchise), the domain 
over which that choice is exercised (what social choices are to be governed democrat-
ically rather than through market processes), and the mechanism by which that choice 
is exercised (both the form of the democracy—i.e. representative or participatory—
and the electoral system—i.e. proportional or majoritarian). At a lower level, the insti-
tutional choices consist of the timing and location of elections, mechanisms to enroll 
and verify the identities of voters, the physical means by which the vote is made and 
recorded, whether individual votes are made in public or are secret, the process by 
which votes are counted, along with how they are verified, protected from tampering, 
and reported to a body for tallying. 
All these decisions are constrained by the technologies and institutions available. 
Voter identification provides an example of a democratic institution limited by the 
prevailing level of technology. Before the British Reform Act of 1832, “the would-be 
voter appeared at the poll, tendered his vote, and then there swore an oath prescribed 
by statute to the effect that he had the requisite qualification” (Maitland 1908, p. 355). 
While the number of eligible voters was small, this was a small burden – in small 
boroughs individuals were likely to be recognized at the ballot box. The Reform Act 
both expanded the franchise and mandated the creation of an electoral roll across 
Britain. These procedural changes prevented disputes about eligibility occurring at the 
ballot box itself, but were also expected by their proponents to reduce the cost of the 
election (Seymour 1915, p. 107). Enrolling to vote in Australia in the twenty-first 
century requires either an Australian driver’s license or an Australian passport—each 
with a color photograph of the holder and digital security features—or the verification 
of an existing enrolled voter how has previously passed the same. 
As this suggests, technological and institutional changes have both expanded dem-
ocratic possibilities and helped develop trust that individual votes—i.e. choices—are 
inputs into the social choice governed by the constitutional system. Technological 
advancement opens up alternative systems through which democracy might be prac-
ticed. Representative democracy as it stands in the twenty-first century developed 
world has been set according to the technological and institutional limits of prior cen-
turies. In order to underline this point, it is worth a brief diversion into the role that 
technology played in equally ‘democratic’ but significantly different forms of democ-
racy that have prevailed in the past. 
Ancient Athenian democracy was organised predominately by sortition rather than 
representation. Several hundred offices, including the membership of the governing 
Council of the 500, were filled each year by random allotment. Athenian juries were 
also filled by lottery, as they still are today. For Aristotle, sortition was the defining 
characteristic of Athens’ identification as a democracy, and, as Headlam (1891, p. 1) 
writes, for the modern mind ‘there is no institution of ancient history which is so dif-
ficult of comprehension as that of electing officials by the lot’. Nevertheless, Atheni-
an democracy faced many of the same practical constraints involving the selection 
and identification of potential office-holders and jurors. Participation in the lottery 
was not compulsory, but for those who chose to do so, identification was verified by 
ownership of a bronze identity plate. These plates were slotted into a tall marble ma-
chine, the kleroterion, from which they were withdrawn according to the random roll 
of a dice. Offices were allocated on the basis of the order the plates were withdrawn. 
The machine was introduced first to reduce possible jury tampering (Ober 1989, p. 
101), and Dow (1939) suggests that the potential for fraud to be committed by the 
operators of the machine was prevented by running the procedure twice. Sortition was 
valued in part as a response to agency problems derived from political power (Berg 
 2015; Rancière 2009). The introduction of the kleroterion, alongside the identification 
controls of the bronze plates, provided a material increase in the ‘democraticness’ of 
Athenian democracy, according to that society’s own conceptions of participation.  In 
that case, technology and technological change expanded the institutional possibilities 
of democracy and reduced the costs of those institutions.  
In this paper, we consider the same potential with blockchain technology. The next 
section will introduce the blockchain technology and consider its application for the 
institutions of voting and elections, drawing on new comparative economics and 
transaction cost economics to provide a theoretical framework for analysis. In the 
final section, we consider quadratic voting as an implication of crypto-democracy.  
2 Blockchain and crypto-democracy  
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto authored a white paper introducing blockchain technology 
(Nakamoto 2008). Using the complex mathematics of cryptography, blockchains 
enable dispersed and pseudonymous people to coordinate information and govern 
exchange in a decentralized way. A blockchain acts as distributed publicly accessible 
and secure ledger of information (Barta and Murphy 2014; Swan 2015). The first and 
most famous application of blockchain was through the digital currency Bitcoin (An-
tonopoulos 2014; Böhme et al. 2015; Godsiff 2015). This was an effort to provide a 
trusted non-territorial digital currency that was not reliant on a centralized bank and to 
operate through financial intermediaries. But the potential applications of blockchains 
are much broader than currency. For instance, blockchains may disintermediate and 
decentralize law, contracts and government (Atzori 2015; Economist 2015a; Mou-
gayar 2016; Popper 2015; Vigna and Casey 2015; Wright and De Filippi 2015). They 
can facilitate self-executing smart contracts in areas such as financial derivatives and 
gambling (Buterin 2014; Kõlvart et al. 2016; Szabo 1997), and create distributed au-
tonomous organizations (De Filippi and Mauro 2014). Most generally, blockchains 
compete with centralized hierarchical organization, such as firms and governments. 
Functionally this implies blockchains are a technology for creating new decentralized 
institutions (Davidson et al. 2016). To the extent that modern economic growth is 
explained through the evolution of effective institutions, blockchain may prove to be a 
general purpose institutional technology impacting many sectors and industries (Allen 
2016; MacDonald et al. 2016). 
Blockchains have also been raised as a potentially efficient solution for voting 
(Barnes and Brake 2016; Daniel 2015; Osgood 2016). This application has been 
termed ‘crypto-democracy’ (Davidson et al. 2016). The successful entrepreneurial 
application of blockchain involves outcompeting existing institutions for solving par-
ticular economic problems. Using the institutional possibility frontier (IPF) frame-
work (developed within new comparative economics) we can compare the existing 
institutions for voting and the electoral process and examine the effect of the introduc-
tion of blockchain. 
 
There is no single institution for managing the voting and election process; rather 
we can observe several institutional forms that exist on a spectrum of institutional 
possibilities. In making institutional choices society face a tradeoff between the costs 
of disorder, and the costs of dictatorship. How different institutions minimise these 
costs can be mapped as an IPF (Djankov et al. 2003). Before examining the costs of 
dictatorship and disorder in the electoral process, it’s first important to note that these 
costs are subjectively perceived by each political actor (Allen and Berg 2016). There-
fore, we can, for instance, use experts’ perceptions of electoral integrity to understand 
this cost tradeoff (Norris and Grömping 2017), as well as other historical examples of 
social losses from the democratic process.  
The costs of disorder for voting and the electoral process refer to the risk of private 
expropriation such as individuals committing fraudulent registration, impersonation, 
or voting multiple times. Prosecutions following elections provide evidence that these 
are more than hypothetical risks to the system (e.g. The Electoral Commission 2016). 
To the extent that voters have a preference in any poll, the failure of these preferences 
to be captured by the system—e.g. measured by voter turnout—also represent disor-
der costs.  
The costs of dictatorship are the public expropriation of the voting process by pub-
lic actors. This could include overt practices such as ballot-stuffing, vote rigging and 
manipulated results, which may happen where electoral officials favor the incumbent 
candidate or ruling party (Norris and Grömping 2017). Dictatorship costs will be pre-
sent where the centrally controlled electoral register is inaccurate, either through inel-
igible voters being registered or eligible voters left off the list (Norris and Grömping 
2017). Dictatorship costs include not just public malfeasance, but also negligence. An 
example of this is in the Australian 2013 Federal election, where the High Court ruled 
that the Senate election for the State of Western Australia was invalid because the 
Australian Electoral Commission had lost 1370 ballot papers (Australian Electoral 
Commission v Johnston [2014] HCA 5, 2014). Some phenomena will reflect costs of 
both disorder and dictatorship. One example of this is bribery, where the distinction 
will depend on whether it is a public or private actor that is collecting the bribe. The 
same can be said of integrity of the system, and the costs of enforcing the results. 
Violence is yet another example. That is, disorder is present when private actors deny 
other individuals from exercising their voting rights, such as through violence or fear 
of violence (e.g. Norris and Grömping 2017), whereas dictatorship will be present in 
instances of state-sponsored violence (e.g. Schedler 2002).  
Centralised and decentralized institutions manage these dual costs in different 
ways. Centralised institutions limit the perceived costs of disorder by having a cen-
trally managed voter registry and having full authority over the conduct of elections, 
and limits costs involved in duplication, but increases the perceived costs of dictator-
ship because these circumstances introduce risks that the process could be (interna-
tionally or negligently) manipulated by state actors to favor a party or candidate. 
Laws maintaining the electoral commission’s independence guard against the worse 
of the perceived dictatorship costs. In contrast, decentralised institutions limit the 
dictatorship costs associated with concentrated power by introducing competition and 
 choice between jurisdictions, but this introduces the risk of perceived costs of disorder 
by giving more power to individuals and relying on private collective action.  
At this point, we can begin to construct an institutional possibilities frontier for 
managing the voting and election process, illustrated in Figure 1. First, on the right of 
the IPF, a single centralised electoral authority, controlled by the ruling candidate or 
party in an election. Second, a centralised electoral authority established as impartial 
and independent of the government of the day (e.g. the Australian Electoral Commis-
sion, responsible for conducting the electoral system for federal representatives across 
the country). Third, a decentralised system with several electoral authorities (e.g. in 
the United States, each state is responsible conducting elections of their own federal 
representatives). Fourth, on the left of the IPF, an arrangement of multiple privately 
managed systems (e.g. there are several for-profit services that provide voting and 
election services, used mainly by public companies and membership organisations).  
 
Fig. 1. Institutions of voting and the electoral process  
Let us now return to the effect that blockchains have on the institutional environment.  
Blockchains are a governance technology reducing the costs of consensus, coordinat-
ing information, and monitoring and enforcing contracts. Indeed, given that democra-
cy is itself an economic problem of coordinating preferences—with various potential 
comparatively efficient institutional solutions—it is somewhat unsurprising that 
blockchains may be applied to democracy. At the time of writing the most prominent 
application for blockchain for online voting is FollowMyVote.com, who claims to 
embody “all of the characteristics that a legitimate voting system requires: security, 
accuracy, transparency, anonymity, freedom, and fairness” using blockchain (fol-
lowmyvote.com 2017). Claims over the potential of blockchain technology for voting 
are in effect arguing that blockchain technology comparatively decreases the various 
costs of dictatorship and disorder, including “robustness, anonymity and transparen-
cy” (Lee et al. 2016). Put another way, following the transaction cost economics 
framework of Oliver Williamson (1975), we can view blockchains as economising on 
the costs of uncertainty and opportunism in a decentralized way.  
Of course, there is the potential that crypto-democracy could be applied within a 
centralised institutional possibility. A centralised electoral commission could, for 
example, use blockchain technology to maintain their electoral roll which has integri-
ty and transparency benefits, meaning that the voting process would be harder to ma-
nipulate and it would reduce the possibility of human error. But we anticipate that the 
major benefits for crypto-democracy will be for decentralized institutional possibili-
ties ordinarily typified by higher perceived costs of disorder, as a decentralised ledger 
decreases the many of those costs (e.g. fraudulent registration, security, enforcement, 
duplication, etc.) without needing to rely on central control. For this reason, we pro-
pose that the introduction of the blockchain technology to the voting process—crypto-
democracy—causes an inward shift in the IPF, skewed towards reducing the per-
ceived costs of disorder. This is shown in Figure 2.     
 
Fig. 2.  Introduction of the blockchain technology  
The majority of current proposals focusing on using blockchain for voting examine 
what appear to be pure efficiency gains for voting on the blockchain. However, an 
inward shift in the IPF due to the discovery of blockchain technology also presents 
 the possibility of institutional entrepreneurship to discover new possibilities within 
the IPF space for solving the broader democratic problem (see Allen and Berg 2016). 
That is, the implication of an inward shift of the IPF implies more institutions are 
possible, not what those institutions are in practice. We explore one new institutional 
possibility to solve the democratic problem in the following section, quadratic voting. 
3 A new institution of democracy: quadratic voting on the 
blockchain  
Quadratic voting (QV) is a new voting mechanism proposed by Lalley and Weyl 
(2014). Posner (2016) suggests that "Quadratic voting is the most important idea for 
law and public policy that has emerged from economics in (at least) the last ten 
years". The basic idea is that the millennia old democratic franchise model of one-
person-one-vote (1p1v) has the unfortunate but well-known flaw in that it is economi-
cally inefficient because it entirely ignores intensity of preference. If I care only a 
little about an issue and you care a lot (maybe it affects you more), we both have an 
identical voting margin. This leads to well-known problems with 1p1v such as tyran-
ny of the majority. This means that issues that affect a minority of citizens, yet have 
significant welfare consequences for them (Lalley and Weyl offer gay marriage as an 
example), can be blocked by a casually indifferent majority. This is Pareto inefficient: 
there are clear opportunities for gains from trade. Lalley and Weyl (2014, p 2) explain 
that “1p1v offers no opportunity to express intensity of preference, allowing ineffi-
cient policies to persist. … The basic problem is that 1p1v rations rather than prices 
votes, resulting in externalities across individuals.” They propose that the QV mecha-
nism can resolve this problem (see also Posner and Weyl 2014). 
QV works by introducing a payments mechanism into voting but, crucially, each 
voter is on both sides of the market: you pay to vote (buying votes along a quadratic 
pricing schedule, e.g. if 1 vote costs $1, 2 votes costs $4, 3 votes costs $9, 10 votes 
costs $100, 100 votes costs $10,000), but you also get paid after the vote (the pay-
ments go into a pool to be redistributed among all voters). QV is therefore both a vote 
pricing schedule and a reallocation mechanism. Lalley and Weyl (2014) show that the 
QV mechanism is, in the limit, ‘robustly efficient’ (Lalley and Weyl 2014, p 1) (recall 
the 1p1v mechanism is not efficient): QV induces revelation of true preferences, ag-
gregates those preferences, and then compensates those affected by the decision. 
There are several points to note about the QV mechanism: it overlooks persuasion; 
it has implementation challenges; and it has high transactions costs. First, it imple-
ments an exchange and compensation mechanism (which is the logic of seeking to 
improve the Pareto efficiency of an outcome where all citizens have given prefer-
ences). But an alternative mechanism—implicit in the 1p1v mechanism when under-
stood in the context of an economy—is that citizens may seek to persuade each other 
to change their preferences, or to adopt better preferences.
1
 The economic logic of this 
has recently been developed by Almudi et al. (2017) and Potts et al. (2017) in an evo-
lutionary group selection (replicator dynamic) model they call ‘utopia competition’, in 
which agents use their own economic resources to seek to persuade other agents to 
adopt their own ‘utopia’ preference bundle. Evolutionary utopia selection model pre-
serves 1p1v, but the compensation mechanism works through costly persuasion rather 
than transfer. However, the claim is that the utopia selection is also more efficient 
than 1p1v. 
Second, as an abstract mechanism QV is asymptotically efficient. But there are still 
a number of implementation challenges for secure voting in relation to verifiability, 
robustness against false accusations, and secrecy. Park and Rivest (2016) have pro-
posed a number of specific mechanisms using cryptographic techniques (including 
homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs) to resolve the issues of ano-
nymity and payments efficiency using cryptocurrency. However, they acknowledge 
that the problem of overcoming collusion (which is an inherent instability in QV, 
which Lalley and Weyl acknowledge but offer no solution) remains problematic. 
However, the central message of Park and Rivest (2016) is that many of the problems 
of robustness in implementation can be resolved by adding cryptography to the mech-
anism. 
A third constraint on QV, and arguably the most immediately practical problem at 
any non-trivial scale of application, is high transaction costs. That makes it infeasible 
in practice compared to 1p1v, which is for all its Pareto economic inefficiency is ac-
tually a low cost solution in exchange and contract because there is no exchange and 
contract (and thus has high transactions cost efficiency). This is a point that neither 
Lalley and Weyl (2014) nor Posner and Weyl (2014) really address. We therefore 
emphasise that the ‘crypto’ solution to robustness suggested by Park and Rivest 
(2016) also extends to a general transaction cost solution in the form of QV on the 
blockchain. 
Quadratic voting should be understood as a mechanism that is inherently imple-
mented on a blockchain at the point of voter identification, robustness and verification 
of the bidding and tallying mechanism, and security and transactional efficiency of 
the vote buying, fund pooling, and redistribution mechanism. By envisaging and im-
plementing the QV mechanism in the context of a platform such as Ethereum, which 
enables smart contracts in which a citizen preprogram their preferences and then al-
low their software agent (or Distributed Autonomous Organization) to in effect auto-
mate the trades and voting and to make and receive payments, the transactions cost 
constraint on QV in an analog world is significantly reduced. The shift to a block-
chain-platform also suggests other prospective applications that address problems of 
collective decision making over distributions of preference intensity, but which for 
                                                          
1 This critique was also made by Tyler Cowen on his blog Marginal Revolution: 
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/01/my-thoughts-on-quadratic-voting-and-
politics-as-education.html 
 transactions costs reasons get caught in low Pareto efficiency mechanisms, such as the 
turgid representative democracy of corporate governance or city councils.
2
   
4 Conclusion 
The basic economic problem of democracy is to coordinate preferences between dis-
tributed people. This is an institutional problem, constrained by transaction costs and 
information costs, and therefore available technologies. Given that blockchain is an 
institutional technology for creating decentralized institutions, in this paper we have 
examined the potential for blockchain to open up new institutional possibilities of 
crypto-democracy. We focused on one new institutional possibility opened up through 
blockchain, quadratic voting, and its potential to more effectively solve the democrat-
ic problem. 
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Abstract. A vacuum of public trust in Australia has met with the maturation of 
technologically competent constituents.  Changing sociopolitical attitudes and 
perceived government corruption and inefficiency have effected demands for 
accountability and transparency.  Two responses are visible: the digitisation of 
government services and original models of digital democracy.  This paper dis-
cusses the role distributed ledger technology plays in decentralised governance 
in Australia. 
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1 Introduction 
 ‘A sense of the future is behind all good politics.  Unless we have it, we can give 
nothing - either wise, or decent to the world.’ [4] 
 
There are notable trends becoming visible to even the casual Australian observer: the 
widening of class structures, deepening mistrust in authority, the increasing penetra-
tion of more complex technology and living services that provide design solutions for 
operational or governance-related problems.  The concurrent development of secure 
transmission architecture on accessible platforms creates a solutions environment that 
begins to address the primary obstacle to public engagement with authority and arte-
facts thus far: trust. 
Increased voter cynicism, symptomatic of the politics of trust,
1
 changing patterns 
of media consumption, the heightened exposure of political actors to public scrutiny 
and poor performance in economic policy, have eroded the capacity of elected repre-
sentatives to govern. [20] [9] [3] In Australia, declining levels of trust are concomitant 
                                                          
1   According to sociologist John Thompson, the electoral success of governments and political 
parties has become increasingly bound to the perceived credibility and integrity of their 
leaders. Within the politics of trust, campaigning on the moral failings of partisan opponents 
has become a strategic means of differentiating political parties in the absence of significant 
policy divergence based on class or ideology. 
 with the emergence of numerous electoral phenomena such as: poor civic engagement 
(particularly among young people)
2
, declining political party membership
3
 and re-
duced satisfaction with representative democracy, government, major political parties 
and the performance of politicians [2] [10].  This trend is not unique to Australia, of 
course. Trust levels are falling internationally [18], [24], however, there have been 
significant evolutions and variations to traditional Australian democracy therefore.  
These include government reform agendas, policy developments that place communi-
ty trust at the centre of implementation [11], the government commission of new 
communication technologies and blossoming entrepreneurial endeavours into new 
forms of democracy. 
Somewhat geographically isolated, alternative models to the traditional representa-
tive democracy have only recently touched Australian shores. Liquid, participatory, 
deliberative, direct and crowdsourced democracy have been designed, tested and im-
plemented in Europe for many years now –with varying degrees of success.  Howev-
er, liquid democracy is relatively new to Australia.  Following in the footsteps of 
global open-source successes such as Democracy Earth,
4
 vTaiwan,
5
 (g0v),
6
 Pol.is,
7
 
                                                          
2 A 2004 study commissioned by the Australian Electoral Commission has revealed that only 
one in four young people perceive politicians can be honest and fewer than half believe that 
politicians can be trusted to do what is right for the country [53]. 
3 As few as one percent of Australia’s adult population are registered members of political 
parties, mirroring similar declines throughout European democracies [3]. 
4 Democracy Earth (http://democracy.earth/#about) is building an open source and decentral-
ised democratic governance protocol called Sovereign backed by Y-Combinator.  Their open 
source platform held a pilot during the Columbian referendum, allowing ex-patriots to vote 
when the government decided not to reopen voter registration during the referendum.  Cru-
cially, appealing to the importance of the liquid democracy model, Sovereign allowed voters 
to both delegate votes and vote separately on specific parts of the referendum. Instead of ab-
solute approval or rejection, the majority of Columbians voted yes to the referendum, but no 
to allowing the guerrillas to participate politically. This option was a nuance that the vote, 
which rejected the peace deal, lacked [16].   
5 vTaiwan (virtual Taiwan) is a direct consequence of the Sunflower student demonstration 
demanding the rejection of a Beijing trade deal, legislation permitting the monitoring of Chi-
nese agreements and citizen conferences discussing constitutional amendment.  They use 
Pol.is distribute social media adverts and broadcast a public meeting where scholars and offi-
cials respond to issues that emerged in the conversation. This is followed by an in-person 
stakeholder meeting co-facilitated by civil society and the government, and broadcast to re-
mote participants for the Government to bind its action to consensus, or provide a detailed 
explanation of why those consensus points are not (yet) feasible. 
6  G0v.tw (http://g0v.tw/en-US/about.html) is an online community that focuses on information 
transparency, freedom of speech and open data.  They publish open-source code and develop 
information platforms and tools for citizens to participate in society. G0v ‘rethinks the role 
that government plays in a digital native generation’. They believe transparency of infor-
mation can help citizens better understand how government works to understand issues faster 
so they can hold government accountable and deepen the quality of democracy.   
7  Pol.is (https://pol.is) is a mobile platform that uses AI and machine learning to build tools 
that offering transparency through decentralisation and insights. 
 Democracy OS,
8
 and D-Cent
9
  (who launched Finland’s Open Ministry and Iceland’s 
Better Reykjavik programme), Australia is beginning to host their own entrepreneurs, 
designing the future of liquid democracy. 
2 The Future of Democracy 
Futurists and technologists have been alert for changes to democracy since Alvin 
Toffler wrote in Future Shock (1970) that representative government was the political 
technology of the industrial era.  It was Toffler’s vision that the electorate would be 
sufficiently proactively informed of likely outcomes of prospective policy to be en-
gaged in strategic decision-making.  This future-oriented, participatory, approach to 
policy design could have such political impact as to ‘be the salvation of representative 
politics - a system now in crisis’ [21]. Toffler’s editor, Clem Bezold, wrote in Antici-
patory Democracy in 1978 that cyber democracy would be comprised of: cyber ad-
ministration, cyber voting, cyber participation, cyber agenda-setting and cyber infra-
structure.  In drawing attention to Australia’s emerging actors in participatory democ-
racy, this paper will briefly discuss existing and evolving global platforms that enable 
the automated administration of executive function, the engagement of policy makers 
and crowdsourcing of legislation as well as cloud and distributed ledger digital voting 
platforms.  
Australia began to see Toffler’s vision realised in 2016.  Not formally - in amend-
ments to the traditional federal electoral format; the Australian Electoral Commission 
is bound by the regulations of the Electoral Act, 1918.  Instead, alternative direct 
methods of voting are becoming known with rising numbers of minor parties such as 
Vote Flux
10
 and the Pirate Party (Australia)
11
 as well as movements such as Online 
Direct Democracy (Senator Online, of old),
12
 MiVote,
13
 The Fourth Group
14
 and or-
                                                          
8 DemocracyOS (http://democracyos.org/) is an online space for deliberation and voting on 
political proposals, using software that aims to stimulate better arguments and come to better 
ruling through peer collaboration. It is a platform for a open and participatory government.  
9 D-CENT (Decentralised Citizens ENgagement Technologies, https://dcentproject.eu) was a 
Europe-wide project joining citizen-led organisations that have transformed democracy in the 
past years, and helping them develop the next generation of open source, distributed, and priva-
cy-aware tools for direct democracy and economic empowerment. The EU-funded project 
started in October 2013 and ended in May 2016.  D-CENT tools inform and deliver real-time 
notifications about issues that matter, they propose and draft solutions and policy collaborative-
ly; decide and vote on solutions and collective municipal budgeting; and finally implement and 
reward people with blockchain reward schemes. The tools can be combined in ways to support 
democratic processes.  
10
 www.voteflux.org 
11
 The Pirate Party campaigns for a free society, civil liberty, and trust in the rule of law. They 
believe in the right to privacy and transparency in government and organisations. Pirate Party 
Australia was founded by Rodney Serkowski in 2008 and has grown from a small group of 
activists to a fledgling political party.  
12 Online Direct Democracy (https://www.onlinedirectdemocracy.org/) is a not-for-profit, enter-
ing candidates for the upcoming federal election. They claim to be Australia's first internet-
based registered political party aiming to provide everyone listed on the electoral roll with a 
 ganisations such as Our Say.
15
 Advancements in technology have made it possible for 
these groups to cost-effectively overcome barriers to entry - each designing for trust 
proactively or iteratively, using such technology as the blockchain to overcome lows 
in public confidence and initiate participatory forms of democracy. 
Current data by Edelman suggests that public confidence in government function-
ing and satisfaction with democracy is so low as to pose a challenge to the legitimacy 
of government [5]. Long perceived as perpetuating a culture of cronyism and corrupt 
behaviour, Australians have gradually invested less trust in their elected political rep-
resentatives with only one in four Australians now believing politicians can be trusted 
[14]. The most recent report of the Australian Election Study indicated only 60% of 
Australians were satisfied with democracy and only 12% of the population believed 
the nation was governed with the interests of all Australians in mind [2]. 
A similar sentiment is represented in many Western democracies, where public 
confidence in political leadership and representative democracy has steadily eroded 
since the 1970s. Attributed to social, political, technological and economic factors 
associated with globalisation, contemporary neo-liberal political outcomes and the 
changing distribution of labour, a concurrent belief that the system is failing is raising 
individual and community fear, exciting the rise of populist parties and movements 
[5]. Existing political trust research has examined the execution of civic responsibility 
as a function of trust [23] and found that civic participation does affect trust in two 
pathways: ethical behaviours and service competence.  Ethical behaviour is defined as 
operating when officials transcend self-interest or agency priorities to pursue public 
needs and service competence is defined as an ability to develop goods and services 
that achieve sustained public satisfaction.  Findings in Wang and Van Wart’s study 
suggest that the public trusts the administration more when demand and response for 
services is well met during the participation process, and the public perceives a high 
level of satisfaction with the services provided.  This met need results in greater hori-
zontal trust, driving participation in civic duty that results in greater vertical trust [23]. 
First, service must be delivered to the public’s standards and ethically. 
Results of Australian empirical studies [7] suggest the cause of democratic entropy 
in Australia is increasingly ascribed to the performance and behaviour of political 
officials and division between representative democracy and participatory democracy 
functions reinforcing a national culture of anti-politics. Findings by Evans et al.  
demonstrate that if politicians support participatory politics with the objective of rein-
forcing the function of representative democracy to ultimately develop a more inte-
grated, inclusive and responsive democratic system, Australians may trust and engage 
                                                          
direct voice in parliament.  Once elected, Online Direct Democracy MPs are bound by their 
agreement with the party to act on behalf of their constituents and all Australians.  
13 www.mivote.com.au 
14 www.thefourthgroup.org 
15  Founded in Melbourne in 2010, Our Say is a collaborative platform that connects communi-
ty leaders with members of the public. Designed to build trust and authenticity in public com-
munication and decision making it has been used by high profile politicians such as Julia 
Gillard who describe the platform as “...modern democracy and modern technology at work” 
((https://www.oursay.org).  
 more with the process of democracy [7]. Accordingly, this paper discusses the use of 
nascent technologies, such as distributed ledger technology, and the potential impact 
on public trust in democracy through the case studies of MiVote and Vote Flux; two 
fledgling Australian direct democracy start-ups, operating on blockchain platforms. 
3 The Potential Blockchain Offers Democracy 
The blockchain underpins distributed ledger technology; the first use case for which 
was Bitcoin.  It operates in a decentralised peer-to-peer network using cryptographic 
algorithms to verify, validate and distribute transactions across millions of nodes, 
enabling the secure, auditable, transmission of assets without intervention by central 
authority.  I.e., the function of decentralised trust (or trust-by-computation) facilitates 
the automation of instructions (also known as smart contracts), which may obviate the 
role of third parties and reduce administration and management costs.  
Since, theoretically, anything of value can be stored on the distributed ledger: con-
tracts, certifications, music, art, identities, policies, bills and votes, for example, gov-
ernments are beginning to invest in blockchain for improved efficiencies and perfor-
mance in regulatory compliance, contract and identity management and civic services 
[12].  
Concurrently, we see increasing numbers of use cases both designed with the intent 
to mediate distrust by instilling transparency into process and circumvent trust entire-
ly by disintermediating the relationship between voter and representative (or consum-
er and supplier).  Top-down applications include movements towards open govern-
ment and the prevalence of open-data and the bottom-up use of blockchain technolo-
gy to store and transmit data securely. 
Notwithstanding policy makers’ concessions to the public’s call for transparency, 
the mechanics of government have remained largely unchanged since federation.  
Empirical studies have hitherto indicated poorly designed or implemented democratic 
innovations risk greater mistrust and the Australian government is acutely aware of, 
and commercially sensitive to, mistrust ‘choking the use and value of Australia’s 
data…’  To that end, the government believes ‘improving trust community-wide is a 
key objective’. [11] The Australian Government’s report Ahead of the Game—the 
2010 blueprint for the reform of the Australian Public Service (APS)—is cast in this 
light. 
Pertinent to the argument in favour of blockchain technology’s application to cen-
tralised services is the consensus algorithm that is fundamental to achieving trust.  
Unlike traditional human service-related transactions, such as depositing money, 
sending a parcel or achieving settlement on a property, where we trust an unknown 
person to conduct the transaction with integrity; a blockchain transaction does not 
require trust.  An information sender does not need to trust the peer network; valid 
transactions are automatically verified (or rejected) on confirmation of the appropriate 
cryptographic code (proof-of-work) and further distributed throughout the network 
until the transaction has reached every node on the network.  The proof-of-work algo-
 rithm requires miners to resolve a time-consuming and complex mathematical puzzle 
for the network nodes to achieve consensus and deem the transaction reliable.  
This consensus model of governance reduces the risk of fraud; enables the auto-
mated processing of smart contracts, creates economies and efficiencies and the open 
network instills trust in the transparency and auditability of ledgers. This shift from 
trusting people to trusting maths offers numerous opportunities for blockchain tech-
nology in low-trust environments.  
For governments, distributed ledger technology is an ideal infrastructure for the 
digital storage or publication of central records and smart contracts permit the reliable 
administration of routine government functions.  As part of the Delaware Blockchain 
Initiative, the Governor of the State of Delaware asked the state’s Bar Association to 
consider clarifying Delaware corporate law to authorise, track and transfer shares on a 
distributed ledger.  The first milestone on the Initiative’s rollout plan has passed at the 
Delaware Public Archives; using smart contracts to automate compliance with laws 
regarding the retention and destruction of archival documents.  The second milestone 
is to be completed in late 2017: smart Universal Commercial Code (UCC) filings.  
The current process is paper-based, slow and error-prone, UCC filings on a distribut-
ed ledger automate the release and renewal of UCC filings, reduce mistakes, fraud 
and cut cost.  
In local civic functions blockchain technology could be applied to the democratic 
process to increase trust and engagement given the public perception of governments 
as “somewhat of an encumbrance – too slow, too corrupt, too lacking in innovation, 
and benefiting too few”. [1] However, state and federal blockchain-based electoral 
voting is considered too novel for Australian application. 
Further to a call for submissions into e-voting by the Victorian Parliament’s Elec-
toral Matters Committee in 2017, the committee decided in favour of electronic ballot 
paper scanning at the 2018 Victorian state election despite Australia Post’s submis-
sion of a blockchain voting architecture.  For, the committee were not satisfied that 
the interconnectivity between government and citizenry was foolproof; citing tech-
nology failures experienced during the Census website crash and Centrelink data 
hacking as a ‘salutory lesson’.16 In addition to security, a significant contributor to the 
VEC’s decision to preference electronic ballot paper scanning was cost.  The cost per 
vote for the vVote electronic voting system at the 2014 Victorian state election was 
$2,261.85 per vote (gross). Excluding capital implementation costs, the cost of a 
                                                          
16 The committee received 34 submissions from organisations including, but not limited to, 
Australia Post, Elections ACT, Electoral Commission Queensland, Electoral Council of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, Australian Electoral Commission, Tasmanian Electoral Commission, 
New South Wales (NSW) Premier and Cabinet, the Research School of Computer Science, the 
Australian National University and Computing and Information Systems department at the 
University of Melbourne. The committee were informed of the risks associated with e-voting in 
lower security and verifiability of the NSW iVote and Victorian vVote system compared to the 
scrutineering of paper ballots; the technology especially vulnerability to a ‘man in the middle’ 
attack.  Accordingly, working with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) the committee 
recommended ‘...an Electronic Voting Board oversee scrutiny…’ of the ‘…most rigorous secu-
rity standards available...’.  The committee were not, however, satisfied the interconnectivity 
between government and citizenry was foolproof [15]. 
 vVote at the 2014 Victorian state election was $396.46, the New South Wales iVote 
system cost approximately $9.50 per vote, and around $10.60 at the 2015 NSW state 
election [15]. In contrast, excluding capital costs, a blockchain vote costs approxi-
mately $1. 
At a grassroots level, there are multiple examples of community efforts in design-
ing innovative models of democracy and democratic processes that have been tested 
in Scandinavia,
17
 Europe and the United States of America
18
- on distributed ledger 
technology and cloud platforms.  While some projects have failed to achieve social 
scale, governments have adopted some; Iceland’s Your Priorities and Spain’s Decide 
Madrid were the result of community collaboration following the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis.  New models of democracy are not only the result of crisis, however, but 
declining trust in politicians and democratic institutions.  A political donations crisis 
preceded the inception of the Estonian Citizens’ Assembly, the work of the President 
and civil society organisations that ultimately proposed democratic reform.
19
 Innova-
tion in Australian democracy could similarly be attributed.  The following case stud-
ies offered in MiVote and Vote Flux are the consequence of dissatisfaction with polit-
ical financing, perceived corruption and the influence national and international polit-
ical donors have in the formation of public policy.  
4 The Future of Australian Democracy  
Toffler worried humans were racing blindly into the future without reflection or 
consultation.  His vision for the future of democracy was inclusive; imagining that the 
public could more effectively steer legislation: “We need to, quite literally, go to the 
people with a question that is almost never asked of them: What kind of a world do 
you want ten, twenty or thirty years from now? We need to initiate, in short, a contin-
uing plebiscite on the future...backed with technical staff to provide data on the social 
and economic costs of goals, the trade-offs so that participants may make reasonably 
informed choices among alternative futures...not merely expressed as vaguely ex-
pressed, disjointed hopes, but coherent statements of priorities for tomorrow” [21]. 
This vision is realised in our case studies, MiVote and Vote Flux, which use block-
chain to invite consultation on the formulation of policy, and in the founding princi-
                                                          
17 Direktdemokraterna is a Swedish party that uses cloud-based voting for referenda in a liquid 
democracy model.  https://direktdemokraterna.se/hur-ska-det-ga-till/ 
18 Collaborative and co-design approaches have been applied to democratic decision-making on 
e-democracy platforms such as Germany’s Adhocracy (https://adhocracy.de/), America’s Chal-
lenge.gov (https://www.challenge.gov/list/), Decide Madrid 
(https://decide.madrid.es/?locale=en), Estonia’s Rahvaalgatus (https://rahvaalgatus.ee/), Ice-
land’s Your Priorities (https://yrpri.org/domain/3).  Some of these tools are gaining traction: 
Your Priorities has been used in Romania, the UK and Estonia.  Decide Madrid is being used 
by municipal governments in Barcelona, A Coruña and Oviedo.  
19 The Estonian Citizens’ Assembly Process (2013) was the direct result of a legitimacy crisis 
involving Estonian political parties and representative institutions caused by illegal political 
financing.  Government responded using democratic innovation: eliciting public support in 
crowdsourcing and deliberative mini-publics. 
 ples of Online Direct Democracy (ODD). All three Australian organisations are unit-
ed in motivation: engendering the inclusive participation in non-partisan politics free 
of influence.  Like Toffler, these organisations believe the constituency contains the 
inherent skills and wisdom necessary to make ethical and appropriate choices for the 
benefit of their community but they use technology to bridge the divide between the 
constituency and representatives.  Their approaches are broadly similar: inform the 
public of tabled issues before parliament and the consequences of the bill, seek the 
opinion of the constituency and feed this information directly to Flux, MiVote or 
ODD parliamentary representative to vote in accordance with the majority opinion. 
There are fundamental differences, however. 
Online Direct Democracy is a registered political party that crowdfunded and built 
PollyWeb as a secure voting platform on similar security principles as banking sys-
tems, with three-step authentication.  Their platform enables Australians to discuss, 
rate and vote on bills and amendments as they are tabled in parliament.  PollyWeb 
engages the public in political dialogue by undertaking research into tabled issues 
before parliament, providing relevant resources and then polling the public on their 
opinion regarding the issue.  This opinion poll is then communicated to the ODD 
party representative to consider in their vote.  ODD ran two candidates in the 2016 
federal election and received 11,133 votes or 0.09% with the highest vote achieved in 
the state of Queensland with 0.23% of the total votes going to the party.
20
 
4.1 Flux 
The classical definition of democracy is an idealised principle of government whereby 
the rule of society is derived from the popular will of the people [14]. Vote Flux was 
founded in 2015 and they operate a custom Issue Based Direct Democracy (IBDD) 
model founded on Deutschian Fallibilism, an evolution of Popperian Fallibilism and 
David Deutsch’s book The Beginning of Infinity. IBDD preferences problem-solving 
over representing “the will of the people.”21 Their policy position evolves as a conse-
quence of a voting auction market where a neutral central liquidity token allows vot-
ers to move their political capital to issues of most immediate subjective importance.  
In forcing an opportunity cost to voter choice, IBDD interrupts ‘tyranny of the majori-
ty’ in the search for good policy;22 achieved by the trading of votes to subject matter 
experts.
23
  
                                                          
20 https://www.onlinedirectdemocracy.org/ 
21 https://voteflux.org/2017/05/26/an-overview-of-flux-and-ibdd/ 
22 https://voteflux.org/2017/05/26/an-overview-of-flux-and-ibdd/ 
23 In practice, each Flux member receives one vote for each bill before parliament.  This vote 
may be traded for a credit in the case of low interest issues or conserved for a later vote of 
greater interest.  Additional liquidity tokens can be collected and distributed for issues voters 
consider of particular importance that are designed to be inflationary in value.  Thus, a more 
contested piece of legislation will cost more to gain more votes; a less contested piece of legis-
lation extra votes will cost less.  In so doing, IBDD seeks to engage apathetic constituents that 
may otherwise waste their vote in the representative system, by providing a mechanism to trade 
their vote with someone more knowledgeable or energised by the outcome of the issue.   
  
Vote Flux is a registered political party with 6269 members (as at 12/7/17 but are 
growing at an average growth rate of 30.4% per month) and branches in each state.  
They ran candidates in the 2017 Western Australian state elections, unsuccessfully.  
Co-founded by a software developer, the Flux application is designed on their Se-
cureVote blockchain platform, which can support in excess of 1 million votes a mi-
nute, or 1.5 billion votes in 24 hours.  Using a private audit log an independent third 
party can verify a personal identity against a blockchain identity but a patented two-
step process of “oblivious shuffle” means no one else will be able to link the two.  
This ensures each vote comes from an anonymised registered voter [25]. 
4.2 MiVote 
MiVote employs a model of destinational democracy - almost precisely as Toffler 
imagined in 1970 [21]: “...a continuing plebiscite on the future…”.  With founding 
principles of neutrality, transparency, representation and equality, their approach is 
inclusive and participatory in nature.  After rigorous research of a pertinent issue, four 
strategic directions are applied for the constituency to consider and vote on.  Written 
accessibly, with basic, intermediate and advanced cascading levels of information, the 
research serves to inform the public of the facts and impact of the issue and asks them 
how they would prefer their representatives vote on their behalf.
24
 
MiVote is a movement with 2765 members - it is not yet a registered political par-
ty.  Currently, their blockchain voting platform consults the membership base gather-
ing data points regarding sentiment.  Their intent is not to run in state elections but to 
propose candidates for the next federal election, using the platform as a direct com-
munication between the voter and their MiVote representative. The objective is to 
direct parliamentary action in favour of the majority opinion. 
5 Limitations: Why Change Will Be Slow  
The relationship between citizen and state hereafter may be shaped by the influence of 
emerging technology but this will not be strictly limited to the blockchain.  Advance-
ments in distributed ledger technology and machine learning will disintermediate 
processes on ever more grand scales at the grassroots level, growth in the use of 
cloud-based platforms are encouraging collaboration and internal hacking of govern-
ment processes indicate democracy in Australia is changing - distributed ledger tech-
nology is only one indicator of which. 
                                                          
24 This might be represented, for example, as reform made to the Political Donations Bill, 
framed as: increased public funding, removal of public funding, donations made to candidates 
or no change to the bill at all - maintenance of the status quo.  MiVote’s ranking system, similar 
to the Single Transferable Vote, means constituents vote for what is most acceptable.  Their 
consent-based decision making approach is reinforced by intermittent polling of the constitu-
ents, enquiring of issues most important to them; this forms part of the research agenda. 
 Sociopolitical behaviour in Australia indicates favourable responses to participa-
tory platforms.  Evans, Halupka and Stoker found in their 2016 study that investments 
made into projects that would enhance trust in the political system and elected repre-
sentatives would be well received.  Their primary finding included justification for a 
national democratic audit to answer three questions: how do Australians imagine their 
ideal democracy? What do they expect from politicians within it? How is the present 
system failing? [7].  
The increasing number of social organisations in Australia that provide tools and 
strategies to increase citizen engagement, political participation and trust is testament 
to this.  There are at least twenty-five organisations undertaking deliberative decision-
making or process design making deep strides into reforming public engagement at a 
community and structural level [8]. 
Accordingly, we find two trends that will influence the expression of Australian 
democracy that mirror European precedent: the integration of open-source participa-
tory platforms by government agencies that promote transparency and encourage 
public trust and the exponential growth of secure, decentralised platforms that attract 
early adopters to digital democracy.  The following reasons indicate why blockchain 
technology is unlikely to be a feature of government’s participatory platforms: 
─ Blockchain is slow: continued development in open-source distributed platforms 
such as Ethereum, Omni Layer,
25
 the lightning network,
26
 and Hyperledger
27
 al-
ready suggest the imminent faster processing of data and more scalable databases.  
Increasing numbers of interoperability protocols and off-chain transactions will al-
so eventually obviate performance concerns.  For, the fundamental limitation to 
faster adoption is directly tied to the primary benefit of blockchain technology: the 
trade-off made between security and speed.  The process of data mining means that 
blockchain cannot deliver speed and security simultaneously without compromis-
ing on the number of nodes on the network. Vote Flux may have their permis-
sioned blockchain network finalised in time for the next federal election, which 
would advance the processing of votes from 1-3 per second to millions per minute, 
but this may cause public criticism with regards security.   
─ Distributed ledger technology is new: until rigorous testing of a novel technology 
has proved consistently reliable by international governments it is improbable we 
will see the adoption of distributed ledger technology for large-scale government 
functions in the short-term. This means the proving ground for liquid democracy 
models in Australia is the start-up enterprise and minor political parties. 
─ Scale: the novelty of the technology means there is currently limited available 
empirical data and academic studies in wide-ranging implementation and achieving 
social change; this titrates investment which impacts product awareness and viabil-
ity. As demonstrated in Europe and with changing funding approaches by Flux, 
MiVote and ODD, it is famously difficult to achieve social scale within resource 
                                                          
25 http://www.omnilayer.org/ 
26 The Lightning Network: https://lightning.network/ 
27 https://www.hyperledger.org/ 
 allocation for civic technology organisations.  Unless organisations are inclined to 
partner and share resources there are risks of reduced impact and public weariness. 
─ The matter of the digital divide: creators of blockchain-enabled democracy plat-
forms are regularly asked about accessibility. If representative democracy is pro-
gressively becoming elitist how does introducing novel technology designed on 
premium platforms reduce this?  Social research into political participation identi-
fies that the deeper the vein of socio-economic inequality and more prevalent the 
social complaints, the more people participate in the political process [2]. To en-
courage participation and social cohesion, platforms need to be considered as ac-
cessible as possible or we compromise political equality and fracturing democracy 
into a greater number of off-shoots. 
6 Conclusion 
Society’s most historic structures are undergoing challenge by the equalising, unre-
lenting forces of technology and globalisation.  This paper described the two primary 
responses by governments and entrepreneurs: the publication of open data to increase 
transparency and public trust and the use of blockchain technology to disintermediate 
the mistrusted process. 
Using Alvin Toffler’s prescient vision of an inclusive, consultative society utilising 
a participatory democracy model, we briefly discussed three Australian organisations 
realising this vision.  Two of which are using distributed ledger technology to defend 
against the primary criticism e-voting has endured so far: security.  While the Austral-
ian government is reticent to apply untested technology to federal functions it is re-
searching the implications of blockchain, as are nine in ten governments [12].  
Per Evans, Halupka & Stoker’s findings [7], supported by politicians, a combina-
tion of cloud-based and decentralised technologies that support the public in engaging 
with participatory decision-making may ultimately enable society to reorganise 
around principles of horizontal trust, enhancing social capital and decreasing class 
stratification; but this is a long-term view. What is clear from the research is that 
technology is not a panacea for increasing public engagement or trust. A multi-faceted 
response is required that engages with community action groups, technologists, civil 
technology firms and industry to design bespoke engagement mechanisms until more 
direct alternatives are deemed suitable. 
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Abstract. The modern digital world of networking and connectivity makes pos-
sible a new era of computing in which users exert greater control over the col-
lection and use of their personal data through the Internet of Things (IoT). Our 
recent empirical work indicates that traditional forms of consent are inadequate 
and that users are looking for different levels of and greater involvement in con-
trolling the collection and use of their personal data – with some participants 
voicing particular concerns about collection and use of sensitive data, such as 
health information, and others pointing to particular risks, such as insecure stor-
age in the Cloud. In response to these needs we propose a new Intelligent Warn-
ing Application in the form of a conceptual architecture for an App that em-
powers users to control their IoT data collection through users: 1) identifying 
their own levels of risk, 2) customizing the App allowing for the setting of their 
identified risk levels, and 3) situated use of the App warning users of risk-
averse situations through ‘nudges’. We conclude with a discussion illustrating 
scenarios of the App’s. 
Keywords: Internet of Things, Privacy, Data Protection, Intelligent Warning 
Systems, Nudges.  
1 Introduction 
The uncontrolled collection of user data through the Internet of Things (IoT) is be-
coming a matter of particular concern in a world of more connectivity, networking 
and collaboration afforded by the IoT. How can individuals better control the collec-
tion and use of their personal data in an increasingly connected and digitized world of 
the IoT?  This world enables multiple new services and the exchange of information, 
which promise to significantly ease and enrich our lives in many different ways. For 
example, the flick of a single switch can instantaneously operationalize multiple de-
vices, invoke different devices’ services and feed back information based on unique 
predetermined individual needs. However the mass collection, integration and use of 
individuals’ private and personal data through modern data mining techniques and big 
data algorithms lead to growing privacy concerns in Australia and around the world 
regarding individual privacy and protection of personal data, as well as information 
security [1-3]. 
 Although the open Internet-based infrastructure on which the IoT is based facili-
tates tremendous access to information, there are specific features that affect data 
protection, privacy and security [4-6]. Firstly, ‘interaction’ in the context of the IoT 
comprises data collection between multiple machines and embedded sensors without 
human intervention, immediate reception or control of any personal data [6]. Second-
ly, entities, organizations or individuals other than individual users whose data is 
being collected, are in control of the data being collected through IoT devices. Third-
ly, without their knowledge or consent, individuals can be followed through surveil-
lance, while their data from different data sets can be combined and processed intelli-
gently to infer new insights based on an individual’s patterns of behavior [7]. And 
finally, at least in Australia, there is as yet, no legal framework that responds effec-
tively to the diverse problems that can arise in the collection, use of and protection of 
individuals’ privacy in the context of the IoT [1-2] [7-8].  
A recent Australian study on individual attitudes towards privacy, conducted by the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, indicates that the Australian pub-
lic’s concern for online privacy has increased over the last five years [3]. However, 
despite this expressed concern, many survey participants described apparently contra-
dictory habitual behaviors, such as not reading privacy policies (65%) or accepting 
default settings while using social media (50%) instead of adjusting these settings to 
limit who has access to their personal information. While this may seem to lay blame 
at the feet of the users for choosing not to engage in the learning or administrative 
tasks required for assuring their personal privacy, an obvious rejoinder to this argu-
ment is that these requirements may be unreasonable given the context of modern 
digital communications.  
Modern digital communications a) present complex processes simplistically 
through heuristic interfaces that hide most of this complexity from the user, and b) 
rely on the fact that users have been conditioned to accept personal disempowerment 
while using the internet. The former condition extends beyond using graphical user 
interfaces to spare users having to deal with programming code: actual audiences, 
relationships between entities, and information flows (to include who is doing what 
with data) are all effectively hidden from the average user or internet-connected ser-
vices. The latter condition is self-evident insofar as users are routinely presented with 
situations that have been engineered by other parties: programs that work in certain 
ways and allow some forms of interaction while disallowing others. In other words, 
while people can engage in navigational and interactive behavior within the online 
environment, they often do so with limited insight or control over the implications of 
these behaviors. Furthermore, the providers of services typically have interests in data 
collection that lead them to actively obscure their interests or the details of how data 
is used within their business models. Conditioning users to accept situations that serve 
these interests can also clearly be beneficial to the provider.  
In view of the above challenges and the fact that data collection through the IoT is 
on the increase with limited to no practical control currently exercised over individual 
data collection and use of this data, the question is how and to what extent individuals 
can be provided more support in controlling their interaction in a world of data collec-
tion enabled by the IoT?  In response to this question we propose a conceptual archi-
 tectural model of an Intelligent Warning Application (App) that allows users to exert 
more control over the collection and use of their individual data collected through the 
IoT. Reliant as it is on cooperation from IoT producers in providing information re-
quested by the Intelligent Warning App, we offer this as an example of the principle 
of ‘privacy by design’ that we advocated in earlier papers based on this research [1] 
and [2], and which numerous privacy regulators have also endorsed. Further, based as 
it is on extensive user interviews and two focus groups, our proposed conceptual 
model also embeds a broader idea of responsive regulation i.e. regulation scaled to 
achieve effective regulation in response to a perceived need and with minimal inter-
vention in preference to heavy-handed top down regulation. 
This paper consists of six sections. Section 2 provides background literature that il-
lustrates the current gap in the literature with respect to intelligent warning applica-
tions/tools. Section 3 provides background to the initial conception of our proposed 
Intelligent Warning App and introduces the research approach to be followed to de-
sign this tool. Section 4 presents evidence of specific user concerns and recommenda-
tions leading to a conceptual model of one view of the Intelligent Warning App de-
sign. Section 5 discusses three scenarios that illustrate instances of nudging based on 
a user’s profile built from knowledge garnered about the user’s privacy needs. The 
Conclusion (Section 6) elaborates on next stages of the study with some limitations 
and recommendations for further research. 
2 Background literature  
The notion of uncontrolled data collection and use of user’s data is a problem that 
plagues many individuals in a modern world of greater connectivity and exchange of 
data through the Internet of Things (IoT).  While the Internet is one of the most dis-
ruptive technologies of the modern age, the constant collection of data through multi-
ple connected devices is a significant concern, especially to individuals who value 
their privacy. Of particular concern is the notion of transparency and understanding 
about how and where IoT data is collected, how IoT data is stored, and when this data 
is used and integrated with other data sets. 
 
2.1 Privacy, data protection, and security in the context of IoT data collection 
and use 
Privacy’ may be treated as a broad concept covering multiple aspects of the collection 
and use of personal information, along with other things (for instance [9]). Alterna-
tively, some especially European commentators may label this ‘data protection’ (for 
instance [10]), while reserving the label ‘privacy’ for the more particular problem of 
being made subject to an unwanted public gaze [11-12]. In our previous published 
papers we pointed out that our interviewees tended to adopt the latter view although 
they also considered data protection to be a pressing concern, both for them personal-
ly and also for society [1-2]. As such, this paper is concerned both with questions of 
 privacy and data protection and (unless otherwise specified) we treat these as over-
lapping and congruent concerns. 
It is not just the control of personal information that is at stake here. Concerns may 
also extend to ‘security’, a term that concentrates on the protection of collected in-
formation from unwanted external access, for instance from hacking. Security princi-
ples (confidentiality, integrity and availability of information) [13] guarantee that 
access to collected information is restricted, open only to those who are authorized to 
do so, and that stored information is trustworthy and accurate. The heterogeneous 
nature of the IoT in combination with its wide scale of use is expected to increase 
security risks of the current Internet. More specifically, the limited computing power 
of IoT technologies violates traditional security countermeasures and enforcement 
calling for the need to define valid IoT security and trust models to gain full ac-
ceptance by its user base [14]. 
2.2 Informed consent in the context of technological artefacts  
One shortcoming of the IoT is the limited support offered for the exercise of informed 
consent i.e. giving users the ability to concur with data collection and use techniques. 
Specifically, the collection of personal data through the IoT, is more than often unen-
crypted, uncontrolled through sensors embedded in the environment, or in the form of 
wearables or surveillance devices concealed in the environment. 
In regard to this, the desire of consumers to exert control over their data has expe-
rienced a major shift over the last two decades. While a minority concern in the 80’s, 
by the 2000s individual fears about the potential abuse of personal (consumer) infor-
mation have become a major concern [15]. Consumers have become concerned about 
the ways in which their personal information is both collected and used, with one 
study indicating that almost 88% of US Internet users have expressed their wishes to 
have an ‘opt-in’ privacy policy (in 2001) whereby Internet companies need to first 
obtain users’ permission to share their personal information with others [15]. As a 
result the notion of a minimal informed consent has evolved through political, legal, 
economic, social and technological realms. 
Informed consent has been introduced as a mechanism to gain more user trust by 
articulating business practices for collecting and using personal information and giv-
ing users autonomous choice in terms of data collection and use.  In this regard the 
model of informed consent for Information Systems has been introduced in 2000 [16] 
constituting values associated with being ‘informed’ (including disclosure and com-
prehension) and giving ‘consent’ (i.e. voluntariness, competence and agreement). This 
model has since inception been incorporated in the ‘Value-Sensitive Design’ frame-
work touted by many authors [17-21] as an integral part of large-scale real world 
software systems. Value sensitive designs appreciate human values in a principled 
[18] and comprehensive way throughout the process of designing technological arte-
facts. 
While informed consent is an attribute of many of today’s modern web-based Apps 
and technology artefacts, ethical considerations related to providing and substantiat-
ing informed consent is considered in a modern world of technology to be inadequate, 
 outdated and limited [22]. More specifically, there are concerns that data collection 
and use practices are not clearly communicated in a responsible way to pave the way 
for informed consent [23]. In addition, current privacy policies are not clear and un-
derstandable by ordinary consumers in conveying how the collection and use of indi-
viduals’ personal information can be protected.  This problem is exacerbated in an 
interconnected world of the IoT. 
In a world of higher levels of service delivery, enabled and facilitated by increased 
collection and use of personal IoT data, the notion of informed consent is therefore a 
major concern. Indeed, prior studies indicate that users often unknowingly ‘consent’ 
to data collection and use practices of online Apps in exchange for services, while 
anecdotes from our empirical research indicate that the inclusion of value-sensitive 
design frameworks in Internet applications as a form of gaining consent is often ig-
nored or bypassed [1].  With the increasing collection and use of individuals’ personal 
information, there is therefore a need for users to be more cognizant of IoT data col-
lection and use allowing them to control these activities in a more systematic way.  
2.3 Nudges as a form of control 
Over the last few years the notion of ‘nudges’ as a form of leading or guiding individ-
uals in certain directions while also preserving their freedom of choice, has been de-
bated significantly (see, for instance [24-27]).  Nudges as a ‘soft reminder’ prompting 
users of unacceptable online behavior have been applied in different contexts e.g to 
support smokers to persevere in quitting smoking, and more recently as part of the 
Facebook web interface nudging users to more carefully consider the content and 
audience of their online disclosures [28]. Being a reminder, nudges can also serve as a 
warning or intervention that can support users in making decisions to disclose rele-
vant or more or less information. The notion of ‘reminders’ is not new, and originated 
as computer-based ‘reminder systems’ in the 90’s, specifically in the context of ambu-
latory preventative care systems.  In the medical domain reminder systems serve as 
invaluable prompts to alert medical staff to necessary interventions associated with 
treatment practices to enhance patient safety [29].  
Over time the use of computer-based reminder systems has become more main-
stream as evident from their use in the form of ‘nudges’ in other application areas 
such as appointment reminder systems associated with email, audit and feedback 
reminders systems, costs of borrowing and workflow systems that are associated with 
rule-based processing of information.  Reminders or recommendations that are in the 
form of nudges and specialized forms of nudges have emerged as a form of changing 
behavior. This form of behavioral changing has attracted considerable attention, often 
leading to concrete reforms in specific domains. Nudges exist in many different forms 
such as the sounding of alarms that call for human intervention (e.g. in the medical 
domain), or reminders in the form of animations or prompts that encourage online 
system users to interact though the entering of data or specific input device activity. 
Another form of nudging encourages users to pause and reflect prior to entering or 
posting information/content online (as in the case of Facebook [28]). Depending on 
the extent of intervention required, more interactive forms of nudging could be in the 
 form of online intelligent assistants that provide users ‘intelligent guidance or warn-
ings’ calling for (perhaps guiding) specific user actions or behavior. 
While there are deeper questions to be asked about nudges, for instance “what they 
signify and express for individuals and their capacity for autonomous and responsible 
decision-making” [26], the use of appropriate individual-centric and intelligence-
based forms of ‘nudging’ may be instrumental in guiding users to exert more control 
over the collection and use of their personal information through the IoT, as proposed 
in the next section. 
2.4 Towards intelligent warning systems 
Based on our initial study of individual perceptions of privacy and concerns about 
control over IoT data collection and use [1-2], there is a need to design appropriate 
tools that enhance or supersede traditional forms of informed consent. In our follow-
up focus groups conducted this year we were told that ‘warnings’ may be more useful 
to IoT users than further refining contract terms (especially where these are treated as 
non-negotiable). The incorporation of ‘nudges’ allowing users to define and select 
different levels of and forms of control over the legitimate collection and use of their 
IoT data is an attractive option. We therefore propose an Intelligent Warning App that 
complements IoT data collection by allowing individuals to exert control over the 
collection and use of their personal data through the IoT. To justify the development 
of such an App, we report on empirical work conducted to elicit requirements from 
users in this regard. 
3 Research methodology and findings 
3.1 Research methodology 
As precursor to defining the functional requirements of our Intelligent Warning App, 
it is worth noting our research methodology. We followed an intense requirements 
elicitation phase to get a deeper understanding of IoT data collection and use practices 
and problems. Our overall aim was to gain specific knowledge of the issues from a 
group of IoT users and software engineers involved in the development of IoT soft-
ware. We were specifically interested in concerns about privacy, data protection and 
security and wanted to hear the views of both sets of stakeholders to verify whether 
the identified problems can be tackled. 
Following ethics approval, the first stage of our study comprised 24 interviews 
with 14 IoT users and 10 IoT designers/software engineers in October 2015 to Janu-
ary 2016. Interviews were individual one-hour face-to-face interviews conducted in 
Melbourne with IoT users and experienced software engineers in the 28 to 55 year 
age group. One of the authors conducted the interviews and transcribed the audio-
recorded interview data, followed by an analysis of this data to identify key functional 
requirements. Three of the authors were involved in the data analysis to ensure trian-
gulation and agreement of the key themes that emerged from the data. We reported on 
 this study in two published papers [1] and [2], where we argued that laws needed to 
provide responsive regulation of IoT privacy/data practices, including through the 
encouragement of minimal standards of transparency and control integrated into the 
design of IoT, adopting a principle of privacy by design (a principle which is partially 
but by no means perfectly expressed through APP 1 of the Australian Privacy Princi-
ples under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), which states that APP entities should “take 
such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to implement practices, procedures 
and systems” to ensure compliance with the APPs).  
Our second stage involving 2 focus groups with 4 and 7 (total 11) users and 6 IoT 
designers/software engineers followed in April 2017. The aim at this stage was to 
confirm the veracity of the findings of our first stage before moving on to obtain a 
more refined understanding of user requirements for privacy, data protection and 
security of IoT devices and compare these with options that designers thought were 
feasible. Both focus groups were conducted on one day (one in the morning and the 
other in the afternoon), each lasting one and a half hours. All four authors were pre-
sent with two authors leading the focus groups and two authors acting as observers. 
Focus group conversations were audio-recorded and used to confirm the key themes 
in the form of functional requirements outlined in the next section. Four participants 
in our first stage participated in the stage 2 focus groups, while the other focus group 
participants were new, selected on the basis of their knowledge of/interest in privacy, 
data protection and security related to the data practices of the IoT. 
3.2 Findings 
As in the case of stage 1, a number of users said that they would like to have more 
transparency and control over their information, as one participant stated “from the 
perspective of a user you don’t actually know what data is collected by these devices 
concerning you and your habits.... cheaper, faster and smarter often means unregulat-
ed”. Users also agreed that there might be individual and cultural variations in terms 
of what information was considered particularly sensitive and how it should be treat-
ed. 
At the same time, users questioned the value of the standard term consent regimes 
that IoT systems typically employ, describing these as “extremely lengthy and full of 
legal jargon that a user does not understand” and essentially ‘click, click, click’ re-
gimes that allowed little scope for negotiation or individual variance. In particular one 
of the participants indicated that this ‘regime’ is a result of “...the design of the user 
interface and having been trained as a user – that is the user experience to click-click 
and don’t worry about the rest of it”, adding that “there is no actual conscious thought 
in the process”.  
Instead, a number of users expressed a preference for more targeted ‘warnings’ that 
would cater to particular concerns about the level of the protection and security ac-
corded to their information and would allow them choices as to how to respond. One 
software engineer indicated that “I talk about notification, about different actions you 
take within the software system. If a software engineer designs notifications into what 
are the side effects [of data collection] of whichever action I have taken within the 
 software, it will help give users awareness about the implications of what you [the 
data collector] are doing”. 
With these in mind, the next sections of this paper focus on how such warning sys-
tems might be designed and integrated into IoT devices from an architectural view, as 
well as how legal standards, for instance in Australia, might be drawn on by policy-
makers to encourage and regulate such design features to ensure they operate to en-
hance rather than constrain individual capacities for autonomous and responsible 
decision-making. 
4 Conceptual architecture of the intelligent warning app 
prototype  
Figure 1 proposes a conceptual architectural model illustrating examples of infor-
mation flows resulting from IoT data collection that the Intelligent Warning App 
should inform the user about.  This diagram illustrates three dataflow scenarios that 
will nudge the user for a form of intervention depending on users’ set-up preferences 
in respect of their data.   
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual architectural model for the intelligent warning app  
The above diagram represents a client server model with an IoT device and the Intel-
ligent Warning App’s intelligent agent (IA) that learns about a user’s privacy and data 
protection requirements as set up by the user. Initially users set up their preferred 
protection levels, for example, control settings for i) GPS location; ii) images and iii) 
data movement/transfer. An initial period of use may lead to modification of the set-
 ting-level knowledge stored by the Intelligent Warning App’s intelligent agent. The 
intelligent agent is also linked to one or more sniffers (e.g. in Figure 1 represented by 
one small black rectangle), which monitor traffic flows in a connected network with 
the consent and cooperation of the IoT service provider (who may treat this as a way 
of offering an externalised system of privacy-by-design to users and complying with 
any relevant legal obligations, for instance in the Australian case under the Privacy 
Act’s APPs – including APP 1, noted above). The next section describes three differ-
ent ‘nudging’ scenarios that the Intelligent Warning App will typically alert to the 
user. 
4.1 Description of dataflow examples that will nudge the user to either 
consent or request adaptation of control 
 Dataflow A: as set up by ‘Abigail’, the Intelligent Warning App will sense or track 
that Abigail’s fitness-monitoring IoT device which is connected to her smart 
phone, accesses her geolocation location data through the phone’s geolocation 
technology and integrates this data with her fitness IoT data in order to target local-
ized advertising about health and fitness services (in a way that if not consented to, 
may breach a local privacy or data protection law, for instance in the Australian 
case APP 2: regarding a use of sensitive health information that is not ‘directly re-
lated’ to the primary purpose for which the information was collected, and APP 7: 
direct marketing using sensitive health information).  Based on controls set up in 
the intelligent agent by the user, this activity will either inform the user or alert the 
user to possible actions that include closing the port through which the geolocation 
data flows. 
 Dataflow B: as set up by ‘Beatrice’, the Intelligent Warning App will assess 
whether images or videos of Beatrice that are collected by her security camera are 
encrypted prior to storing these on the server.  The checking of encryption is not 
limited to images and videos but can also be applied to any other type of data 
which is being sent via one or more channels from an IoT device to a server. Users 
will be aware through nudging that collected data is not encrypted as this data is 
sent out of a specific environmental boundary (in a way that again may breach a 
local privacy or data protection law, for instance in the Australian case APP 11 
which imposes an obligation on APP entities to ‘take such steps as are reasonable 
in the circumstances’ to protect personal information that they hold from misuse, 
interference, loss, unauthorized access, modification or disclosure). Once again the 
user can decide to take preventative actions to stop the flow of unencrypted data, 
for instance disconnecting the device or putting the device behind a “firewall”. 
  Dataflow C: in this scenario, as set up by ‘Chester’, the Intelligent Warning App 
makes Chester aware of voluminous data flowing through one or more channels to 
a third party server overseas (in a way that again may, if done without consent, 
breach a local privacy or data protection laws, for instance in the Australian case 
APP 8 which imposes strict standards on cross-border disclosures of personal in-
formation). Once again the Intelligent Warning App will sense or track uncon-
trolled movement. Hence the Intelligent Warning App should ‘learn’ of destina-
 tions of data and by knowing this, and the setting of user controls, nudge the user 
of any uncontrolled movement of data through specific communi-cation channels. 
The user might then formally act on this by consenting or reporting inadequate be-
havior to an appropriate regulatory entity institution (in the Australian case, the 
OAIC). 
5 Discussion 
Our recommended architecture is considered as an initial attempt to address the gaps 
in individually controlled data/information collection and use through the IoT. We 
consider the illustrated conceptual architecture in Figure 1 as the first stage towards 
developing a fully functional version of our proposed Intelligent Warning App.  We 
aim to further refine our conceptual architecture into a detailed architectural design to 
build a prototype of the App.  The next stage of this research is therefore the capturing 
of more detailed requirements to identify a complete and consistent set of functional 
and non-functional requirements to build the App and its core intelligent agent com-
ponent. More specifically, the finer details of the Intelligent Warning App’s intelli-
gent agent needs to be identified to formulate detailed design requirements of its ar-
chitecture in ways that will both utilize features of machine-learning effectively, and 
at the same time, comply with the basic legal requirements of privacy and data protec-
tion laws in multiple jurisdictions as well as broader community norms regarding the 
treatment of personal data, building these safeguards into the system, see [30]. We 
expect that a comprehensive set of semantic processing algorithms using artificial 
intelligence pattern matching techniques have to be designed as the core functionality 
of this depends on its intelligent agent component. 
6 Conclusion 
Our research in progress proposes one view of an Intelligent Warning App that draws 
on user-selected control levels and privacy principles that are aligned with Australia’s 
Privacy Act APPs to nudge users to better control the collection and use of their pri-
vate data through the IoT.  We consider the model and dataflow scenarios presented 
here the first in a series of models (e.g. process, domain classes, service performance 
and use case models) that need to be developed to illustrate different architectural 
views of the Intelligent Warning App. Once these models are developed, a prototype 
App will be designed for evaluation. 
This research is limited as it is in the early stages of conceptual design and proto-
type development and can only proceed once all functional and non-functional re-
quirements have been defined. An Agile SDLC development approach in combination 
with intelligent agent-based software design is proposed for the App development. 
Another limitation is that the actual form of nudging as a means for users to control 
the flow of their data is at this stage unspecified. User-specific requirements need to 
be elicited through further interviews and discussions with our focus group members 
 while the more nuanced aspects of the Intelligent Warning App’s design also needs to 
be developed in much more depth.  
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Abstract. This paper outlines the efforts made by Global-Regulation, a world 
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ploying machine translation to translate the world’s legislation to English and, 
(ii) creating an automated system to identify compliance clauses and extract 
penalties from legislation. This paper describes Global-Regulation’s vision and 
technology in the context of linked democracy and the democratization of arti-
ficial intelligence. 
Keywords: Machine translation, compliance, penalties, linked democracy, de-
mocratization, AI.  
1 Introduction 
There is a strong relationship between democracy and transparency [1] At the same 
time, some argue that big data will enable citizens to be governed by a data-
empowered “wise king”, who would be able to produce desired economic and social 
outcomes almost as if with a digital magic wand. [2] These trends bring to the front a 
term recently used by Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella, of democratizing AI. By mak-
ing AI available to everyone, it can move from a centralized tool, to one which can be 
used in fields such as healthcare, education, manufacturing, retail and more. The ulti-
mate aim, is sharing AI’s power with the masses, allowing anyone and everyone to 
use the AI systems they need [3]. 
This paper outlines the efforts made by Global-Regulation (www.global-
regulation.com), an online search engine of the world’s legislation, to engage artificial 
intelligence in two ways: (i) employing machine translation to translate the world’s 
legislation to English and, (ii) creating an automated system to identify compliance 
clauses and extract penalties from this legislation. These means are intended to foster 
democracy and improve regulation by enabling lessons drawing from one jurisdiction 
to the other.[4] As stated by Lloyd: “The internet collapses geography and expands 
our concept of community, yet geographic community is a cornerstone of our struc-
tures for democratic participation”[5]. 
                                                            
1 The author is a co-founder of Global-Regulation.  
 The paper starts with a background section underpinning the problem that Global-
Regulation came to solve, how the project was born, preliminary steps that were taken 
and the underlying motivation that drove this project’s co-founders to build it. The 
second section deals with the method in which artificial intelligence was used in en-
gaging machine translation on a massive scale and in the creation of the PenaltyAI 
system, designed to identify compliance clauses and extract penalties from the legisla-
tion. Finally, it concludes with what have been learned and what can and should be 
done next. 
2 Background 
According to Monson, “government services can and should be delivered as efficient-
ly and effectively as the technology you use to get a ride or order dinner”[6]. In a 
nutshell, Monson is capturing both the problem and the underlying motivation behind 
Global-Regulation. Before meeting by chance, both co-founders were running novel 
legal websites. Addison Cameron-Huff was running a website that tracks and provide 
alerts on new provincial legislation and the author was running a website that pro-
vides summaries of case studies in regulation. Joining forces enabled the co-founders 
to embark on this ambitious project creating a search engine of the world’s legisla-
tion. The co-founders did not realized at the time the scale and magnitude of this pro-
ject nor the challenges lying ahead.  
Very quickly it dawned on the co-founders that when one is offering a source that 
was never available before (e.g., Canadian academics can now read Italian legislation 
in English) one needs to convince users that it is valuable. More than once we heard 
American or Australian regulators pondering why should they look at regulations 
from Denmark, for example? ‘We are looking only at comparable jurisdictions’, they 
told us. ‘What lessons can we possibly draw from remote parts of the world?!’. It was 
academics that immediately realized the potential and started exploring the database 
with enthusiasm. And surprisingly enough, it was the tech giants Microsoft, Google 
and Amazon, that generously supported our vision. 
Global-Regulation is now the largest search engine of legislation from around the 
world, enabling comparative search of 1.6 million laws and regulations from 88 coun-
tries. Global-Regulation has employed Microsoft and Google’s machine translation 
on a massive scale translating 750,000 laws and regulations from 26 languages into 
English. By providing this information, Global-Regulation unlocks the global village 
vision in law by automating database translation. To support its vision, it employs 
cloud based technology powered by Amazon to gather, index and standardize legisla-
tion from different countries across the globe. The challenge Global-Regulation faced 
was twofold: how to deal with laws in different languages that are coming from dif-
ferent legal systems. 
  
 3 Machine Translation 
Initially, Global-Regulation connected to each country’s official government website 
and uploaded the legislation to its database. This process did not enable the inclusion 
of legislation in foreign languages. Dealing with this challenge has bearing not only 
on commercial aspects, but also on Global-Regulation’s founders’ vision, to have the 
entire world’s legislation searchable, in English, in one place. 
The importance of this vision cannot be overstated, mainly for developing econo-
mies with unique regulatory structure interested in drawing in external investment on 
the one hand, and making their legal system transparent to its citizens, on the other. 
Making legislation transparent, accessible and searchable, especially on a comparative 
basis, is one of the cornerstones of democracy and a task made possible on this scale 
only due to recently mature technology, advances in artificial intelligence, and gov-
ernments making laws available online. 
The process of machine translation for laws is as follows: 
 
1. Index the laws in the original language and track which language the law is 
in (in some countries laws are published in several languages) 
2. Download the laws in the original language. 
3. Convert laws to “plaintext” (from HTML, XML, PDFs, etc.), where plaintext 
means UTF-8-encoded plain text files. 
4. Format the plaintext so that items like headers, footers, and extra non-legal 
information is removed. Attempt to normalize line endings (especially im-
portant for PDF conversions which have odd formatting issues).  
5. Break the plaintext into pieces that can be handled by machine translation 
systems (which generally have a size limit) using logical break points such 
as line endings. Also translate the title of the law. 
6. Convert each piece into English then stitch the English version together us-
ing the breakpoint identified in the previous step. 
7. Store the translated law and the original law in the database. 
8. As machine translation models for languages improve, periodically re-
translate the laws and store them in the database. 
4 PenaltyAI 
Following the use of machine translation, Global-Regulation have taken a step further 
in order to use its huge database of world laws along with the advanced capabilities of 
artificial intelligence. This step involved the development of a system (called ‘Penal-
tyAI’) to identify compliance clauses in legislation and extract the actual penalties 
from these clauses, and convert it to US dollars (if needed). This ambition to create 
the ultimate risk and compliance system came into life when Global-Regulation’s 
 founders realized that penalties are the kind of information that can be identified with 
a high degree of certainty by an artificially intelligent system [7]. 
After seemingly endless testing, experimenting, coding, consulting2 and hard work, 
Global-Regulation presented its Search3 – the first and only AI system that identify 
compliance clauses in legislation on a global scale, extracts the actual penalties 
amount and serves it all to the user in US dollars. See two examples in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. 
 Fig. 1. PenaltyAI search results for ‘tobacco nicotine’ (Source: www.Global-Regulation.com) 
 
This approach offers advantages at several levels: 
 
• Provides an AI system that can read legal text and produce useful meaning;  
• Enables risk and compliance professionals to explore real and relevant data on a 
global scale, in English;  
• Allows governments and businesses to assess and enhance their compliance ef-
forts;  
• For researchers, it assists in comparing and contrasting risk and compliance data 
globally;  
• Perhaps most importantly, it is a first step in enabling the public to have a transpar-
ent and informed access to regulatory compliance hence an enhancement of de-
mocracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Thanks to Kyle Gorman from Google for the words to numbers converter recommendation. 
3 https://www.global-regulation.com/penalty_ai.php 
  Fig. 2. PenaltyAI search results for ‘nuclear test ban’ (Source: www.Global-Regulation.com) 
 
The “PenaltyAI Search” can answer questions like “What would I pay for violating 
money laundering laws in Jamaica?” or “How much would a smuggler who ware-
houses stolen goods in China pay if they’re caught?” 
The penalties are extracted by an offline algorithm that runs on an Azure Virtual 
Machine that performs the following steps: 
 
1. Find laws that mention keywords associated with civil penalties (as a first 
pass); 
2. Convert all word numbers (like “one million”) into international number 
format (“1,000,000.00”); 
3. Identify the paragraphs that likely contain civil penalties based on words and 
numbers; 
4. Merge several penalties into one, whether they related to the same “clause” 
(section) of a law; 
5. Extract all the clauses and penalties; 
6. Exclude certain classes of text that are almost never penalties but look like 
penalties (such as laws about gold coins and section references in laws that 
have to do with money); 
7. Recognize currencies in text, and combine this data with our table of national 
currencies, and convert penalties into USD using Yahoo! Finance rates 
(through the XML API call); 
8. Store the penalties and clauses in a MySQL database (RDS) (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Screenshot of one of the MySQL tables for penalties (Source: www.Global-
Regulation.com) 
 
After following the said steps, the system then note in its search instance whether or 
not a law has penalties attached to it, so that the search instance can filter by laws that 
have penalties (as opposed to Global-Regulation’s regular search that includes laws 
that don’t have explicit fines attached to them). This process is run as a batch job 
offline because 1.6 million laws takes several hours to process.   
When a user does a search, the search is first sent to Global-Regulation’s Elas-
ticsearch instance, and then the penalties are looked up from the MySQL database 
afterwards. This allows full-text search of laws to be combined with penalties, and in 
a way that results in much less strain on Global-Regulation’s relational database (be-
cause penalties are looked up by IDs rather than a JOIN). Storing the penalties sepa-
rately allows to reduce the amount of data in the in-memory search instance, and de-
couples the services (since Global-Regulation have other types of search like tech-
nical standards and law analytics). See Figure 4 for the overall global penalties sum-
mary. 
 
  
 Fig. 4. Visualization of penalties for non-compliance (Source: www.Global-Regulation.com) 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Global-Regulation enhances linked democracy by using state of the art artificial intel-
ligence technology to provide the world’s legislation in English. Furthermore, Global-
Regulation provides an advance system to extract compliance clauses and penalties 
from this legislation. Furthermore, Global-Regulation builds on the democratization 
of artificial intelligence and Microsoft’s generous support to bring the benefits of 
technology in general and AI in specific, for the advantage of the public. 
What could only be a dream few years ago, has turned with Global-Regulation’s 
vision and advanced technology into an innovative tool of global democracy, now 
used by leading academic institutions and governments around the world. Going for-
ward we look to expand this democratising tool in a way that will enable every citizen 
of the world to ask for her legal rights and responsibilities in her country of choice, 
based on this database of world laws and receive a reply, completely automated, with 
a click of a mouse. 
We have learned that combining big data - the world laws, with advanced artificial 
intelligence, creates fertile ground for endless opportunities in the realm of bringing 
the law to the people and bridging the gap between society’s bricks (laws) and its 
citizens. Yet the main challenge going ahead is twofold: how to use the technology in 
 a way that will be understandable, intuitive and friendly to people; and, perhaps more 
importantly, how to explain to users around the world, that Global-Regulation is a key 
to linked democracy. 
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Abstract. Wider access or “democratisation” of technology emerges as one of 
the most powerful force of change in the way we think, learn, exchange infor-
mation and knowledge, and most importantly, in inspiring new ways to effect 
social change. In this paper, I will discuss that the advancements and emerging 
efficiencies in AI and technology has not democratised access to legal infor-
mation. I argue that the innovation in technology has primarily been driven by 
private sector, to the detriment of the community at large. 
Keywords: Innovation, emerging technology, legal publishing, equal access, 
open access to information, open access to technology, community-based out-
comes.  
1 Introduction 
A normative, rational dialogue on democracy typically begins with Rousseau’s defini-
tion that the state represents the will of the people through commonly agreed instru-
ments and procedures.
 
Terms such as “popularly elected” government, representa-
tives, and “social contract” spring to mind (Rosseau 1767). In a simpler world then, if 
one posits that the developments in artificial intelligence and emerging technology 
serves to enhance exchange of information and ideas, break down geographical barri-
ers and improve the human condition in general, then the reasonable (if not sanguine) 
assumption is then that a well-connected citizen can easily access and connect with 
information which enables the citizen to access public and legal information. 
For this paper, I will discuss how access to the Internet does not necessarily mean 
equal access to justice, in the context of legal information; that the benefits from 
AI/technology innovation has been consistently usurped by market interests. I con-
clude with identifying that the cooperation and collaboration between private-public 
forces as the way forward in re-imagining equal access to the Internet and justice-
related content.
1
 
                                                          
1 I will be referring to artificial intelligence and technology inter-changeably. In this cluster, I 
am not differentiating between automation, process creation, big data mining, data analytics 
 2 Context and a Reasonable Person’s Self-litigating Journey  
Let me start this discussion with a context. In Australia, a person’s most common 
pathway to justice is when law or regulation is being observed, as exemplified as 
applying for a passport or paying a speeding ticket, or even more mundane activities 
like getting married or registering a land title.
2
  
I would like the reader to consider the following scenario:
3
 you are enjoying a quiet 
picnic alone in the NSW bush land. Whilst enjoying your book, you hear a rustle 
ahead of you.  You spot a fox pup, which seemed to be in distress. You sit and ob-
serve: not knowing what to do, for an excruciatingly long time. You tell yourself that 
you would wait for the pup’s mother to arrive and you would leave when she does. 
That moment never arrives. The pup seems to be limping towards you and making 
horrible noises. You make the decision to take it to the nearest police station to seek 
help. You and your new companion, now warmly swaddled in your shirt in the pas-
senger seat, are racing down the highway to the nearest police station. You are being 
guided by Google Maps, from the iPhone resting on your lap. A patrol car appears 
behind you, with sirens blaring. 
You both stop at the shoulder of this highway. The police officer asks, “Do you 
know how fast you are going?” You nervously answer that you are speeding as you 
have an injured fox pup in your vehicle. By saying this, you have just admitted break-
ing the law. The police officer notices the iPhone on your lap and that you are shirt-
less, both of which are summary offences. He then proceeds to inform that you are 
knowingly transporting a game animal without a permit in your vehicle. 
4
 In a short 
span of time, you have just broken four different laws. The police officer, being the 
enforcer of black-letter law, issues you four tickets. One week later, you receive a 
Court Appearance Notice tor a CAN, to answer for your alleged “crimes”. Until this 
moment, you have never broken any laws or even considered breaking any laws. The 
most mundane infraction you have ever committed is jaywalking in the city, which 
also happens to be a summary offence in NSW. 
You decide to self-represent yourself in Court. After all, you did not knowingly 
broken any laws, you did not hurt anyone and no property was stolen. You are a vic-
tim of circumstances. You are confident that the officer of the Court would consider 
this matter with discretion. But to answer the charges in Court, you will have to form 
a plea or counter-claim against the summons from the State. Whilst you have not 
broken any aspects of private law, you have breached four separate public laws; laws, 
                                                          
and so forth. I will be using the over-arching concept of artificial intelligence and emerging 
technology as a development in the field of computer science, created by humans to effect 
efficiency, intelligent collaboration and waste reduction. 
2 S7 of the Australian Passport Act 2005 (Cth), Part 5.2 of the Road Transport Act 2013 
(NSW), Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). 
3 Some of the material facts of the case are derived from a matter dismissed by the presiding 
district court judge in Sydney on 6 September 2016. 
4 Rule 300 of Australian Road Rules 1999 (Cth), Part 5.2 of the Road Transport Act 2013 
(NSW), s5 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) and s3 of the Rural Lands Protection 
Act 1998 (NSW). 
 which universally apply to every single person in NSW. As almost all government 
information is available online combined with a plethora of free material in the Inter-
net, you are certain that you would be able to build your own argument. After all, you 
live in a free, democratic society with unfettered access to information. 
As a non-legally trained individual, you invariably commence to locate court forms 
and procedures from the Court website and other non-profit sites which offer such 
templates. You perform searches
5
 in Google to find out about your numerous offenc-
es. Thanks to Google’s predictive text searching and pattern recognitions, you are 
able to locate what actual laws have been breached. You may even locate the legisla-
tive instruments and regulations, which detail the laws you have allegedly broken.
6
 
Your persistence and a stroke of luck may even direct you to types of remedies you 
are entitled to. Armed with this knowledge, you might like to find out if there are any 
cases in NSW or in wider Australia, which resemble your situation so as to assist in 
the building of your argument.  Your searches, again operating with newspaper arti-
cles, opinion pieces, newsletters from law firms which specialize in traffic offences, 
and plenty more. There is a plethora of information: all of which seems to offer con-
flicting information. All that information, free and available: the dilemma is, which 
lot of information is credible and authorised for your day in court? 
Suppose then, that this exact scenario is presented to a legal practitioner. This prac-
titioner will review the legal issues and commence research to identify the rights of 
the clients and possible remedies. The research typically commences with Google, 
followed by any number of wikis, blogs, metasites and sites created by private and 
government entities. The practitioner, may even consult a specialist site and do re-
search in a paid legal research platform like LexisNexis to locate commentaries. 
Although we have the same scenario and juxtapose circumstance, the objective of 
this imagined journey is to understand this: how does an ordinary person access the 
legal information, which a person is entitled to in an open society? In simpler, terms, 
how does an ordinary person gain access to the justice system? And the question per-
tinent to this discussion is this: if technology is supposed to increase access to infor-
mation, how is it the person in the first example above being disadvantaged? 
3 The Internet and Accessing Legal Information Online: 
Themes 
The examples illustrated in the previous section is not meant to trivialise the legal 
education and training that law students, and indeed legal practitioners who undertake 
years of studies to achieve their standing. Rather, it is a critique that the rule of law in 
its purest sense, does not seem to be served by the leaps in AI/ emerging technology. 
This observation is not unique to Australian. The fastest way in which any citizen 
would access “law” or the written word of law is to go online and search for infor-
                                                          
5 Free test searches which typically contain the queries or and not limited to  “is it ..” or “what 
is …” or “how is ..” 
6 See www.legislation.nsw.gov.au 
 mation. In Australia, the state has been not only been providing and maintaining in-
formation for public consumption, but also by observing appropriate Creative Com-
mons arrangement, thus enabling private citizens to reproduce and republish the in-
formation. To the best of its capacity, the Australian government (local, state and 
Federal levels) have attempted to meet its social contract with the community. How-
ever, the community stands to lose when the state is not pro-active and pragmatic in 
creating and maintaining tangible community outcomes when it comes to re-
publication and reproduction of legal information: outcomes which include innovative 
consumption methods, value-added ‘next-gen’ apps and tools that would greatly en-
hance the experience in accessing legal information. 
Azyndar et al. (2015:285) highlight that emerging online “next-gen” tools not only 
improves digital literacy, but it paves the way to the greater debate on how legal in-
formation can be ethically used and shared. They believe that the changing landscape 
of the legal publishing industry and indeed the legal profession in the US shows 
growing reception to smaller legal publishers: agile legal technology start-ups, adding 
value to public information and making value-added content available at affordable 
pricing models. Examples of such start-ups or ‘disruptive legal technology’ players in 
the US include Ravel Law,7 Casetext and FastCase.
8
 Azyndar et al. (2015) argue that 
the disruptors’ entry into the legal publishing market pose significant changes in the 
legal profession itself: in the manner in which legal content is exposed to students to 
the evolution of new consumption and research patterns within the profession. More 
so, Azyndar et al. argue that the disruptors’ involvement in the legal publishing mar-
ket will pave the way towards a more equitable and affordable access model for the 
community at large. 
The proposition that disruptive technology democratises the legal profession is also 
put forward by Yoon (2016). His article argues that emerging technology in access to 
legal information provides dual benefits: on one hand, it promotes greater access to 
legal information for ordinary citizens. On the other, enhancements in technology 
mean that lawyers can now discard the old economic model of practicing law, and 
begin to serve the rule of law in a more transparent, less routinized manner. In Yoon’s 
                                                          
7 Ravel Law was purchased by LexisNexis on 10 June 2017:  a sale rumoured to be in the vicin-
ity of U$20 million. See Venture backed Ravel Law sells to Lexis Nexis” in 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/10/venture-backed-ravel-law-sells-to-lexisnexis/, published 10 
June 2017, accessed 12 July 2017 
8 Ravel Law (www.ravellaw.com) was founded by two law graduates from Stanford Law 
School in 2012, was one of the first, affordable legal content provider which models provides 
data analytics for the profession. CaseText (www.casetext.com) on the other hand, is case and 
legislation look-up service, founded by a litigator who found the legal publishing paradigm 
unaffordable and old-fashioned. CaseText received crowd funding from the legal community 
and raised U$7 million in 2015(see https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/03/legal-tech-startup-
casetext-raises-7-million-series-a-round-led-by-union-square-ventures/). FastCase 
(www.fastcase.com) was founded in 2008 by a solicitor who found the cost  to access legal 
materials prohibitive. All three legal techs, as they identify themselves offer free-to-air infor-
mation available to members of public and an affordable pricing structure to encourage access 
to justice. 
 words, the legal profession returns to one, which serves the rule of law and the ideals 
of justice, and is no longer a luxury reserved for the wealthy (Yoon 2016: 66). 
The self-litigating context that I laid out above, combined with Azyndar et al. and 
Yoon’s propositions, reveal three themes that encapsulate the theme of this paper. 
Firstly, generally speaking, access to the Internet is affordable and has become in-
creasingly easier. With Google as the first port of call, an ordinary citizen can pretty 
much conduct some form of legal research. There is no challenge or issue in entering 
the Internet in a liberal democratic country such as Australia (Cann 1989: 1168). Sec-
ondly, emerging technology and ease in which sites can be created means that whilst 
there is no shortage of legal information, forms, opinions, and blogs, there is no way 
to ascertain the currency and credibility of the sites. The Internet remains an unregu-
lated sphere, powered by private interests and the adage that “In the web, no one 
knows you are a dog” rings true for the parties who consume, and the parties who 
produce or reproduce content (Christopherson 2007: 3038-56).
 
And finally, which is 
corollary of the second point, that meaningful and useful information is often trapped 
behind an unaffordable pay wall. This highlights the dilemma: for all the easy and fast 
access to technology and information --- open access to legal information specifically, 
remains a myth. I will expand on these three points in the following sections. 
4 Access to Internet and Unequal Access to Content 
The normative argument reads that ubiquitous connectivity fosters faster exchange of 
ideas and easier access to information. And in turn, that the advancements as experi-
enced in the Internet should lead to easier access to justice-related content. Various 
writers have argued that the reality remains that there is unequal access to the Internet 
and therefore, unequal access to content, meaningful content that is. 
This view is argued by Cedar-Silva (2013: 17) when he posits that the Internet is a 
contradiction in praxis:
 
on one hand, the advances and plurality of technology enables 
ease of entry to the Internet, on the other, the advancements have meant that private 
interests are gaining efficiency in finding newer, creative ways to monetise and even 
create higher barriers to access.  This contradiction reflects the sentiment of Vin Cerf 
(2012) who maintains that the Internet is an enabler of rights, may those rights to be 
enforced by private or public interests. 
Expanding Cedar-Silva’s proposition, Lloyd (2001: 505) argues that unequal ac-
cess to information or ‘digital literacy divide’ is at the core a socio-economic issue: 
that decreasing price of connectivity does not present equal opportunity to crucial 
social information, if the citizenry is still hampered by demographic, geographic and 
socio-economic factors.
 
It is this socio-economic factor, which amplifies access ine-
quality: that access to information and more specifically legal information is facilitat-
ed by the ability to pay. The implications for this passivity is chilling: that we as citi-
zens and the elected government, are wittingly and willingly surrendering public in-
formation to market forces and allowing these forces to drive the innovation and 
modernization of public information.
 
If the interests of the private sector drives inno-
 vation and content modernisation, then that means access to public information is 
reduced to a marketplace. 
Cedar-Silva’s contradiction is similarly observed by Perez (2013: 61-63), who ar-
gues that the success of the Internet is attributed to its democratic environment, pow-
ered by a combination of private-public interests intent to learn and create new ways 
of learning, production and consumption. Perez observes that as soon as an initiative 
is centrally coordinated or institutionalized, the creative process, consultation and 
civic focus is lost. Like Cedar-Silva, Perez argues that the Internet largely remains a 
private sector environment and the private interests will always be financially driven.  
5 Innovation and the Commons 
Innovation, especially in the field of AI/technology represents new opportunities for 
private sector to become more competitive and consumer focused, as well as enabling 
public sector to serve community needs in more efficient ways (Cann 1989: 1167). 
Innovation should mean the expansion of consumer choice and challenging the status 
quo of the commercial and public sector. However, if the rewards of innovation are 
not harmonized with the community at large, the drive for innovation will be to 
achieve financial gains. Cann (1989: 1168) argues that there is lack of recognition that 
innovation is predominantly driven by “parochial self-interest”. He argues that it is 
flawed not to evaluate innovation in a more holistic manner: that is, harmonising the 
benefits of innovation for the community at large and the private sector.  In the free 
market, states are reluctant to introduce protectionist policies to emerging technology 
(legal or otherwise) as it is seen to be paternalistic and stifling competition. It is in this 
climate that the private sector has the discipline and motivation to excel and bring 
forth the best of breed. 
Add to the mix is the emerging trend of grass-root innovation. Growing interest 
and the low cost of entry to create online presence has witnessed innovative online 
tools created by private individuals. Specific to the Australian legal industry, the In-
ternet is host to a plethora of independent websites. This demonstrates that the con-
versation has moved from “who has a right to internet” to “who has a right to legal 
content”. To my point of changing consumption patterns, for the first time in a long 
time, New Zealand Law Reports, United Kingdom Reports, Victorian Reports and 
NSW Law Reports are all now available in pay-per-view format at affordable A$15 to 
A$25 per Case. These Reports are still available in an enterprise subscription format, 
but the availability of these Reports at this competitive rates indicate that the stake-
holders in the Courts and Law Reporting Councils recognise the inevitably of change 
in the profession brought on by emerging technology and AI. In the last 3 years, the 
Australian and UK Law Report Councils demonstrated courage and commitment to 
positive social outcomes in creating and pioneering new consumption patterns apro-
pos to the changing milieu. 
Again, referring to the legal publishing industry, the private sector which used to 
and to an extent, still holds a monopoly on innovation, is now faced with growing 
competition from smaller, more agile independent players, a majority of them private 
 individuals, who are able to create more agile ways of production, consumption and 
collaboration. The implication of this shift is simple yet powerful: the conversation 
about the benefits of innovation should now encompass the private sector, the private 
citizen and the government sector in a collaborative, reciprocal manner.  The era of 
top-down monetization and consumption approach is rapidly losing its hold. The 
technological advances in connectivity mean that the dialogue about access to content 
is a tripartite conversation (Lloyd 2001: 505). The way in which we can translate 
innovation into improving social realities is one when the Internet is driven and ad-
vised by “participation of local stakeholders with a global reach in mind” (Cedar-
Silva 2013: 26). 
6 The Right to Internet as a Human Right? 
The nature of the Internet is also its key success factor: that it is freehold, and that it 
crosses boundaries.  It is this very characteristic, which makes the Internet, a prime 
post-modern means to improve social reality on a local and global level. No country 
on earth currently protects ‘the right to the Internet’. No state or commercial entity 
can enforce his or her sovereign or private rights online, aside from the innocuous 
monetised enforcement. As such, the right to Internet is highly dependent on the level 
of development and democratic freedom in a specific country. This goes back to my 
earlier argument that whilst access to the Internet is fairly affordable, it is the equal 
access to content remains dubious. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights can possibly be used as a global covenant to safeguard this ‘right 
to access’. More significantly for this discussion, Article 19 entrenches the freedom 
not only of access but also to 
 
“…to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regard-
less of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”  (Land 2013: 393) (author’s em-
phasis). 
 
Although Article 19 does not guarantee a right to be online, it does provide a 
framework on how the government, private sector and private individuals can work to 
maintain this freedom. Land recommends the reading of Article 19 by recognising 
that the technology underlying the content, serves as “framing device” to enable 
choices to be made. That the Internet as an enabler of rights, is made possible through 
efficient architecture designing, easier to learn coding skills, increased open source 
standards and most importantly, a growing number of cross-border of grass-roots 
movements who collaborate to effect social change locally and globally (Land ibid, 
395). I draw on the examples of the Arab spring revolution that was galvanized 
through Facebook and the resourcefulness of local activists in China who expose state 
censorship using other online mediums, as Facebook is banned (Cedar Silva 2013, 
17). 
 How do the competing stakeholders in the online environment balance the public 
and private sector’s interest to pursue optimum return on investment, in light of main-
taining an entrenched freedom of access and freedom to access content in the format 
of choice? To this point, I ask the question: does that mean the traditional practice of 
placing key legal information behind an unaffordable pay wall, poses as a possible 
breach Article 19? 
7 Public and Private Interest serving to Democratise Access to 
Technology and Access to Content 
In light of the dire diagnosis of innovation and benefits of technology, is the common 
person doomed to be the last adopters of due to high barrier to entry? As cheaper 
access to Internet feeds the growth in self-taught programmers and grass-roots’ sites, 
it is realistic to utilise a neocorporatist model in engaging the three parties in the dia-
logue on democratising access to technology and access to content (Barton 2015: 
542). Without diverging from our discussion, it is important to remind ourselves that 
the neocorporatist or liberal corporatist approach describes how the socio-economic 
policies of a society is brought about through the engagement of private sector, pri-
vate individuals and the government through consultation, cooperation and establish-
ment of common benchmarks, protocols and outcomes (Preminger 2017: 85-99). This 
may seem idealistic, but this approach will mean that every stakeholder level not only 
has a say but has an obligation to effect a change in the commons: may it be in en-
forcing civic rights or pursuing commercial pragmatism. If the public sector and pri-
vate citizens remain a passive voice in ‘netizenship’ then the paradigm will always be 
one, which prioritises commercial interest. (ibid: 90). 
I do not suggest that in order to reclaim the Internet as a civic commons, one need 
to embark on radicalized movements as exemplified by anti-globalised movements. 
Rather, it is a dialogue towards establishing tripartite protocols involving the nomen-
clature from all sides to enable improved access to the Internet and access to content 
(Waters 2004: 854-874). The following are my proposed re-imagining on democratiz-
ing access and access to content, in the context of legal information. 
7.1 Sustainability and maintaining the quality of independent sites:   
Returning to the ‘fox pup’ scenario and access to legal information in Australia, con-
tent is predominantly found in government sites as well as commercial online sites 
maintained by LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters and Wolters Kluwer. For the members 
of public, legal content can be sourced from the publicly funded, non-profit met site 
AustLII, JADE a crowd-sourced, freemium legal site and a plethora of other smaller 
self-publishing non-profit sites. Irrespective of the public-private nature of the sites, 
all raw data is sourced free-of-charge from the state.  
The breakthrough in publishing technologies and e-business innovation as pro-
duced by the commercial publishers are hidden behind paywalls. It is ironic that the 
innovation based on data sourced from the state; yet the state does not benefit from 
 this data exchange. In fact, consider the millions of dollars which have to be spent on 
legal publishers by the State Department of Justice annually to subscribe to reports, 
case law and legislation.  
In the absence of any publishing protocol or regulation, the ‘revolution’ of the 
smaller, online publishers take form: some for altruistic reasons, some for commercial 
reasons.
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 The unaffordability of the commercial legal publishers and low cost to data 
parsing has witnessed a demand (and support) for smaller publishers. In Australia, an 
increasing number of practitioners (and non practitioners) are turning to AustLII and 
JADE. These two online publishers, one a donation-based metasite and another 
crowd-sourced funded site, are constantly monitored by Judgment Offices for accura-
cy, currency and quality. This leaves a gap in maintaining such standards in the com-
mons. In the absence of a coherent policy or republishing protocol, the relevance of 
sites who self-publish are defined by their own purpose. A donation-based site is be-
hoven to foundational funds, a crowd-sourced organisation can only grow as fast as 
the crowd-funding metrics and a privately funded site will only last as long as the 
entrepreneurial drive is sustained (Cay Johnston 2006: 65) There is an imperative to 
create a set of republishing standards which maintains accuracy, quality, currency, 
access and technology knowledge exchange. 
7.2 Community-based consultation, outcomes and benchmarks 
The raison d’être of the private sector is to monetize and increase shareholder value. 
This is predominantly done through identifying innovative ways to produce and con-
sume.
 
The public sector does not hold this reason: its primary reason of being is to 
serve the community. The public sector is not expected to be agile.  So, in the context 
of legal publishing, how can the community at large benefit from any publishing 
agility or innovation? As there is no reciprocal technology transfer protocol between 
private sector and the government, the state is literally giving away the family jewels 
to the private sector in the absence of community consultation.  I propose that in this 
context, that the community is informed on the manner in which legal information is 
harvested from the government sites, the manner in which they are republished and 
commercialised, and the effected ‘returns’ to the community. Private citizens have a 
right to know how their taxes are being used to inadvertently fund private innovation, 
and have a say on how this can benefit the community. 
Further to this, the public sector can no longer rely on the private sector to realize 
change but it must actively engage with smaller entities to create a monetization, 
commercialization outcomes and reproduction policy, which provides equal playing 
field for all. 
                                                          
9 In 2012, US legal tech start-ups or disruptive legal technology providers raised over U$60 
million and 2013 witnessed a growth of $458mil. This figure started to decline as cost of 
programming and cloud computing become more affordable, as reported by Joshua Kubicki, 
2013 Was a Big Year for Legal Startups; 2014 Could Be Bigger in Tech Cocktail (Feb. 14, 
2014, 12:07 PM), http://tech.co/2013-big-year-legal-startups-2014-bigger- 2014-02,  
 An example of successful and profitable private-public sector collaboration is the 
arrangement between CanLII, metasite similar to AustLII based in Canada. CanLII’s 
content is powered by Lexum, legal technology provider based in Montreal which 
created a 'freemium' model to law reports in Canada. This site is not funded by dona-
tions, rather through a combination of funds raised by law societies and the members 
of the Canadian bar. Lexum similarly collaborates with other disruptive legal technol-
ogy players and from an overseas standpoint, seems to co-fund the metasite through 
innovation-transfer.
10
 
7.3 Platform agnostic and blockchain transactions 
Blockchain, in the simplest terms, is a system of recording digital transactions: from 
financial records to how many times a PDF was downloaded from a monetised infor-
mation website.
11
 The underlying structure of the blockchain reveals a network of 
distributed databases capable of reconciling transactions. Consider the legal publish-
ing world: a new paradigm in which the user does not have to subscribe to any plat-
form but is still able to purchase and access content from across a myriad of plat-
forms. The user does not have to consider currency or inventory exchange or how 
bills are issued. The user simply searches and purchases content at the end, and the 
transaction is reconciled. The user receives a bill on the frequency required i.e. 
monthly or quarterly, and the publishers of the content are monetised as soon as the 
purchase takes place.
12
  
The key to blockchain resembles the milieu that I referred to earlier: that it operates 
in publishing protocols and standards agreed to by the private-public and community. 
The hard question remains: despite the growing trend towards platform agnosticism 
and Google-pendency, no commercial legal publisher of content would allow federat-
ed searches to cross their pay walls. All publishers, legal and commercial believe in 
the superiority of their content and the expensive, unaffordable and bewildering pric-
ing structures reflect this perceived superiority. The lack of collaboration between 
publishers also reflects their fear of losing market hegemony and the disappearance of 
smaller disruptors gobbled up by capital (Gallacher 2009: 8-10). Thus, returning us to 
the debate of unequal access to content despite equal access to the Internet. 
                                                          
10 https://lexum.com/en/ accessed 19 July 2017 
11 Definition of blockchain from https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/ 
and “What is Blockchain” from http://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-
technology/, accessed 19 July 2017 
12 At the time of writing, the Consolidated Councils of Law Report in Australia, LexisNexis, 
ThomsonReuters and JADE have agreed to an interlinking protocol which enables a user to link 
from one platform to another. This groundbreaking protocol represents the judicial and practi-
tioner recognition of enabling equal access to content, and is the first concerted step in private-
public collaboration. Aside from JADE, none of the legal publishers have opened this option to 
their customer base. AustLII and Wolters Kluwer have declined to participate in the undertak-
ing of this protocol. 
 
 8 Conclusion 
The innovation and development in AI/technology and indeed the cheaper access to 
the online environment has not provided ‘netizens’ with equitable access to legal 
information. The ‘netizenry’ remains a disgruntled yet passive voice, happy to grouse 
that the state is failing its responsibility in sustaining and maintaining equal oppor-
tunity to technology and content, but also unwilling to be involved in effecting 
change.  The paradoxical paradigm of cheaper access to the Internet and equitable 
access to legal information can only be addressed if the three major parties in this 
environment recognise the importance of each other’s role and obligation in fostering 
innovation and equitable access. The private citizens, by being silent and passive on 
the commodification of public information is as culpable as the state in eroding basic 
human rights. The private sector, unimpeded by government policy or community-
based protocols will continue to pursue monetization objectives. To close, consider a 
quote from Lloyd (2001) who said, “We must understand that the digital divide, like 
the justice divide, is a political divide”.  
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